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THE RIGHT OF WAY: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING OF SELECTED
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS
Abstract
One of the central goals of current education reform in this country has been to
equalize learning opportunities and outcomes for all groups of children, including and
especially those groups previously marginalized. With federal education reform
mandates of the early twenty-first century, the work of schools is rigidly evaluated on
evidence of achievement - not simply evidence of good processes and intentions. This
high-stakes demand for universal achievement has brought several ethical aspects of
school leadership, including distribution of resources and equality of educational
opportunity, sharply into focus.
The subject of ethics in school administration has only recently been attended to
by researchers (Beck & Murphy, 1994). Prior to 1990, most of the research regarding the
school principalship was of a positivist, technical nature. In this study, I engaged in
phenomenological inquiry because I was interested in learning about the lived
experiences of the selected participants as they were engaged in a single phenomenon -
decision-making when faced with an ethical dilemma in their principalship. Clark
Moustakas' (1994) model of transcendental phenomenology will provided the basis of
the research design.

The purpose of this study was to explore and describe individual principals'
experiences of ethical decision-making in a complex era. I presumed that most school
principals would have a vivid memory of an experience when they were forced to make a
"tough decision" - one that challenged them to take a position in spite of competing and
deeply felt moral values. Ethical dilemma, in this case, was the term used to describe an
event which calls for a decision to be made when moral values or ethical principles were
in conflict. I was interested to know how they encountered this dilemma, what they
thought and how they felt about it, what values they brought to bear, what advice they
sought and from whom, how they resolved the dilemma, and what effect the experience
had on their own leadership.
Turmoil stemmed from what these principals experienced as a conflict of duties.
Consistent with the conclusions of prior studies, I found that the most vexing ethical
dilemmas reported by these principals involved imposing sanctions for staff (primarily)
and students (secondarily). In three cases the issue was dismissal for underperformance.
In two cases the issue was communicating dissatisfaction with teacher performance,
either verbally or through the formal evaluation process. In two cases the issue was
student discipline, specifically the determination of appropriate consequences for
misbehavior. Two cases were unique in that they didn't fall into these categories, but
were illustrative of how inner conflict arises when one is duty-bound to present a stance
that runs counter to one's authentic self These reported ethical dilemmas could be
located within one or more of the following paradoxes: Justice versus mercy, conflict
within the ethic of the profession (as described by Shapiro & Stefkovich, 2001), and
personal code versus professional code.

Several other themes emerged from the data. First, nearly all these principals
reported being strongly influenced by the impact their decisions would have on their
school community, especially the staff. Second, many of these principals were able to
speak positively about their experiences, believing that their struggles resulted in refined
leadership skills. Third, the experiences of these principals underscored the need for
support from the superintendent and other central office personnel when difficult
decisions had to be made. Finally, all of these principals' stories ended with a positive
ending, with the principals' claim that they were comfortable with their decision-making
and their belief that they did the right thing. Any negative feelings, such as fear or doubt,
were not reported, leaving me to believe that these principals were not comfortable
discussing them, even in a confidential setting with a researcher unconnected to their
school systems. This points to the need for a support network where school principals
can feel comfortable raising thorny ethical issues, and where private doubts and fears can
addressed with candor.
I hope that this study of these school principals' ethical decision-making will
contribute to the current knowledge base of the role of the school principal, with
implications for principal preparation programs, professional development of current and
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THE RIGHT OF WAY
Introduction
My father recently described to me how I was as a child. He said I reminded him
of a person who was hit by a car as she crossed the street. As they took her away in an
ambulance, bruised and bleeding but conscious, she was asked why she didn't look both
ways before crossing the street. She indignantly replied, "Because I had the right of
way!"
Years later, as an elementary school principal in pursuit of a doctoral degree, I
find myself steeped in the study of ethics. I have come to see this dogged determinism
toward adherence to principle as the kind of blind, impartial sense ofjustice of which
Immanuel Kant would be proud. My concern about ethics in school administration is
borne of a genuine desire to do right by the children who attend my school, a sentiment
which I am guessing is shared by most, if not all, school principals. In a context of
intensifying accountability, conflicting demands by school community constituencies,
thinly stretched resources, a personal appreciation for ihe vulnerability of children
compelled to attend school, and a desire to offer latitude and empowerment to a talented
teaching staff, however, the right way is not always obvious to me.
In my research and study, I hoped to gain a broader and deeper understanding of
ethical dilemmas as they have been presented to other elementary school principals. In a
broad sense, I hoped to learn about the nature of these dilemmas. Were they primarily a
reflection of current tensions over accountability and achievement as measured by
standardized tests? Or did they possess a timeless quality, echoing the trials and

struggles of public education over the years? Was there a pattern, or did individual
school principals experience moral struggles over diverse phenomena? In a deep sense, I
hoped to describe in rich, textured detail how several elementary school principals
experienced the phenomenon of working through an ethical dilemma. What was it about
them and their own morality that led them to experience the event as a dilemma? What
was their thought process as they engaged in decision-making and reflection? What were
their "non-negotiables" and why? What potential outcome "tipped the scales" in favor of
one course of action over another, and why was this outcome privileged over others?
How do these school principals see themselves as moral arbiters in the aftermath of the
event? How has the experience changed their leadership? What can I - and other school
principals - learn from their experiences?
Personal Background
As a teenager in the 1970s I took a job as a counselor in a camp for children with
disabilities. At this time children with all varieties of disabilities were treated as one
homogenous group, regardless of individual circumstance. That children with disabilities
should he able to attend a recreational camp was representative of the beneficent thinking
at the time, and people associated with such camps (and separate schools) were well
intentioned people like myself who wanted to do something helpful for vulnerable
children who otherwise had no other means of recreation. My early experiences with
these children led to a career choice, and for the first ten years ofmy adult working life I
was a teacher of children with significant physical and cognitive disabilities in a separate
school/hospital setting. I was happy in this role until I gradually came to the realization

that schoolwide learning expectations for these children were shamefully low, and that I
was powerless within that system to change the prevailing attitude that contributed to an
impoverished curriculum and mediocre school program. Desiring the positional power
that I thought was necessary to effect substantial change on behalf of children who
struggled in their learning, I jumped at the first chance to become a school administrator
- an assistant principal at a medium-sized, suburban elementary school. This was during
the early years of education reform in Massachusetts and, with my personal frustration
over what I perceived to be low expectations for children with disabilities, the goal of
measurable achievement for all students was and remains a powerful motivator for me.
I believe that school is the place where children's lives are either made or broken,
their futures either elevatsd or restricted. As a school principal, I am acutely aware that
decisions made today on behalf of children will have long-lasting implications for their
future. No longer assured ofmy own righteousness as I was as a child and a young
teacher, however, I am somewhat fearful ofmy own agency in affecting the lives of the
children in my school. When faced with complicated and ambiguous situations calling
for morally and ethically correct solutions, how will I loiow what to do?
When I began my doctoral studies, it was with an eye toward discovering how
successful principals solve such dilemmas. Given time, research and exemplars, I felt
that I too could behave in ways that were beneficial to my school community, (for I soon
realized that the principalship entails moral responsibility to parents, teachers, and a
whole host of other people in addition to children). Earnestly wishing to construct a
sense of how to do things right, I embarked on several years' worth of study regarding
exemplary leadership, distributed leadership, transformational leadership, effective

schools, school management, and aduh learning and development - only to come to the
conclusion that leadership must, above all, be ethical if it is to result in elevating the
quality of lives of members of the school community. Moreover, I concluded that ethical
leadership is a hard thing to pin dovra and define, that what feels right to one morally
upstanding person might not feel so to another. However, I am optimistic that
conscientious thought and reflection on my and others' ethical decision-making can
clarify important considerations when faced with ambiguous but high-stakes situations.
It is that desire for a better understanding of ethical decision-making in the elementary
school principalship, illuminated in the phenomenon of facing an ethical (or moral)
dilemma, that compels me to examine the topic. It is, simply put, a desire to know what
questions to ask and how to frame the answers.
The Elementary School Principalship: A Context for Ethical Ambiguity
The elementary school principal serves many masters. In organizational theory,
the superintendent and the school committee direct the work of the principal, who in turn
directs the work of the teachers and support staff, who then direct the students. In reality,
the power structure is not so hierarchical. Sergiovanni has characterized schools as
nonlinear systems:
Nonlinearity means that the act of playing the game has a way of changing the
rules. In nonlinear situations, every decision changes existing conditions in such
a way that successive decisions also made at the same time no longer fit. This
makes it difficult for a principal, for example, to plan a series of steps or be
committed to a stepwise set of procedures based on the initial assumptions. ... In

short, nonlinear relationships between events lead to consequences that are
unpredictable. (Sergiovanni, 1996, p. 35)
The school community elects school committee members who evaluate the work
of the superintendent. The collective - and occasional individual - parent voice carries
much authority with those who would retain and succeed in their positions. The parents
glean much of their views from what their children tell them about their school
experience. The term "middle manager" (Fullan, 1997, p. 7), implying that there is but
one force above and one below, fails to convey the complexity of the various power
structures pushing and pulling from all sides. Teacher unions, school councils, parent
organizations, central office directors and special interest advocacy groups are but a few
of the additional power structures exerting force over the decision making of the school
principal.
For many, the elementary school is not just a place where children go to learn - it
is the repository of hopes and dreams parents have for their children and the tangible
evidence of a community's investment in the future. High profile decisions are either
debated in public arenas, such as televised school committee meetings, or they are made
at a higher level, such as state mandated assessment programming. At the building level,
school principals seeking to promote community through consensus building engage staff
and parents in decision-making. However empowering and beneficial this process is, it is
unwieldy and time-consuming, and it is not feasible for principals to hold every decision
up to majority vote. Some decisions, such as those which impact individual students, are
not appropriately debated in a public forum. The majority of decisions which impact the
school lives of children are made privately, while sitting at a desk or driving home after a

long day. Divergent exterior forces give way to interior ones. Blumberg and Greenfield
refer to this dimension of decision making as the subsurface life ofschool principals:
"The essential meanings of the principalship lie below the surface, ... for most intents
and purposes, they are rarely the subject of any public forum. In a sense, they constitute
the undiscussables of the job" (Blumberg & Greenfield, 1986, p. 213).
Principal decisions are privately made and publicly scrutinized. Decision making
over a seemingly mundane event often carries symbolic weight. Refusal to honor a
parent request for teacher assignment will symbolize irrational rigidity to some, equitable
and principled behavior to others. A student suspension will signify commitment to a
safe school environment to teachers and a vengeful, punitive stance to the one being
suspended (and, perhaps, his uncle, who may also be a school committee member.)
A school principal acting on behalf of students must be able to justify her decision
making on an ethical, moral basis - to herself and to others. The compulsory nature of
schooling and the institutional powerlessness of children demand it. At the core of their
leadership, school principals are first and foremost advocates for children (Blumberg &
Greenfield, 1986, p. 214). Principals often claim, "I base all my decisions on what is best
for children." Exactly what is best for children, however, is not always clear, especially
if the legitimate needs of the few are in conflict with the legitimate needs of the many.
Subverting one's personal sense of ethics for bureaucratic purposes is a common
frustration in any administrative, middle management position (Dexheimer, 1969).
Blumberg and Greenfield point out in their work with school principals, however, that
what is most "perplexing and agonizing" is when "a youngster has to pay the price" for
institufional loyalty (p. 215). For this reason, administrator preparation programs have
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recently included coursework in ethics, in order to help aspiring principals think in
advance about how to approach problematic situations (Beck & Murphy, 1993). This is
helpful but not in itself sufficient to guide the school principal through the difficult task
of determining the right course of action.
What sets the nature of the principalship apart from other administrative roles as
an inherently conflictual position is that many of the conflicts v^ith which the
principal mast grapple involve teachers and students or teachers and parents, and
these most often occur outside the principal's perceptual field. Additionally, they
frequently require that the principal perform a neat balancing act between one's
perceived role as 'advocate' for the child on the one hand and, on the other, the
pressures to conform to a very strong message that is central to the ethos of
teachers as a group - 'support the teacher, right or wrong'. . . . Value conflicts
pervade the work world of school principals. (Blumberg and Greenfield, 1986, p.
240)
What are the ethical dilemmas that elementary school principals talk about, and
how do they talk about them? How do they describe their decision-making process, and
how do they feel about their decisions in the aftermath? How does their experience
inform their current beliefs about their own leadership? What role, if any, do personal
ideals ofjustice, caring, equality, and morality factor in the decision making?
These were the questions I explored in my research. In order to begin, however, I
first developed a conceptual framework to my inquiry. How to describe, define, and
operafionalize the terms "ethics," "ethical dilemma," "morality," "justice," and
"equality?" What are the foundational and contemporary philosophical and

psychological theories of ethical decision-making? How do researchers approach and
write about the subject of ethical decision making in school leadership? Robert Starratt
notes that "many ethical problems have no easy solution" and urges that "research be
undertaken to gain a better understanding of the personal struggles of those who must
make difficult moral choices." (in Beck, 1994, p. ix) It was and is my desire to do just
that.
LITERATURE REVIEW PART I: ETHICS BELIEF SYSTEMS:
Philosophical Foundations of Ethics
How can we treat every studentjustly when to do so may violate our institutional
rules and norms? Ironically the question stemsfrom principals ' caring about
kids. Often our understanding ofM'hat is bestfor individual kids leads to
individualizing our treatment ofthem. But once we 've done that, we hear from
colleagues, other students, andparents that what we 've done for that child is
unfair or preferential treatment over others. Soon we hear that our decisions are
inconsistent, that they 're leading to chaos and anarchy in the school among both
student and staff{Ackerman, Donaldson, and Van Der Bogert, 1996, p. 13).
In Making Sense as a School Leader, Ackerman et al. (1996) highlight the tension
a school principal may experience between caring for a child and enforcing the rules of
the school. The authors tell the fictional story of a principal, Gerry Taylor, who
suspended a child in the interest of maintaining consistency with school rules (while
under pressure from teachers, parents, and the superintendent), but who believed the
suspension would damage the child. The ambiguity of the situation is reflected in the
12

opposing stance adopted by two of the three authors: Ackerman concludes the principal
betrayed her own sense of what was right, and that the school community should learn
that justice will be meted out individually, with respect to individual circumstances and
needs. The chapter's coauthor, Donaldson, argued that this "moral relativism" is
inappropriate in school discipline - that it is the principal's responsibility to teach
children about realistic consequences for misbehavior.
This particular ethical dilemma is situated in the typical work life of the school
principal, and is very likely played out in schools across the country every day. The
ambiguous nature of the dilemma, however, and the arguments in favor of one course of
action over another can be found in the ideas of the earliest philosophers, who struggled
to articulate those principles that would lead to the most ethical way of thinking and
acting. Contemporary ethicists such as Rawls, Noddings, and Benhabib continue the
struggle. A central question for these philosophers has been, "What makes an action the
most ethical one? " Is it the strict but fair adherence to agreed-upon rules, or the careful
consideration of how the decision might affect the specific people involved? Should the
most virtuous person acting from the best of intentions be trusted to respond in the most
ethical manner? Is the best decision the one which strengthens caring relationships
among people involved?
In the following section I describe several important belief systems within the
field of ethics philosophy. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a
comprehensive account of all ethical belief systems, traditional as well as contemporary,
but a cursory knowledge of foundational schools of thought is helpful in relating to the
13

single subject stories and in understanding why the participants experienced narrated
events as "dilemmas."
Deontology
Deontology is an ethical belief system that privileges the "right" over the "good"
(Rawls, 1999, p. 28) and emphasizes adherence to rules and duty in praxis. "Any action,
in order to be moral, must be taken in the belief and because of the belief that it is right -
from duty, not because of personal inclination, gain, or love" (Sergiovanni, 1992, p. 104).
Immanuel Kant, an eighteenth century German philosopher, created the ideal of the
"categorical moral imperative" which meant a universal set of rules for "all people at all
times, in all places, and under all conditions ..." (Beckner, 2004, p. 15). Heavily
influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau's eighteenth century teachings on human freedom
and the dignity of man (Pojman, 2002, p. 139), Kant believed that such a universal set of
rules was necessary for the establishment and sustenance of a "peaceable community"
(Nash, 2002, p. 108), given the diverse nature of human morality. Rushworth Kidder, a
contemporary writer of ethics, calls deontology "rule-based thinking" and writes, "It
describes an imperative (or requirement) that our actions conform to certain large patterns
- in other words, that they can be made into universal principles of action" (1995, p.
157). Kant believed these universal rules were "self imposed moral commands" (Nash,
p. 134), thereby honoring the human element of free will, even as he attempted to
separate out human subjective tendencies from the process. In a "secular, pluralist
society," the reigning principle is respect for others, because it is only through mutual
14

respect that society can create its own moral imperative - but create one it must (Nash, p.
106).
Deontology and Moral Objectivism
Related to deontological thinking is "moral objectivism". That is, some moral
principles are derived from universal laws of morality that have validity despite the
individual circumstances or situations or degree of cultural acceptance (Beckner, 2004, p.
49). One such universal law would be "natural law," an "absolutist" standard of essential
righteousness that Thomas Aquinas promoted in the 13* century. Borrowing from
Aristotle's idea that "reason is the true self of every man" (Aristotle, trans. 1925, cited in
Pojman, 2002, p. 44) and the Stoics from the 1^' century BC,' who believed that human
beings have within them the ability to "discover" true righteousness (Pojman, p. 43),
Aquinas espoused the theory that men, through reason, were inclined naturally to follow
the laws necessary for "human flourishing."
To the natural law belong those things to which a man is inclined naturally; and
among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason . . . Hence
this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done andpromoted, and evil is to
be avoided, [principles of beneficence and nonmalfeasance] All other precepts of
the natural law are based upon this; . . ." (Aquinas, trans. 1945, cited in Pojman, p.
44).
' Stoicism; man is a microcosm corresponding to the macrocosm of the universe. Through reason he is
able to discern the universal law and order present in nature and to live a life in accord with it. "The world
is providentially ordered..." (Beckner, 2004, p. 10-11).

Aquinas' ideas related to natural law are present in our contemporary ideals of individual
rights. That is, natural law rights exist simply because we are human.
In 1785 Kant wrote Groundwork ofthe Metaphysics ofMorals as an inquiry into
the nature of moral philosophy. In this work, he sought to describe a moral philosophy
based solely on reason, extricated from experiential (empirical, or data-based)
considerations. He purposefully wrote this Groundwork as a precursor to a more specific
inquiry of moral thought, reasoning that the "metaphysics of morals," which
acknowledged the "empirical" or "practical" application of moral judgment, needed to be
illuminated and clarified first, so that the "rational" part might then be considered
independently. In a later book, enthled The Metaphysics ofMorals (1797), Kant sought
to explicate moral duties in detail. In this initial work, however, Kant lay the foundation
for the deontological belief system of morality.
Reason and Good Will
Central to Kant's belief system was the criterion of "good will," wherein the
moral measure of an action is best taken in proportion to service to "duty:"
. . .an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it
but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon, and therefore does
not depend upon the realization of the object of the action but merely upon the
principle ofvolition in accordance with which the action is done without regard
for any object of the faculty of desire (Kant, 1785/1997, 4:400, p. 13).
In Kant's view, an action is not moral if it is taken out of personal inclination, or
with consideration for outcome. Only that which is taken with good will is morally right
(Pojman, 2002, p. 141). Intelligence, courage, honesty - all these are virtuous qualities.
16

but, without pure motivation toward acting in accordance with intrinsic "goodness," can
be used for bad purposes. Inclination alone is insufficient for true morality. For
example, if one has an inclination to obey a law, then acting out of this inclination is
considered "conforming to duty," a different thing entirely from acting "from duty"
(Kant, 1785/1997, 4:398, p. 1 1). In fact, the more one is disinclined to an action, the
more "moral" the action Kant deemed it to be. The originality of this principle is well
seen in Kant's discussion of the relationship of "beneficence" to duty, good will, and
morality:
To be beneficent where one can is a duty, and besides there are many souls so
sympathetically attuned that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest
they find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy around them ... But I assert that in
such a case an action of this kind, however it may conform with duty and however
amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth but is on the same footing
with other inclinations ... for the maxim lacks moral content, namely that of
doing such actions not from inclination but fi-om duty (4:398, p. 11).
When Kant first began his investigation of a morality based purely on reasoning
and independent of empirical information, it was this thought process - this synthesis of
rational principles - he had in mind. The morality of an action or maxim, Kant believed,
must satisfy the criteria of good will and universalizability in the mind ofthe one
contemplating. In Section II of Groundwork ofthe Metaphysics ofMorals, "From
Popular Philosophy to Metaphysics," Kant makes a powerfijl case in favor of the primacy
of rational thought - of reason - as the sovereign arbiter of morality. Arguing against the
17

"foreign addition of empirical inducements," or the application of examples from
"anthropology, theology, physics, or hyperphysics," Kant proposed that
reason ... can gradually become their [incentives'] master; on the other hand a
mixed doctrine of morals, put together from incentives of feeling and inclination
and also of rational concepts must make the mind waver between motives that
cannot be brought under any principle, that can lead only contingently to what is
good and can very often also lead to what is evil (4:411, pp. 22-23).
And further:
. . .all moral concepts have their seat and origin completely a prior in reason, ... in
this purity of their origin lies their dignity, so that they can serve us as supreme
practical principles; that in adding anything empirical to them one subtracts just
that much from their genuine influence and from the unlimited worth of actions
... (4:411, p. 23).
Kant assigned this "mixed doctrine of morals" to what he called "popular
philosophy," which draws from concrete examples ofhuman behavior and decision-
making. It was his intent to lift pure reason - independent of examples and capable of
presenting theory - up and out of this construct, in order to describe the metaphysics of
morals. Moreover, Kant assumed that not all human will is good. A person's will is
often subjectively influenced by some non-universalizable maxim, or end goal, or
through conformity with some objective law, which Kant called "necessitation."
However, if a person is to act from duty and with good will, reason is required. When
reason commands a person to act, it is called an "imperative" and is expressed in the




Kant distinguished between the "hypothetical" imperative from the "categorical."
The hypothetical imperative represents that which is the means to some desired end, i.e.
"If I want to lose weight, I ought to go on a diet." The categorical imperative is "that
which represent(s) an action as objectively necessary of itself, without reference to
another end" (Kant, 1785/1997, 4:414, p. 25). It is attended by a will which conforms
only to reason and duty.
[the categorical imperative] . . . has to do not with the matter of the action and
what is to result from it, but with the form and the principle from which the action
itself follows and the essentially good in the action consists in the disposition, let
the resuh be what it may. This imperative may be called the imperative of
morality(4:416, p. 27).
If an action is taken out of "respect for [universal] law," in spite of personal
disinclination and a likely undesirable outcome, then that action is deemed as one which
emanates from veritable good will, and is the true moral action (Kant, 1785/1997, 4:400,
p. 13). The "law" Kant refers to is the self-imposed law of the universal categorical
imperative - that which the actor or "lawgiver" (4:438, p. 45) decides is the universally
"right" action. The categorical imperative must pass three criteria, or Principles. The
first is the Principle of Universal Law. Kant expressed it in this way: "/ ought never to
act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become universal
law " (4:402, p. 14) and later: "act only in accordance with that maxim through which
19

you can at the same time will that it become a universal law" (4:421, p. 31). That is, the
same standard or rule which governed the action must be able to be applied in the same
way to all similar circumstances. Similarly, Kant's "universal imperative of duty" states,
"act as ifthe maxim ofyour action were to become by your will a universal law of
nature " (4:42 1 , p. 3 1 ). Conversely, any action or maxim - that is, the rule governing the
action - that could not become universal law lacks moral content, and should be
"repudiated" (4:403, p. 16).
Kant made no claim that such a law actually was proven to exist - he only argued
in the principle of its moral supremacy. Moreover, if such a law were to be played out in
human existence, it would be that very human experience - with all of its inherent
subjective influence - that would detract from its being of "absolutely good will" (Kant,
1785/1997, 4:426, p. 35).
Deontology and the Ethical Dilemma
Deontology is the primary consideration of rules or obligations. Therefore, an
ethical dilemma arises when two or more rules, principles, or obligations come into
conflict.
Act-deontology versus rw/e-(ieonto/ogy._Rule-deontologists such as Immanuel
Kant appeal to principles as moral authority. These principles may be seen as either
absolute (sovereign under any circumstances) or objective (may, under certain
circumstances, be subordinated under some other principle) (Frankena, 1973, p. 25-26;
Pojman, 2002, p. 137). Kant and more contemporary ethicists such as W.D. Ross (1877-
1971) speak in terms of "duty." Ross listed those duties which he considered prima facie,
or self-evident, in terms of their moral authority: promise keeping, fidelity, gratitude for
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favors, beneficence, justice, self-improvement, and nonmaleficence (Ross, 1930, p. 21
cited in Pojman, p. 137). For Ross and other objectivist deontologists, an ethical
dilemma would occur when one or more of these "duties" came into conflict with one
another. In this way, Ross' deontology differs from Kant's in that Ross believes there is
more than one principle worthy of adherence, a pluralistic view. An absolutist
deontologist such as Kant, believing in the supremacy of an absolute, universal moral
standard, and possessing the rationalist view that reason was the key to its discovery,
would never acknowledge the validity of a true conflict, although he would acknowledge
the human propensity for disinclination toward doing one's duty.
Act deontologists see each act as a unique ethical occasion and believe
that we must decide what is right or wrong in each situation by consulting
our conscience or our intuitions or by making a choice apart from any
rules (Pojman, 2002, p. 135).
Deontology and moral relativism. Moral authority in this case is one's
own conscience. "The main argument for act-deontologism, ... is the claim that
each situation is different and even unique, so that no general rules can possibly
be ofmuch help in dealing with it, except as mere rules of thumb" (Frankena,
1973, pp 24-25). Participants in Carol Gilligan's 1982 study recorded in her book
In a Different Voice came to see morality in their choice about abortion based
entirely on their own circumstances and through their own conscience, without
adherence to universal principle or law. Joseph Fletcher (1966) used the term
"situation ethics" to describe an act-deontology that held the primacy of love as
the final arbiter of ethical decision-making, and the "rightness" of any decision as
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being wholly dependent on the circumstances, or situation, involved. This ethical
stance is one of moral relativism - the morality of an action is relative to the
circumstances which surround it. "The situationist holds that whatever is the
most loving thing in the situation is the right and good thing (Fletcher, 1966, p.
65).
Contemporary Deontology
Frankena describes "extreme act deontologists" as those who "maintain that we
can and must see or somehow decide separately in each particular situation what is the
right or obligatory thing to do" (1973, p. 16). Hannah Arendt, a contemporary ethicist,
embodied this type of thinking when she declared immoral the actions of the United
States government in the Vietnam War. The U.S. government justified its promulgation
of war based in teleological thinking about the presumed benefits of eradicating
communism as well as historical notions about the failure of prior policies of
"appeasement." Arendt pointed to the complexity of the world and the situation and
declared as overly-simplistic the consequentialist justification for what she and many
others viewed as crimes against humanity. She attributed the evil that men do not to
historical forces leading to rational (if misguided) lessons from history, but rather to the
shockingly "novel" and utterly unpredictably evil experiences exemplified by the
Holocaust and German and Russian totalitarianism. (Arendt, 1994, pp. 3 1 9 - 320, cited
in Villa, 2000, p. 30). Her stance here echoes Kant's warning against using history as
example of what ought to be done: "Nor could one give worse advice to morality than by
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wanting to derive it from examples. ... Imitation has no place at all in matters of morality
..." (Kant, 1785/1997, 4:409, p. 21).
Arendt also revealed the potential for the perversion of a notion of "natural law"
in her book The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). Using the ideology of "natural law"
as well as "historical law" (that is, that "all laws have become laws of movement"), she
illustrated how Hitler and his regime based all acts of genocide on the ideology of
inevitable movement toward racial supremacy. In this sense, perpetrators of the
Holocaust were convinced to be relieved of personal agency - the totalitarian ideology
was created to be a force greater than individual action (Villa, 2000, p. 18).
Contemporary Deontology and the "Concrete Other. ". In 1973, William K.
Frankena wrote, "In any event, it seems to me that in order for one's maxims to be
considered moral duties, it is not enough that one be able consistently to will one's
maxims to be universally acted on. Much depends on the point of view from which one
wills one's rules to be universally followed . . . There is more to the moral point of view
than being willing to universalize one's rules. . ." (p. 33). This unwillingness to push
one's maxims on others - or the adoption of a unilateral stance to moral authority - is
central to contemporary ethicists' response to traditional deontological, universalist
thinking.
Feminist moral theorists such as Gilligan and Noddings "have developed a rich
and significant body of work that has analyzed moral emotions and moral character"
(Benhabib, 1992, p. 49) in part as a response to the erasure of the "affective and emotive
bases of ethics" inherent in Kantian and neo-Kantian theories of morality, or a "gender
blindness of much modern and contemporary universalist theory" (Benhabib, p. 51).
23

Basing theories of moral growth on the idea of masculine autonomy which comes from
going out in the world denies the kind of moral growth traditionally experienced by
women and children as they are "sustained by a network of relationships" (Benhabib, p.
51). Benhabib claims that moral theory has privileged "moral judgments" over "moral
emotions and character," and in so doing, has made much of it gender blind, hence the
need for acknowledgement of the "concrete other." She claims that Kantian universalist
theory assumes a stance that excludes the purview of women and other persons
underrepresented in traditional moral philosophy. She doesn't rule out the moral
imperative of universalizing one's judgment, only that the judgment must be rendered
within a dialogue (a moral discourse) that includes the concrete other as equals in the
conversation - one that practices a "reversibility of perspectives" inherent in moral
development (Benhabib, p. 52). The capacity to judge a situation from a multiplicity of
perspectives ["representative thinking" in Arendt's term (Arendt, 2003, pp. 139-140),
"ideal reversible role-taking" in Kohlberg's (Berkowitz, 1985, p. 8)] is crucial to the
moral conversation, or the exercise of "good judgment" (Benhabib, p. 54).
Kant and Aquinas would agree with Ackerman's criticism of Principal Taylor's
(the fictitious principal mentioned earlier in this section), decision to suspend the child.
By punishing the child under pressure from external forces, this principal was not acting
according to the principle of nonmalfeasance, or "do no harm," to which the principal
was bound. Moreover, her error in judgment is made even more egregious when
applying Kant's standard of universalizability. Surely this principal would not want her
decision of suspension to become the universal standard for administrative decision-
making. The idea that the school community may be displeased by the decision (a
24

threatening outcome for any school administrator) should not enter into the decision
making at all. In the deontological system, one must follow the principle regardless of the
consequences. Moreover, carrying out her duty toward the child with the full knowledge
that the community would be displeased would have, in Kant's view, added to the moral
value of the duty.
Contemporary deontology and impartiality. The contemporary deontologist John
Rawls has been described as "offering the most comprehensive contemporary
philosophical justification ofjustice as the preferred ethical basis for morality..."
(Berkowitz, 1985, p. 8). In his hook A Theory ofJustice, Rawls (1971) set out to describe
"the nature and aims of a perfectly just society" in service of an ideal theory. Using the
principle "justice as fairness," he sought to build on Kant's and others' ideas of "social
contract" in order to explicate all that which serves the fundamental interests of human
association. According to Rawls, the choices about how to generate and sustain an ideal,
hypothetical just society must be made impartially by its members who are in ignorance
of personal status. In this way, justice is borne of fairness. He uses the metaphor of a
"veil of ignorance" to describe the ideal ethical stance, wherein the decision-maker has
no understanding of his or her ovra situation.
This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of
principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social
circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design
principles to favor his particular condition, the principles ofjustice are the result
of a fair agreement or bargain (Rawls, p. 11).
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According to Rawls, a decision devoid of personal implication or consequence,
based purely in application of the principle ofjustice, is inherently the most desirable.
Therefore, a society that is founded and self-evaluated according to mutually agreed upon
conceptions ofjustice, one in which members voluntarily and of free will enter and self-
impose these conceptions, is a just society. In Rawls' terminology, this "initial choice
situation" is the "original position" (Rawls, 1971, p. 16). Rawls also uses the term
"contract" to suggest the hypothetical process through which the mutual "accept[ance] of
moral principles" is obtained (p. 14), specifically for its connotation of the "rational
choice" (p. 15) inherent in the purposeful selection and agreement as well as its public
nature. In the original position, all members have equal say in proposing and critiquing
principles ofjustice. They are all ignorant of their own personal situation, and therefore
cannot argue in favor of any principle that would privilege one class over another. The
outcome is a set of principles, ranked in order of importance, that an impartial (but still
self-interested) group can deliberately and reasonably agree to. Under this system,
Rawls' asks which of our taken-for-granted notions ofjustice will hold firm (such as
racial discrimination or religious tolerance) and which will falter when scrutinized from a
purely impartial viewpoint (such as distribution of wealth and power) (p. 16). Rawls
refers to this process of individually examining principles ofjustice, adopting some and
revising others, as "reflective equilibrium," the working toward some state which is not
necessarily stable but reflective of the goal of the "original position"(p. 18).
Rawls' theory ofjustice is similar to Kant's deontology in that morality lies in the
autonomous adherence to self-imposed, universal laws and principles. It differs.
- Kohlberg's Stage theory of Moral Development includes Stage 5, "which is based on universal human
rights and democratic agreement or contract.." (Kohlberg, 1985, p. 79)
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however, in the idea of a plurality of voices weighing in to define its universal nature.
For Kant, the categorical imperative was self-imposed only after one asked oneselfto
apply it universally. For Rawls, Benhabib, and Arendt, the imperative is legitimate if and
only if it acknowledges the voices of the entire community to be affected by the
universalization of the principle or law. This is a defining feature of contemporary ethics.
Enlightenment theories of ethics were articulated by men of learning and privilege, who
enjoyed elevated status in the political world as well as in their own homes, and who may
or may not have had the welfare of the underrepresented members of society in mind
when they espoused their notions ofjustice.
Rushworth Kidder promotes a deontology based on the idea that a fundamental
core set of moral values exists across time and culture. There are, he claims, moral
imperatives such as "do not kill" and "do not steal" universally accepted and codified in
all major religions and cultures. Kidder's definition of an ethical dilemma involves two
of these core values in conflict with one another. He uses the term "paradigm" to
describe common conflicts: justice versus mercy, short term versus long term, self versus
community, and truth versus loyalty. Although he acknowledges the teleological stance,
his book How Good People Make Tough Choices (1995) - designed to help people think
about ethical issues more clearly - guides the reader into a system of viewing ethical
dilemmas within one or more of the four paradigms, and then choosing the side most
closely aligned with cherished values. If Kidder were to counsel Principal Taylor, he
would most likely tell her that she should show mercy to the child, rather than uphold the
prevailing desire for justice:
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Compelled to choose between justice and mercy, I would (all things being equal)
stick with mercy, which to me speaks of love and compassion. One reason: I can
imagine a world so full of love that justice, as we now know it, would no longer
be necessary. But I cannot imagine a world so full ofjustice that there would no
longer be any need for love. Given only one choice, I would take love.
(Kidder, p. 221)
Utilitarianism
What then could be more plausible than that the right is to promote the
general good - that our actions and our rules, ifwe must have rules, are to
be decided upon by determining which of them produces or may be
expected to produce the greatest general balance of good over evil?
(Frankena, 1973, p. 34)
In the eighteenth century, David Hume, a Scottish ethicist and historian, wrote A
Treatise ofHuman Nature (1740) andAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
(1777), both critical responses to the previously accepted ideas ofman as "ethical
rationalist" (Magill, 1961, p. 489). He put forth a "mitigated skepticism" concerning the
natural abilities of people to rationally and through reason and contemplation do what
ought to be done. Hume did not believe it was possible to arrive at the most ethical
decision purely through reason and contemplation, although he did acknowledge that
reasoning was a necessary step (Magill, 1961, p. 494). He distinguished between the
rational and the sentimental, the latter more closely approximating man's ethical
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decision-making, due to the human tendency to act partially on feeling, and with an
inherent lack of full knowledge. His Enquiry was a study of the vices and virtues of
man through the ages, undertaken so that he might better understand the nature ofhuman
morality. Hume articulated the notion of "universal principles, from which all censure or
approbation is uhimately derived" (Hume, 1777, cited in Magill, 1961, p. 489). He
determined that there were two principles that were universally "good" - beneficence and
justice, and that all ethical behavior belonged to one or both of these principles.
Beneficence and justice, above all, serve utilitarian ends, and therein lay their moral
supremacy.
The teleological or consequential school of thought places utilitarianism - or the
greatest good for the greatest number (Beckner, 2004, p. 61) - as the key determinant of
the moral right. Regardless of the motive, what is "most right" is that which leads to the
best outcome for the most people, or "a greater balance of good over evil" (Frankena,
1973, p. 14). The ends justify the means. Jeremy Bentham [who, with John Stuart Mill,
was an English social reformer of the 19"^ century (Pojman, 2002, p. 108)] grounded the
theory of "utilitarianism" in Hume's philosophy of the virtues of utility and defined it as
. . .that which tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness
either for the individual or for the human community. The good of the latter (the
greatest number) must be the determining criteria of the rightness or wrongness of
conduct (Beckner, 2004, p. 16).
Beauchamp and Childress (1984) claim that the most salient characteristic of
utilitarianism as a moral theory lies in its singleness of purpose:
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. . .that there is one and only one basic principle in ethics, the principle of
utility. This principle asserts that we ought in all circumstances to
produce the greatest possible balance of value over disvalue for all persons
affected (or the least possible balance of disvalue if only evil resuhs can
be brought about (p. 45).
Whereas Bentham's utilitarianism sought to minimize pain and maximize pleasure,
devising a mathematical formula attempting to quantify such qualities, (Frankena, 1973,
p. 35), John Stuart Mill proposed a more refined theory of utilitarianism that considered
"pleasure" to be of a higher order than in Bentham's "hedonistic" sense (Pojman, 2002,
p. 1 10). The goodness to be promoted, namely pleasure and freedom from pain, is
intrinsic, not extrinsic, as intrinsic goodness is in itself value-free (Beauchamp &
Childress, 1984, p. 45). "Pleasure" or "goodness" for a "non-hedonistic" or "pluralistic"
utilitarian is the maximizing of "power, knowledge, self-realization, perfection, etc." for
the people as a measure of the "greatest general good" (Frankena, p. 15).
In the utilitarian view, moral authority is neither derived from motive nor
adherence to principle. Moral authority is derived from a calculated course of action
which maximizes intrinsic value for the greatest number. Consistent with the principle of
moral objectivism, John Stuart Mill stressed the importance of impartiality in this
calculation or decision-making:
Utilitarianism is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As
between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as
strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. (Mill, 1863, cited in
Kidder, 1995, p. 156)
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Utilitarianism and the Ethical Dilemma
Act Utilitarianism versus Rule Utilitarianism. The act utilitarian will ask, "What
is it that I should do in this situation that will bring about 'the greatest balance of good
over evil?'" (Frankena, 1973, p. 35) The act utilitarian "skips the level of rules and
justifies actions directly by appeal to the principle of utility" (Beauchamp and Childress,
1984, p. 48). The question is specific to the one doing the asking, and there is no
criterion for universalization, although the precedent set by such an action is considered
in the overall balance. With general utilitarianism, the criteria of universalization ("What
if everyone else similarly situated did the same thing?") is brought back into
consideration (Frankena, p. 38). Even so, the act utilitarian, although agreeing that it is
usually better if everyone followed the rules, (e.g. truth-telling), will argue that
sometimes it is better (and more moral) to break the rule. The beneficial consequence is
the final arbiter of what is right.
Rule Utilitarianism has, much like deontology, the centrality of rules over actions
in determining moral supremacy. However, unlike deontologism, the central question is,
"Which rules will promote the greatest general good for everyone? That is, the question
is not which action has the greatest utility, but which rule has?" (Frankena, 1973, p. 39).
A rule-utilitarian would argue that the act-utilitarian, in breaking some rule, was in fact
adhering to some stronger rule, or principle, such as "do no harm." This adherence to a
stronger principle is what makes an action right. According to Frankena, the idea of
"distributive justice" is important to rule-utilitarianism. That is, there is a criteria of
equal distribution of "good" for the most people inherent in the overall balance of "good
over evil" (Frankena, p. 42).
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Aristotle and Virtues Ethics
Aristotle believed in the primacy of values and virtues. He answered the question
"What is the best life?" with the notion of happiness - not the self-indulgent or euphoric
kind, but the kind of happiness that is derived from a life lived virtuously, that is, with
prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance (Beckner, 2004, p. 78; Nash, 2002, p.82).
Aristotle believed in moral virtue, which was learned incidentally and reflectively from
life experience, and intellectual virtue, learned through purposeful instruction (Nash,
2002, p. 82). A virtuous person earnestly works toward finding the "Golden Mean"
(Beckner, p. 74), or that ideal point in the middle of a person's human tendencies
between excess and deficiency, both of which he deemed "vice." (Aristotle, trans. 1893,
p. 35) The Golden Mean may be different depending on the circumstances, but there is
always one to be sought. It is in this search that persons combine contemplation with
action, and, in so doing, become increasingly virtuous.
. . .moral virtue is moderation or observance of the mean . . . and on this sense it is
a hard thing to be good; . . . Thus, anyone can be angry - that is quite easy;
anyone can give money away or spend it: but to do these things to the right
person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right object, and in the right
manner, is not what everybody can do, and is by no means easy; and that is the
reason why right doing is rare and praiseworthy and noble (Aristotle, trans. 1893,
p. 40).
Aristotle's way of thinking is the ancestor of the philosophical school of thought
called "virtue ethics" (Pojman, 2002, p. 158). Aristotle believed that men possessed the
capacity to grow into their natural character through rational contemplation and action.
32

Happiness for men and mankind, in the Aristotlean view, can be compared to the growth
of an acorn into a strong oak tree. Within the acorn lies the essential nature of the tree -
with proper nourishment and care, the tree is the natural end point for the acorn (Magill,
1961, p. 158). The giving of proper nourishment and care to oneself in service of the
goal of happiness Aristotle termed "self-love" (Fletcher, 1966, p. 112) and it was
considered by him to be a necessary condition of virtuous living. This "self-love" is not
undertaken in the narcissistic or self-indulgent sense. It is taking a contemplative,
rational course of action over a lifetime in order that one may better serve humanity. In
other words, "... a virtuous agent has a well-ordered soul. That is a soul in which reason
has authority over desire and passion, so that they aim at their proper objects" (Jacobs,
2002, p. 51). In this sense, Aristotle's views are also teleological in that the "end" or the
"goal" is the primary motivator for moral action. However, Aristotle did not mean the
outcome of the event was central to what "ought" to happen, it was the human end - the
full development of man as a virtuous being, that was most important, that was (and
always will be) the goal. For Aristotle, there exists a natural alignment of virtue and
happiness in persons. "Virtuous agents find virtuous activity naturally pleasing" (Jacobs,
2002, p. 51), and they are intrinsically motivated to do that which virtue requires. This
school of thought includes the idea that as people grow and reflect on their experiences,
they can and do become increasingly virtuous. This is called "aspiration ethics"
(Beckner, 2004, p. 144; Fletcher, 1966, p. 96), and psychological theories of moral
development support and extend this notion.
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But if happiness be the exercise of virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it will be
the exercise of the highest virtue; and that will be the virtue or excellence of the
best part of us.
Now, that part or faculty - call it reason or what you will - which seems naturally
to rule and take the lead, and to apprehend things noble and divine - whether it be
itself divine, or only the divinest part of us - is the faculty the exercise of which,
in its proper excellence, will be perfect happiness (Axistotle, trans. 1893, p. 234).
Virtues ethics has become an attractive alternative to deontological and
teleological theories, due to the acknowledgment of the humanity inherent in morality. A
system of ethics based solely in rules and actions, says Pojman, leaves out the humanity
of the enterprise, so that doing the morally correct thing becomes a kind of "mental
plumbing, moral casuistry, a set of hairsplitting distinctions that somehow loses track of
the purpose of morality altogether" (2002, p. 161). Moreover, if one does the morally
correct thing in the end, there is no distinction between that which is done
enthusiastically or grudgingly. Rather than relying on pure reasoning and rationalism,
virtues ethics allows us to look at the exemplary lives ofAbraham Lincoln, Mother
Teresa, and Mohandas Gandhi, and ask "What would [Lincoln, Mother Teresa, Gandhi]
do?" Other criticisms of rule and action based ethical systems are that (1) they lack a
motivational component; (2) they are founded on a theological-legal model that is no
longer appropriate; (3) they ignore the spiritual dimension of morality; and (4) they




The "virtues" of virtues ethics have traditionally been separated into two separate
types: moral and nonmoral virtues. Moral virtues, such as benevolence and honesty, are
tied to objective moral principles. Nonmoral virtues, such as courage and patience, may
act in service of moral principles, but not always (Frankena, 1973, cited in Pojman, 2002,
p. 164). Virtues ethics takes a pluralistic viewpoint. That is, ". . .there are different ends
or virtues worth pursuing for their own sakes, or distinct intrinsic goods, or distinct and
irreducible principles (or all of these)" (Jacobs, 2002, p. 16). Although Aristotle and
other Virtues Systems ethicists do not promote guidelines for actions, there is in the
theory an inherent duty to behave virtuously.
Aristotle would not judge Principal Taylor's decision on the basis of whether
strict adherence to the rules were followed (a nonconsequentialist, deontological
viewpoint), nor whether the outcome proved to be in the best interests of the majority (a
consequentialist, utilitarian viewpoint). In fact, Aristotle would most likely frustrate this
principal in his refusal to offer guidance, as virtues based ethics, being pluralistic, is not
prescriptive (Pojman, 2002, p. 171). "Pluralism implies that there is no single measure or
standard of value that will decide all conflicts of obligation or determine the weights of
all the values at issue in a situation or a judgment" (Jacobs, 2002, p. 16). Regardless of
Principal Taylor's decision, Aristotle would recognize the competing claims of
obligation, and say the principal was acting in the most ethically responsible way if she
acted as her best, most virtuous self- acting out of neither fear nor self interest
(Beckner, 2004, p. 145), but in accordance with her idealized moral self (Nash, 2002).
The principal's wisdom behind her decision is the key determinant of the "rightness" of
her decision. Aristotle's definition of wisdom is based on a construct of "intellectual
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virtue." Intellectual virtue includes practical wisdom, which he defined as "a true and
reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man"
(Magill, 1961, p. 161). Practical wisdom includes intuitive reason - that part of human
thought that understands viscerally universal principles of morality. Scientific
knowledge, another intellectual virtue, is that which is concerned with what is "logically
necessary" (Magill, 1961, p. 161). Philosophic wisdom is that which combines intuitive
reason with scientific knowledge, and guides the person toward the ideal action (Magill,
1961, p. 161). It is through contemplation that people realize the benefits of wisdom and
grow into more intellectually virtuous beings.
Pojman illustrates the difference between the deontologist and virtue ethics belief
system:
. . .The moral law may require me to give a part ofmy income to feed the poor, but
I don't have to like them; I give my money because it is right to do so. ... The
virtue ethicist rejects this kind of thinking. While we don't have direct control
over our emotions, we do have indirect control over them. ... we can take steps to
inculcate the right dispositions and attitudes. ... We are responsible for our
character (2002, p. 176).
From the Philosophy of Ethics to the Psychology of Morality:
Theories of Individual Moral Development:
Early and contemporary deontological and utilitarian theories of ethics are
concerned primarily with social phenomenon, or, in a grand sense, how members of
society decide to behave toward one another. Virtues ethics, concerned with individual
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moral growth, is closely related in content to psychological theories of moral
development. In drawing this connection from philosophy to psychology, Dexheimer
writes, "Ethical philosophies from Aristotle to Phenix, Barnard, and Maslow have all
indicated that the real source of ethical behavior exists within the individual and not in
any code of ethics" (1969, p. 277). In this next section, I discuss three important theorists
of individual morality: Kohlberg, Noddings, and Gilligan. As with the first section of
this paper on early and contemporary ethicists, this selection of authors is not intended to
be exhaustive. I have selected these theorists because they represent to me three distinct
but salient voices in the field of moral development, and their ideas regarding the
individual perspective inherent in ethical decision-making is relevant to my co-
researchers' narratives.
Lawrence Kohlberg
Kohlberg' s stage theory of moral development provides an important early
conceptual framework for understanding how people grow into their moral selves.
Critics (Friedman, 1985; Gilligan, 1982) point to the privilege of the autonomous,
impartial, "male" perspective in Kohlberg's evaluation of the "highest" stage of moral
reasoning, to the detriment of moral reasoning which includes more female concerns of
care and context. Nevertheless, Kohlberg himself claimed that his stage theory presumed
the primacy of rational, impartial justice from the outset, that his theory was concerned
with "justice reasoning" only and "that it is unfortunate that it was simply called 'moral
reasoning' as if it represented the whole breadth and substance of the moral cognitive
domain" (Friedman, p. 40, ching Kohlberg et al., 1983). Kohlberg considered his theory
"limited to what he calls structural stages in the development of reasoning about justice
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and rights" (Friedman, p. 40) and, as such, is valuable to our understanding ofhow
people develop their understanding of right versus wrong.
Lawrence Kohlberg began collecting data on the moral decision making of young
men in the 1950s and continued his research for twenty-five years (May, 1985, p. 116).
His research entailed asking people for their responses to the Heinz dilemma and
categorizing their responses into one of six stages of moral development. His results led
him to conclude that there are universal, sequential, and distinct stages, each representing
growth in moral thinking, that account for differences in the way people reason about
moral dilemmas. "Kohlberg identified six stages, two stages occurring at three distinct
levels - the pre-conventional, the conventional, and the post-conventional" (Duska &
Whelan, 1975,p.45).
Pre-conventional Level:
Stage 1: Punishment and Obedience Orientation, in which threat of punishment
and obedience to authority act as moral authority;
Stage 2: Instrumental Relativist Orientation, in which one is motivated to "satisfy
one's own needs," reciprocating with others if necessary;
Conventional Level:
Stage 3: Interpersonal Concordance of "Good Boy - Nice Girl" Orientation, in
which gaining the approval of others constitutes moral authority;
Stage 4: Law and Order Orientation, in which adherence to rules for the good of




Stage 5: Social-Contract Legalistic Orientation, in which standards of behavior
are determined by societal consensus or democratic governance;
Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principle Orientation, in which moral authority is
one's own conscience consistent with universal ethical principles (Duska & Whelan,
1975, pp 45-47). Kohlberg's Sixth stage of moral development has been said to be
"virtually identical to Rawls' theory ofjustice" (May, 1985, p. 135).
Kohlberg's stages of moral development parallel Piaget's stages of cognitive
development and, like Piaget's stages, share three characteristics: (1) invariant sequence,
wherein people may stay at the same stage or move one stage further in the sequence, but
they do not move backwards; (2) hierarchy, where lower stages of thought are replaced
by higher (and more "morally adequate") ways of thinking; and (3) structured wholes, or
individual consistency of reasoning regardless of the context (May, 1985, p. 1 17).
Much of the criticism of Kohlberg's theory stems from the superior value he
placed on what he termed "Stage six" reasoning (May, 1985). It is at this stage that
Kohlberg claimed some particularly morally evolved people abandon any ideas of moral
relativism and construct their reasoning purely on principle. He is dismissive of those
responses which seem to contradict consistent reasoning, in particular, those which are
initially based in the universal principle of the supreme value ofhuman life, but which
then stop short of universalizing the reasoning (May, 1985, p. 120). May also points out
that Kohlberg himself was reluctant to claim complete closure on the stages. In 1981, he
posed the possibility of a seventh stage which goes beyond "contractarian justice
deliberations" (May, 1985, p. 122) and encompasses a more spiritual motive ("agape")
for moral actions. May claims that the absence of closure on the stage theory opens the
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way for a fatal flaw in the claim that Kohlberg has discovered, through empirical
evidence, the "deep structure" of moral reasoning stages (p. 122). What may seem like
evidence of structure may be flawed if the stages are incomplete. May also criticizes the
weight that Kolhberg places on the idea of "partiality to oneself as a diminishing value
of morality. Stage two respondents act out of self interest but so do. May asserts, Stage
five respondents when they espouse reversibility - that they act in such a way that their
own rights and responsibilities of a member of a community will be protected too. That
Stage five thinkers differenfiate between themselves and others, and Stage two thinkers
do not, does not seem to May to be evidence that Stage two thinkers actively disregard
the needs of others. Both sets of respondents ultimately act in their own best interests.
Years later, Kohlberg described his version of a "just community," drawing
largely on Dewey's idea of democratic community and Durkheim's theory that
membership in a community creates an "experience" which "induces in the individual
moral sentiments" (Kohlberg, 1985, p. 84). Kohlberg claimed his theory of a just
community "does not make a typological dichotomy between justice and care"
(Kohlberg, 1985, p. 84).
Carol Gilligan
In 1982, Carol Gilligan wrote In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women 's Development, largely in response to Kohlberg's theory of moral growth and
development which, she claimed, deleteriously ignored the considerations of the moral
growth of women. Citing prior studies of moral judgment which highlighted essential
differences between men and women (Haan, 1975; Holstein, 1976), Gilligan asserted an
error in the research which privileged the masculine mode over the feminine:
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. . .the moral judgments of women differ from those of men in the greater extent to
which women's judgments are tied to feehngs of empathy and compassion and
are concerned with the resolution of real as opposed to hypothetical dilemmas.
However, as long as the categories by which development is assessed are derived
from research on men, divergence from the masculine standard can be seen only
as a failure of development. As a result, the thinking of women is often classified
with that of children (Gilligan, p. 69 - 70).
Considering that the voices ofwomen in discussing matters of morality have
traditionally been subverted by the power of male voices, Gilligan chose to examine the
language that women use when describing conflict in an area that is strictly within their
purview: birth control and abortion. It is in these questions where, Gilligan says, ". . .the
dilemma of choice enters a central arena of women's lives" (1982, p. 70). However,
unlike men, for whom "independent assertion in judgment and action" mark the entrance
to adulthood, women have been judged and judge themselves on their capacity to care for
others, and therein lies the real dilemma. Gilligan found that, at the heart of their
morality, women seek to refrain from hurting others. She called this the "crifical moral
issue" (p. 71). In her interviews with twenty-nine women Gilligan found that the
language of morality for women existed in a context of "care and responsibility in
relationships rather than as one of rights and rules" (p. 73), and that this language, when
viewed in and of itself as a legitimate moral orientation, signified a differently ordered
moral hierarchy, not an inferior one. Rather than a stage theory which privileges "justice"
thinking, Gilligan's stage theory of moral development privileges the development of an
"ethic of care" (p. 74). Care for the self ("selfishness"), grows into a sense of
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"responsibility" for others. However, the "exclusion of herself ' as an equally worthy
recipient of care leads to a "reconsideration of relationships" and, ultimately, a "new
understanding of the interconnection between other and self (p. 74). The universal
imperative remains "care" - for oneself as well as others, and, in particular, for the
relationships between the two. Morally evolved people, Gilligan seems to say, place a
primacy of concern for real-life caring relationships as the ultimate guide for moral
development. That Kohlberg maintains this is representative of "conventional" thinking,
and therefore of lesser moral adequacy than "post-conventional" thinking, is where
Gilligan and other feminist ethicists take issue.
Nel Noddings, the ethic ofcare, and subjectivism
Nel Noddings writes in the Foreword of Lynn Beck's (1994) book Reclaiming
Educational Administration as a Caring Profession:
When we genuinely care, we want to do our very best to effect worthwhile
results for the recipients of our care. ... It is an orientation of deep
concern that carries us out of ourselves and into the lives, despairs,
struggles, and hopes of others. To care is to respond, and to respond
responsibly, we must continually strive for increased competence. ( p. ix)
According to Noddings, the greatest human virtue is the capacity to empathize
with and care for others. Moral decisions grounded in care for others supercede all other
ways of thinking based on sets of rules, probable consequences, etc. Any action
motivated by care for others is inherently the ethically correct one. Moreover, any action
that strengthens a culture of care is the responsibility of the community leader.
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Considering the ethical dilemma encountered by the fictitious Principal Gerry
Taylor, Noddings would wish the school principal to act consistently with her intuition to
protect the child from harm. She would most likely agree with Donaldson's assessment,
in that she must further communicate to her school community that all decisions would
be made on the basis of care for individual children, and that this stance was necessary to
creating a culture of caring.
Aristotle's and Nodding's conceptualization of ethics is grounded in a human's
inherent nature or character, rather than in principles. Moral authority, in this case, has a
subjective, human face. As such, one's intuition is a legitimate factor in decision-
making. The central question is not "What shall I do?" but "Who shall I be?" (Nash,
2002, p. 82). In contrast, the first two schools of thought, deontology and teleology or
utilitarianism, separate principle from the person, and, in so doing, attempt to remove the
human element from ethical decision-making, lessening the effect that intuition or "gut
feeling" may have on the process. Moral authority is found in objectivity. Reason is
sovereign.
In his essay entitled Emotions, Morality, and Understanding, Hirmian (1985)
argues in favor of the positive role that emotions play in moral reasoning. Refuting the
idea that emotions are non-cognitive, passive phenomena over which we have no control,
he proposes that emotions - such as compassion - are an important component to the way
we make sense of ourselves and others, "in a single act which is both knowing and
feeling" (Hinman, p. 63). Hiimian echoes the Aristotlean view that what is important in
morality is not the application of reason to determine some action, but in the
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"development of the moral awareness which leads to choice" (Hinman, p. 66), or the
notion of "moral agency:"
The moral agent is not just a Kantian rational self or a utilitarian calculator, but
rather a whole person, a person who not only thinks and acts, but also feels and
perceives. Morality then becomes not the impartial application of principles, but
the moral cuhivation of the entire self: the development of moral perceptions and
emotions as well as the sharpening of our moral reasoning skills (Hirmian, 1985,
p. 67).
By acknowledging the role that emotions play in making moral judgments,
Hinman is voicing the subjectivist view that there is no moral objectivity. Facts of values
do not, in and of themselves, compel us to act or avoid. It is rather the human tendency
to ascribe repugnance or desire to act that renders a moral judgment. This is not to say
that morality is a matter of personal preference. "Morality is still full-force, full-fledged
morality and need lose nothing by being based upon human subjectivity" (Jacobs, 2002,
p. 23). It has authority over our actions in the way that personal preference, or individual
taste, does not.
We judge what to do, what practices to accept, and which to discourage on the
basis of what elicits our admiration our gratitude, or esteem, our contempt, our
fear, our distrust, and so forth. Moral judgments uhimately have a basis in the
passions and in desires, in something/e/?. Also, they render the judgments
practical by giving them motivating energy. It is feeling that moves us, even
when it is feeling informed by factual knowledge and structured by reasoning
(Jacobs, 2002, p. 25).
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Hinman is critical of Kohlberg's stage theory which places primacy on
"universality and impartiality in moral judgments" (Hinman, 1985, p. 67), which then
necessarily devalues the positive role that emotions can play in moral decision-making.
Kohlberg's use of the Heinz dilemma as an assessment tool comes under criticism, too.
Hinman refutes the idea that "the agent's own personal history is largely irrelevant to
moral deliberation" (p. 68). "Yet insofar as the development of character is a matter of
one's personal history, considerations about character fall by the wayside when dilemmas
ignore personal history" (Hinman, p. 68).
Finally, Hirmian addresses the Kantian and utilitarian idea that emotions can
cloud one's judgment in making decisions about the correct and moral action. Some
emotions do cloud one's judgment. Rather than just dismissing them entirely, however,
he argues in favor of "educating the emotions" - of cultivating an understanding of "the
illuminating dimension of the emotions" as well as an understanding of how some
emotions can distort judgment (Hinman, 1985, p. 69). Understanding the role one's
emotions play in ethical decision-making would therefore be an important component to
reflexivity in the process.
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LITERATURE REVIEW PART II: ETHICS IN SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION
Introduction
In 1966, the American Association for School Administration (AASA) published
its first "Code of Ethics" for school administrators, claiming that by codifying ethical
practices, it had demonstrated that "school administration is a profession with ethical
stature" (AASA, 1966, p. 11). That this would occur in 1966 is a little unexpected, due to
an apparent lack of interest in ethics as an administrative concern in the years
surrounding the publication. A review of the literature on the principalship in the mid-
twentieth century reveals little interest in the subject at the time, no revelatory antecedent
- no outcry from within or outside of the profession for school administrators to attend to
ethical concerns. In the early 1960s, school principals were mostly concerned with
improving their science and mathematics programs (Beck & Murphy, 1993). With the
advent of Taylor's principles of scientific management in the early part of the century and
their subsequent application to school administration, literature regarding the
principalship up to that time was primarily concerned with applying positivist research
methods to promote business-like efficiency in school organization (Beck & Murphy,
1993; Callahan, 1962; Maxcy, 2002). Beck and Murphy refer to the period between
1946 and 1985 as the "behavioral science era" in the principalship literature (Beck &
Murphy, 1993), and use the descriptor of principal as "businessperson" (1994, p. 20) to
capture aspects of the role. While ethical and efficient school administration are not
mutually exclusive interests, the subject was largely ignored in the literature of the day.
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There are a handfUl of notable exceptions, however. Both J. G. Harlow's ( 1 962)
Purpose-Defining: The Central Function ofthe School Administrator and Culbertson's
(1962) New Perspectives: Implicationsfor Program Change include a plea for
administrator preparation programs to pay attention to ethical issues (cited in Beck &
Murphy, 1994, p. 24, and Farquhar & Piele, 1972, p. 13). Culbertson was one of the
leading proponents of moving away from behavioral science in administrator preparation
programs and as early as 1 962 encouraged such programs to embrace an ethical approach
to school administration:
Knowledge about the social sciences cannot provide complete guides for dealing
with administrative processes. Moral issues face school leaders as they engage in
these processes, and such issues transcend scientific theories. ... Since
administrators have the task of selecting means which are effective and moral,
they frequently face value dilemmas in making decisions. (Culbertson, p. 161)
Farquhar published an article in 1968 entitled "The Humanities and Educational
Administration: Rationales and Recommendations," and in 1 972 he reiterated his
argument in favor of including humanities studies in programs of administrator
preparation:
Another, more precise, rationale supporting use of humanities content is as
follows: since purpose is a chief distinguishing feature among organizations,
since the determination and realization of organizational purpose requires the
administrator's skill in making value judgments, and since this skill can be
developed through exposure to content depicting value conflicts and moral
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dilemmas, the prospective administrator should study the humanities, where such
content abounds. (Farquhar & Piele, 1972, p. 13)
These three publications are overshadowed, however, by the volume of material
at the time written about school leadership as a behavioral science, where knowledge is
certain, successful practices can be replicated, and personal beliefs and values are
irrelevant.
Ethics in Educational Administration University Programs: Creators of the
ICnowledge Base
One way of learning about the significance of ethics in school administration is to
look at the amount and type of scholarly attention paid to the subject in university
programs. As school administrators typically gain their credentials through university
based preparation programs, university educators have been in a key position to
determine and prioritize the knowledge base required for school administrators. In 1978,
Silver and Spuck conducted a comprehensive analysis of all topics included in courses of
administrator preparation. They searched for no less than forty topics either addressed
specifically in the course title or embedded in broader content. They referred to their
study as "the most comprehensive survey of preparation programs in the United States in
the history of the profession," but they neglected to include the study of ethics in their
survey (Silver & Spuck, 1978, cited in Beck & Murphy, 1994, p. 23-24). In the same
year, Farquhar surveyed 48 universities for information regarding the inclusion of ethics
in their administration preparation programs. This was the only study to date of this
nature. Of these 48 universities, 18 responded, and of these 18, only 1 1 claimed to
include the topic of ethics anywhere in their courses. One respondent seemed to speak
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for universities everywhere when he or she said, "Ethics is an important topic and a
neglected one; we don't do much, or anything, specifically in this area at our institution"
(1981, p. 195, cited in Beck & Murphy, 1994, p. 25).
A Shift in Epistemology or Ways ofKnowing about School Administration
By the end of the 1970s, Americans had grown disillusioned with public
institutions, including schools (Lazerson, 1987, p. 44). There was a growing cynicism
regarding public institutions as people became more socially aware of systems of
oppression and injustices that had been perpetuated throughout the country's history, and
by school officials in particular (Friere, 1970; Kozol, 1967).
Perhaps in response to this cynicism regarding school leaders, researchers began
to seriously consider the role of ethics in the field. In 1976, responding to crhicism of the
University Council for Educational Administration (UCEA) for its noted departure from
behavioral science theory in its latest conference proceedings. Crane and Walker wrote:
Contrary to our thinking in the 1950s and 1960s we have come to the point of
view that the whole enterprise of educational administration is so immersed in a
value saturated matrix that "ought" theory cannot be ignored, and that to
deliberately separate it from "is" theory is not only unreal, but is seriously to
misunderstand what educafional administrafion is all about. (1976, p. 3)
The 1980s saw a shift at the university level regarding attitudes of what
constituted appropriate scholarly research in education, from positivistic methods to
interpretive, qualitative methods (Evers & Lakomski, 1991; Halpin, 1960). In 1984,
William P. Foster asserted the time had come for school administrators to stop basing
their decision-making on a knowledge base borne of "management science," citing the
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inability of positivistic research to inform the administrator of those aspects of school
administration that he believed was at the heart of the work of the organization:
Yet managers and school administrators perennially face the question of what the
organizational response should be to such issues as equality of opportunity,
effective teaching, and racial desegregation. These issues reflect the dynamics of
a pluralistic society, where groups conflict with each other for positions of power,
yet a science of management avoids confronting such questions with the excuse
that they lie outside of legitimate science: .... (Foster, 1984, p. 104)
From Theory to Practice
Foster set forth an ambitious goal for research which would "reconcile the theory-
praxis problem" of school administration, an effort "aimed at restructuring the modem
institution so that it can respond to the needs of all groups in society" (1984, p. 104). He
pointed to Herbert Simon's (1965) Administrative Behavior as the defmer of school
administration as a behavioral science, and argued that it marked the end of school
administration as an ethical endeavor:
Administrative Behavior found its inspiration in one major source - logical
positivism. The interpretation of the positivists' tenets led to the conclusion
expressed in Simon's work that administrators could only be concerned with the
factual verification of decisions, not with their ethical or moral content. Of
importance to administration was the maximization of efficiency, not the essential
rightness nor wrongness of the decisions, (p. 105)
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The following chapter headings are typical of the discrete technical skills
approach, or behavioral science educational administration literature prevalent in the
1960s and 1970s:
Chapter 1 : The Concept of School Organization
Chapter 3: Organization for Instruction
Chapter 6: Library Service
(Otto & Sanders, 1964)
Chapter 1 : Getting Better Results from Substitutes, Teacher Aides, and
Volunteers
Chapter 6: How to Run a More Efficient School Office
Chapter 12: Program Planning - Using Management-by-Objectives in
School Administration
(from Handbook ofSuccessful School Administration, 1974)
Chapter 1 : How to Evaluate Teacher, Principal, and School Climate
Chapter 3: Planning - How to Set Goals and Reach Them
Chapter 5: How to Improve School Climate
(Bean & Clemes, 1978).
Claiming the failure of positivist research approaches to adequately capture the
complex social phenomenon of school leadership, Foster called for
... a reformulation of administrative studies [which] would require the new
administrator to become conscious about the interrelationships that may occur
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between the social arena and the organization in question, and to recognize
through a reflective bracketing how the primitive concepts of his science may
covertly serve these social needs. (1984, p. 109)
Foster laid out a persuasive argument that it is the school administrator's
responsibility to redress some of the inequalities inherent in modem schooling, borne of
oppressive and hegemonic practices, and, in so doing, voiced a need for school leaders to
replace scientific management with ethical leadership in the center of the role. This
orientation represented an epistemological shift to a postmodem/poststructuralist
approach to school leadership, where positivist approaches had up to that point formed
the basis of study. The end of the twentieth century saw an increase in the perceived
legitimacy of the more subjective, qualitative forms of research that have potential to
elucidate the beliefs and values of school administrators. Beck and Murphy claim
".
. .rigorous attacks on the privileged place of science and on the absence of attention to
values in the profession reached a crescendo in the late 1980s and early 1990s" (Beck &
Murphy, 1994, p. 28).
Rather than take for granted the simple derivation of administrative science from
positivist social science, the postmodern administration theorists draw on new
philosophy, literary theory, qualitative research methods, and other nontraditional
intellectual backings. Educational administration, viewed from the metastructural
perspective, is informed by a wider variety of disciplines than the earlier




University programs were slow to respond to Foster's call. Norton and Levan's
1987 review of doctoral students in educational administrator programs found that "of the
665 education administration courses completed by these 78 students, not a single one
has a title that would suggest a focus on ethics or values" (cited in Beck & Murphy, 1 994,
pp. 25-26). Beck and Murphy, in their 1994 review of literature related to ethics in
administrator preparation programs, concluded ". . .it is difficult - if not impossible - to
see evidence of meaningful attention to issues of ethics in preparation programs in school
administration" (p. 26).
In 1988, however. Strike, Haller and Sohis had published their first edition of The
Ethics ofSchool Administration. This book was one of the first textbooks written
specifically for university based programs of educational administration. In it, the
authors presented a cursory discussion of ethical philosophy, concluding that most
dilemmas school administrators are likely to face are located within the framework of
deontology (or "Kantianism") versus utilitarianism. They refer to this dichotomy as "a
philosophical debate between the idea of respect for person and the idea of benefit
maximization" (Strike, Haller, and Sohis, 1988, p. ix). This book presents several case
studies of administrative ethical dilemmas along with relevant moral principles and
questions raised. After providing details of the case, the authors include an analysis of
competing principles that make up the dilemma, and then widen the discussion to include
the philosophical traditions invoked by the situation. The overall intention of the text is
to help aspiring or practicing school administrators think more clearly about the ethical
and moral dimension of their role, and become fluent in a language that is used in
communicating to self and others the ethical rationale for the decision-making. This
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book is now in its third edition, and Beck and Murphy found the original was being
widely used in places where ethics was taught as a separate course (Beck & Murphy,
1994, p. 64).
In 1993, William D. Greenfield published a chapter entitled "Articulating Values
and Ethics in Administrator Preparation" in which he called for "the formal consideration
of ethics in administrator preparation curricula" (p. 267). Greenfield argued persuasively
that the inclusion of ethics in administrator preparation courses is necessary due to the
"vital moral socialization funcfion" of schools, the compulsory nature of schooling, the
special responsibility of the school principal toward children and the school community,
and the potentially oppressive hegemonous power relationships that exist in schools
(1993, pp. 267 - 269). Greenfield wrote about the importance of the moral dimension of
educational leadership:
. . .the administrator's ability to exercise authority is rooted in a belief by the
teacher in the moral goodness or Tightness of the administrator's point of view.
With this approach the moral or ethical dimension of concern is neither the
character nor the specific actions of the administrator (although both of these are
relevant) but rather the moral basis of the authority relationship between the
administrator and the teacher. . . . Leadership, as used here, is differentiated from
power in being characterized by the voluntary acceptance by another of one's
influence. (1993, p. 275)
Greenfield envisioned coursework that would
. . . enable individuals to acquire the knowledge, pracfice the skills, and develop
attitudes that will enable them to identify and analyze the ethical dimensions of
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the kinds of problems and decisions they can expect to experience in doing school
administration, and to build personal confidence and the courage needed to make
difficult normative judgments. ^ (Greenfield, 1993, p. 281).
Greenfield then described in detail what the coursework should look like,
including a knowledge base of ethics and morality, Starratt's (1991) theory of ethical
schools, case studies, problem-solving approaches, and qualitative investigations into
school pracfices.
In 1992, Beck and Murphy replicated Farquhar's (1978 - 1981) study, publishing
their report in 1994. They found evidence of increased interest in ethics in university
programs of administrator preparation. They believed the reasons for increased interest
were attributed to (1) a growing belief in the connection between administrative problems
and ethical solutions - a pragmatic rationale; (2) a response to the call for increased
scholarship in this area by UCEA policy statement; or "emerging scholarship and reform
policy" and, for the largest number of respondents, (3) a belief that "educational
leadership was, at its core, an ethical endeavor" (Beck & Murphy, 1994, p. 36).
In the course of their study, as Farquhar had done 15 years earlier. Beck and
Murphy analyzed the course syllabi provided by 1 7 universities for course content. They
found that, of the 17 respondents, 7 universities considered ethics a "core part of their
program" and 8 had a specific course in ethics in school administration as an elective.
One had recently proposed a required course, and one had specific requirements for the
domain embedded in other leadership courses (Beck & Murphy, 1994, p. 57). They found
themes and patterns in the course syllabi, and categorized them under (1) course
'
It is interesting to note that in its (1996) Standards for School Administrators, the ISLLC frames its
standards under the headings "Knowledge, skills, and attitudes".
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purposes, (2) course content, and (3) pedagogical approaches (Beck & Murphy, 1994, p.
58).
Beck and Murphy fovmd that most courses tried to strike a balance between
teaching a knowledge base related to the "various schools of philosophical ethics,"
including historical as well as contemporary schools of thought (theory) and a
reasoning process used to address ethically "troubling" situations likely to be
encountered in the profession ("problems of practice") (Beck & Murphy, 1994, p. 59-
60). In the area of course content, Beck and Murphy found "there is little agreement
regarding the scope, nature, and guiding perspectives for ethics classes" (p. 64). Strike,
Haller and Soltis (1988) featured prominently in these classes. Guiding principles
based on theory, presented with case studies or topics, made up the course content for
eight university courses (Beck & Murphy, p. 64). Twelve syllabi revealed course
content that included readings from outside the educational field, primarily from
philosophy and sociology (p. 65). Beck and Murphy found that pedagogical
approaches ranged from deductive practices, where students were to "discover
relevance" by learning the theories first, and then "finding situations that might
illustrate or be informed by them" to inductive practices, where students were to read
an assortment of cases and then "uncover ethical theories, principles, and decision-
making approaches as they applied ..." to a combination of the two ("mixed") (Beck &
Murphy, p. 67-68).
Finally, Beck & Murphy found patterns in the course syllabi that reflected a
growing use of approaches which relied less on formal lecture and more on practical
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application of problem solving, specifically in the use of case study (Beck & Murphy,
1994, p. 72). They concluded that this reflects:
... a growing concern with developing skills in moral reasoning; a belief that
these skills should be practiced in simulated situations; an acceptance of the idea
that many problems facing leaders do not lend themselves to neat, easily
discovered solutions; and an interest in equipping prospective leaders to discuss
moral issues and present thoughtful rationales for positions and decisions, (p. 72)
They also noted a trend toward the use of reflection on "one's personal and
professional beliefs and actions" as an important learning tool - a trend, they say, that
indicates a move away from the assumption of school as a "rational bureaucracy" to be
studied through organizational behavior, as well as a "growing faith in the notion of
experiential learning" (Beck & Murphy, 1994, p. 74). Both trends parallel a growing
understanding of the way in which adults learn (Mezirow & Associates, 2000, Tennant
& Pogson, 1995), that is, with personal experience and reflection as a fundamental
teaching tool. Beck and Murphy also concluded that the increased use of readings
taken from the humanities reflected a change in thinking about the nature of the work of
school principal. They noted a departure from a technique-driven set of discrete skill
practice to a deeper understanding of personal and professional values and a reliance on
personal ethics as guide, regardless of action or decision.
Beck and Murphy ended their report with a proposal for a continued dialogue on
ethics. With the claim that contemporary discourse carried on by current ethicists is
inaccessible to those outside of the field of study. Beck and Murphy distilled the issues
and language to a set of concepts and language more accessible to people studying
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school leadership. They described a variety of assumptions within a set of issues that
are "inextricably linked to ethical commitments," citing current literature that has
informed scholarly dialogue. These issues are
1. Actual, perceived, and desired conceptions of purposes of education;
2. Beliefs about human nature;
3. Understandings of actual and ideal communities;
4. Perceptions of value, the nature of commitments to pursue them, and the
role of ethics in helping persons honor those commitments;
5. Epistemological assumptions regarding the nature of "truth" and "reality,''
legitimate types of knowledge, and strategies for inquiry and discovery;
6. Attitudes toward moral tensions, ambiguities, uncertainties, and
paradoxes. (Beck & Murphy, 1994, p. 82)
Beck and Murphy called on professors in educational leadership programs to
move away from the teaching of ethics as a technique-driven system of problem-
solving principles and guidelines, and toward an open dialogue about what it means to
"promote moral thinking and acting" (Beck & Murphy, 1994, p. 95) in a profession
characterized by complexity and ambiguity.
Review of Research in Practice
Humble Beginnings
Although researchers have paid some attention to the study of ethics for school
administrators in university programs (Beck & Murphy, 1994), little attention has been
paid to the role of ethics in administrative practice. Three years after the AASA
published its Code of Ethics, Dexheimer published a paper entitled The ethics ofchief
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school administrators: A study ofaccommodation. In this paper he presented his
findings from a survey in which school superintendents were asked how they would
respond to a situation with ethical implications. More often than not, Dexheimer found
"non-ethical replies" (1969, p. 277). In 1984, Ashbough and Kasten found only 7% of
the articles in Educational Administration Quarterly dating back to 1 965 concerned
themselves with ethical issues.
Ethics in School Administration in the Reform Era
In its 1989 reform agenda, the National Policy Board for Education
Administration listed "moral and ethical dimensions of schooling" (p. 19) as a curriculum
strand. In 1990, Kirby, Paradise, and Protti conducted research designed to "describe
typical ethical dilemmas confronted by educational administrators and to determine
normative levels of ethical reasoning of practicing school administrators" (1990, p. 2).
Their research consisted of two phases: In the first phase, 23 school principals were
asked to describe a "typical ethical dilemma that they had experienced," with follow up
questions probing alternatives considered, actions taken, input from others,
consequences, support from supervisors, and "a retrospective evaluation of the choices
made" (1990, p. 2). They found over half of the respondents described dilemmas
involving teacher competence. Other dilemmas centered around student behavior,
teacher/student conflicts, or teacher/parent conflicts.
Using a rating scale modeled after Kohlberg's stages of moral development (Van
Hoose and Paradise, 1979), Kirby, Paradise, and Protti categorized principal reported




Stage 1 : Individuals operating from a punishment orientation base decisions on
prevailing rules and standards.
Stage 2: characterized by an institutional orientation; rules and policies of the
institution of affiliation dictate judgments.
Stage 3: ethical reasoning is guided by societal orientation, a concern for the
general welfare of society.
Stage 4: an individual orientation prevails; concern for the client takes
precedence over legal, professional or societal norms.
Stage 5: decisions are formulated in accordance with an internalized code of
ethics. (Kirby, et al., 1990, p. 3)
An analysis of responses indicated that the largest group (31%) operated from
stage 3 reasoning. "Prevailing rules of the organization explained reasoning ..." (Kirby,
et al., 1990, p. 3). 19% of the respondents were judged to reason at or above stage 4
("individual") reasoning, and 6% operated at stage 1 ("punishment") levels. In
presenting their results, the authors acknowledged the possibility that the respondents
may be describing their behavior in higher stage terms than their actual behavior
represented.
In phase two, the authors posed dilemmas cited in phase one to 17 administrators,
offering alternatives gleaned from phase one information, and asked them to describe
what they would do in this case and what they thought their peers would do. This second
question was posed because, according to the authors, it "may give a more complete
account of how typical administrators do respond," although the authors don't offer any
support as to why this might be so. The authors do point out, however, that the two sets
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of responses will "disclose the degree of comfort with and trust in the moral character of
individuals in educational administration" (Kirby, Paradise, and Protti, 1990, p. 5).
Responses were rated for participants and their perceptions of peer behavior along
the stage continuum. The authors were careful to point out that there was no value
ascribed to particular behaviors, but that the reasoning behind the choice was the unit of
analysis. Interestingly, the authors found that when describing his or her own reasoning,
the average school administrator described Stage 3 reasoning, but when describing
perceptions of peer behavior, presented a lower basis of reasoning in one out of three
cases. These principals perceived their typically behaving peer operating from Stage 2
reasoning.
"*
In 1 99 1 , Millerborg and Hyle reported their findings of a quantitative study in
which they assessed 306 elementary principals', secondary principals', and district
superintendents' ability to "make ethical and legal decisions as well as their reported
behavior decision pattern when ethical and legal options were in conflict" (Millerborg &
Hyle, 1991, p. 2). Assuming that legal and ethical conflicts occur in the daily life of
'^
Although the information obtained from this research is helpful in highlighting the typical
dilemmas faced by school principals during this time period, and the degree of disappointing ethical
behavior reported for "typical peers" informs us about the professional context in which principals
believe they operate, conclusions here are limited in several ways. First, in categorizing responses, the
authors rely on a derivation of a moral reasoning scale (Kohlberg's) that (1) was not intended by its
author to be used in such a fashion and (2) has undergone much criticism for being mcomplete (and
therefore flawed) (Lay) and male biased (Gilligan, 1982, and Friedman, 1985). Second, the notion of a
"typical peer" is so vague as to be meaningless. Arendt (1951, 1994, 2003 ) and Benhabib (1992),
contemporary ethicists, argue vehemently for the recognition of the "concrete other" and the "plurality of
perspectives" when making moral determinations. In reality, there exists no "typical peer," and any
respondent trying to gauge the behavior of such a nonexistent entity has an impossible task. Finally,
stage three reasoning, appearing of lesser value than stages four and five, is that which incorporates legal
considerations. Operating outside the law is irresponsible for any school administrator, regardless of
personal inclination to behave otherwise. School principals are duty bound to act in compliance with
laws surrounding schooling, and if they disagree with the laws, must work within the democrafic process
to change them. That school administrators base their ethical decision-making on legal considerations
should not be considered of lesser "value" than the other two stages of reasoning.
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school leaders, these authors examined the decision-making of respondents for prevailing
concerns or "choice patterns" (p. 6). Using a questionnaire that called for making a
choice between an ethical decision or a legal one, the authors found a significant number
chose the ethical-but-illegal over the legal-but-unethical. They found no significant
difference in responses with regard to gender, age, school size, district size, highest
degree held, or ethics preparation, but they did find that secondary principals were more
likely than the elementary principals to make an ethical but illegal choice (Millerborg &
Hyle, 1991,p. 14).
In 1992, Campbell presented qualitative research intended to "introduce a larger
empirical study that examines conflict and tension between individuals' beliefs about
right and wrong and collective ethical imperatives within the context of schools"
(Campbell, p. 1). Although her empirical study had not yet been completed, Campbell
provided results from an introductory qualitative study designed to inform the reader
about the moral conflicts faced by teachers and administrators in schools, to "examine the
problem of the professional teacher and administrator having a moral conscience but
working within a school with its own, perhaps conflicting, ethical components"
(Campbell, p. i). The author, citing research from the business world, assumed that
teachers and administrators, like corporate workers, found themselves in moral conflict
over issues in which the institution or the collective (in this case the school system)
demanded one thing while their individual conscience demanded another. Campbell
pointed out the divergent perspectives inherent in the philosophical study of ethics (i.e.
subjectivism vs. objectivism, relativism and emotivism vs. absolutism and positivism),
but stated that, for the purposes of the study, she would begin with the presumption that
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there exists in the minds of the individual and the collective, an objectivist idea of right
and wrong:
Ultimately the philosophical problem of right and wrong has implications for
choice, self-reproach, and nagging doubts that plague individuals as they confront
issues involving integrity, hypocrisy, conscience, agony, and guilt within the
realm of moral and ethical behaviour and belief" (Campbell, 1992, p. 16)
Acknowledging that the "big stories" of ethical and moral compromise on the part
of school officials tended to receive notoriety, Campbell claimed that she was more
interested in the "smaller, less sensational incidents in which moral agency is either
compromised or ignored [on the part of both teachers and principals]" (Campbell, 1992,
p. 23). She was hopeful that her findings would "increase the level of moral and ethical
awareness and clarity of educators" (Campbell, 1992, p. 25). Campbell conducted her
research around eight significant questions regarding the ethical dilemmas encountered
by teachers and principals, what they did about it, and what they thought about what they
had done in the context of their own morals and the collective ethic of their schools. Her
initial findings led her to the conclusion that the later empirical study would best be
structured conceptually around theories of situational adjustment, social strategies of
compliance, and role conflict (Grace, 1972; Lacey, 1977, cited in Campbell, 1992, p.
30). Campbell concluded the main finding of her initial qualitafive research was that
teachers, although somefimes willing to go against administrative directives on moral
principle, were disinclined to go against "collegial norms and values" (Campbell, 1992,
p. 31), underscoring the validity of Shapiro and Stefkovich's theory that an "ethic of the
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profession" exists separately from personal ethical belief systems (discussed later in this
paper).
Standards of practice are a hallmark of recent education reform efforts. In 1996,
the Interstate School Leaders Licensure Consortium (ISLLC) adopted the Standards for
School Leaders. Six standards of expected performance were described within a
framework of Knowledge, Disposhions, and Performances. The fifth standard focused
on ethics. (See Table 1) It reads, "A school administrator is an educational leader who
promotes the success of all students by acting with integrity, fairness, and in an ethical
manner" (ISLLC, 1996)
Table 1
ISLLC Standard 5: The Ethics Standard
Knowledge: The administrator has knowledge and understanding of:
• Various ethical frameworks and perspectives on ethics
• The purpose of education and the role of leadership in modem society
• The values of the diverse school community
• Professional code of ethics
• The philosophy and history of education
Disposhions: The administrator believes in, values, and is committed to:
• The ideal of the common good
• The principles in the Bill of Rights
• The right of every student to a free, quality education
• Bringing ethical principles to the decision-making process
• Subordinating one's own interest to the good of the school community
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• Accepting the consequences of upholding one's principles and actions
• Using the influence of one's office constructively and productively in the service
of all students and their families
• Development of a caring school community
Performances: The administrator:
• Examines personal and professional values
• Demonstrates a personal and professional code of ethics
• Demonstrates values, belies, and attitudes that inspire others to higher levels of
performance
• Serves as a role model
• Accepts responsibility for school operations
• Considers the impact of one's administrative practices on others
• Uses the influence of the office to enhance the educational program rather than for
personal gain
• Treats people fairly, equitably, and with dignity and respect
• Protects the rights and confidentiality of students and staff
• Demonstrates appreciation for and sensitivity to the diversity in the school
community
• Recognizes and respects the legitimate authority of others
• Examines and considers the prevailing values of the diverse school community




• Opens the school to public scrutiny
• Fulfills legal and contractual obligations
• Applies laws and procedures fairly, wisely, and considerately (ISLLC, 1996).
In a 1999 study conducted by Maxcy, Tashakkori & Iwanicki, a majority (71%)
of participating principals in Louisiana ranked the Ethics Standard as having the most
value for them. Interestingly, this same set of respondents indicated the least amount of
desire for professional development in this area (Maxcy, 2002).
In 1998, Grogan and Smith conducted a study of women superintendents'
approaches to moral dilemmas. The authors interpreted data compiled from interviews
with 1 1 women superintendents through a "feminist morality" framework, one which
focuses on the ethic of care promoted by Gilligan (1982), Beck (1994) and Noddings
(1984). These superintendents reported that, for them, the most vexing dilemmas were
those that involved staff and students and implementing punitive sanctions. The
superintendents were acutely aware of the pain they were causing by dismissal of staff
and expulsion of students, but in the end were compelled to act in what they believed
were the best interests of the students. In their decision-making, they relied on
"localized knowledge of the particular people involved in the incidents, on the capacity
to imagine the other's situation based on prior personal experience and on the ethic of
care" (Grogan & Smith, 1998), aspects of leadership which have been associated with
feminist moral theory.
In 1999, Kevin Roche published the findings of his qualitative research designed
to "determine how five principals in Catholic school settings actually respond to moral
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and ethical dilemmas within their professional role" (p. 256). Using four hypothetical
case scenarios as the context for interviewing, the author found that these principals
used avoidance, suspending their own morality, creative insubordination, and personal
morality as strategies for coping with ethical dilemmas, in contrast to prior research
claims (Campbell-Evans, 1988) that school principals tended to employ rational,
consequentialist decision-making processes.
Finally, in 2004, Dempster, Carter, Freakley and Parry published resuUs of their
study that looked at Contextual influences on school leaders in Australia. Australia has
more recently undergone educational reform that includes, much like recent reform in
the United States, such aspects as
...the imposition of strong competition and accountability frameworks on public
institutions; the articulation of standards and measures of performance; an
emphasis on corporate forms of governance; a stress on results or outputs, not
processes; and last but not least, the downsizing and decentralization of the public
sector. (Dempster, et al.)
The authors contend that it is this last aspect of reform - which they refer to as
"site-based management" - which causes the most tension for school principals as they
try to reconcile the demands associated with being "a semi-autonomous leader" and a
"line manager accountable to bureaucrats" (Dempster, Carter, Freakley and Parry
2004, p. 164). Through survey and interview data, the authors set out to discover the
nature and extent of "micro-contextual and macro-contextual influences" (p. 163) on
principal ethical decision-making. They asserted that the reform mandates have led to
three phenomena in the work of the Australian school principal, namely,
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"decentralization, intensification, and complexification" of the role. They label these
phenomena "market-oriented trends." (Dempster, et al., 2004, p. 165) In looking at the
most pervasive "micro-contextual influences" on principal decision-making, they found
that most principals reported their own work experience in education, on the job
leadership, and parents of children in the school carried the most influence. Following
closely was the influence of professional colleagues. Professional development was
reported to have the least influence (Dempster, et al., p. 165). When the data was
disaggregated, the authors found, not surprisingly, that the principals with the most
tenure relied on their own work experience to influence their decision-making.
However, they also found that the longer a principal had been in the role, the less they
relied on their professional colleagues, and that the influence of professional
development lessened as their tenure increased. When they looked at the data for
gender differences, they foimd that women principals were more likely than men to be
influenced by their colleagues and by professional development.
These authors also found that with decentralization and site-based management,
principals no longer took their directives from people "in senior positions" but instead
looked to others for guidance. Most often, these principals turned to other principals (a
strong majority), senior department officers, and senior administration team members,
in that order (Dempster, Carter, Freakley and Parry, 2004, p. 166). One third
acknowledged their spouse or partner as an influential consultant. The authors
conclude that, although they had initially believed that site-based management would
preclude principals from seeking consultation from senior administrators, "those with a
knowledge of the context in which they are expected to work are considered more
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important sources of support than those without that direct knowledge" (Dempster, et
al.,p. 167).
Turning their attention to the macro-contextual influences on principals' decision-
making, the authors describe the ethical tensions feh by principals as they are forced to
contend with the "marketing" of their schools. These principals reported pressure
under reform to generate income for their schools through increasing enrollments and
getting corporate sponsorships and endorsements. ^'Dealing with the promotion and
marketing ofthe school was the most troublesome of the three finance and funding-
related items for public school principals" (Dempster, Carter, Freakley and Parry, 2004,
p. 170). Most of the principals reported that prioritizing marketing over sound
educational practice provided a context of ethical dilemmas for them.
Dempster, Carter, Freakley and Parry conclude that professional development for
principals in Australia should address their need for "support networks to assist them in
their ethical decision-making processes" as well as a "knowledge base about the macro-
contextual influences likely to impact on local decisions" (2004, p. 172).
Emerging Theory in the Field of Ethics in School Administration: A Review of
Prominent Literature
Robert J. Starratt and "Building an Ethical School
"
In 1994, Robert J. Starratt wrote Building an Ethical School: A Practical
Response to the Moral Crisis in Schools. Using strong language, Starratt declared an
urgent need to "marshall the resources" necessary to build ethical schools, to "take stock
of our present situation in schools" and to "grasp the enormity of the task facing us"
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(1994, p. 3). He wrote, "That task is no less than the task of reversing a massive
deterioration in the ethical life of our society" (p. 3), and he supported this claim by citing
"...increases in murder, rape, muggings, child abuse and other domestic violence, drug
addiction, drug related crime, white-collar crime, corporate violation of tax,
environmental, and price rigging laws" (p. 4).
Children, says Starratt, are particularly vulnerable to this decaying ethical
environment: "Besides the violence, depravity and deception found in public life,
children and youth encounter appeals to the most self-indulgent, childish, manipulative
and pornographic fantasies in the entertainment and advertising media" (Starratt, 1994, p.
4) and he cites statistics that claim an increase in violent and drug related behavior over
the past twenty years. Starratt fears "as more and more young people grow up with a
disregard for community standards of behavior, our society is in danger of descending
into ethical anarchy" (p. 5).
Starratt claims that schools, rather than helping the situation, add to the problem
in several ways. First, schools' emphasis on the child as an individual overshadows the
idea of school as community. Individual achievement is the focus and the mission, to the
detriment of the collective progress of the classroom or school in a learning community.
This emphasis on individual growth leads to the second school based problem - increased
competition among students and families, a phenomenon which Starratt claims is
promoted by teachers and other school personnel, and is based on what he believes is
misplaced blame on the schools for a declining U.S. economy. Third, he says an
emphasis on testing and "superficial mastery of the subject matter" does nothing to help
students understand the "important questions" of the subject, or find the "larger pattern of
70

relationships among the bits of inforaiation" which would help students relate scholarship
to personal experience and the human condition (p. 20). Starratt likens "achievement"
with "getting ahead," and claims knowledge is "divorced from value and from a moral
quest" (p. 22). Fourth, Starratt claims that schools have become separate entities unto
themselves, their own "private reality," devoid of personal responsibility to the larger
world. Finally, Starratt believes that children in schools are forced to conform to
authority without opportunity to think for themselves about the meaning of right and
wrong.
Whether or not Starratt' s claims are as dire as he presents them, his writing is
consistent with other writings of the time that uses the degradation of society as the
impetus for reform efforts which include a focus on ethical behavior (Lickona, 1989). In
making recommendations for turning around this problem of moral degradation
promulgated by schools, Starratt describes his ideas about the qualities of an ethical
person, bringing up the parallel dimensions of autonomy and cormectedness. He provides
a "multidimensional ethical framework" for analyzing the "ethical content of situations"
(Starratt, 1994, p. 45), a framework which consists of three lenses: the ethics of critique,
justice, and caring.
Citing postmodern literature describing the oppressive and hegemonous nature of
schooling (Friere, 1970; Giroux, 1988) Starratt first promotes the ethic of critique "...for
enabling the school community to move from a kind of naivete about 'the way things are'
to an awareness that the social and political arena reflect arrangements of power and
privilege" (Starratt, 1994, p. 47).
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The second lens Starratt presents is the ethic ofjustice. He divides this area into
two schools of thought: The first, based on the early teachings of Hobbes and found in
the contemporary writings of John Rawls, looks at ethical behavior among individuals as
a social contract, whereby people in a society agree to treat one another fairly in order to
serve their own advantage. The second school of thought within the ethic ofjustice,
Starratt says, emphasizes community over the individual, is based on the works of
Aristotle and Dewey, and looks at the community, rather than the individual, as the great
promoter ofjustice and ethical behavior.
The third lens Starratt presents is that of the ethic of care. Promoted by Noddings
(1984), Beck (1994), and Gilligan (1982), this ethic emphasizes valuing personal
relationships as the agent of ethical behavior, and a genuine concern for the dignity and
worth of all people as the overall arbiter of ethical behavior and decision making.
Starratt' s book urges administrators to look at school leadership decision-making
through all three lenses, fostering practices that exemplify commitment to the ideals of
each. He makes concrete suggestions for school-based practices that promote the
perspectives ofjustice, care, and critique, such as student government, home-school
associations, and means of implementing discipline, scheduling, curricular and extra-
curricular programs. His book is prescriptive in detailing steps involving in "building an
ethical school," and as such, is helpful to aspiring and current principals in assessing their
own beliefs and practices toward this end.
Thomas J. Sergiovanni and "Moral Leadership
"
In 1992, Thomas J. Sergiovanni wrote Moral Leadership: Getting to the Heart of
School Improvement. This book was a natural extension of Sergiovanni' s prior work in
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exhorting school administrators to put human interests first in the running of schools
(Sergiovanni, 1990). Although consistent with other works of the early nineties which
call for school leaders to cultivate their ethical side, Sergiovanni 's book goes a bit further
in asking school leaders to actually step aside and allow the school community's
collective "moral authority" to act as the leader of the school. Sergiovanni describes a
school community's "covenanf as the collective allegiance to the school's purpose,
values, and goals. According to Sergiovanni, the school community's covenant is the
best substitute for hierarchical, technical, or psychological (charismatic) leadership, and it
is the principal's job to nurture that covenant and the people within the community who
serve h. Building on Peter Vaill's (1984) description of "purposing" as a primary
leadership function, Sergiovanni claims that it is the school's covenant that "provides the
added dimension of values and moral authority, to make purposing count" (Sergiovarmi,
1992, p. 73).
Joan P. Shapiro and Jacqueline A. Stefkovich and "The Ethic ofthe Profession
"
In 1984, Van Cleve Morris, in an essay entitled "Plato's 'Philosopher-King':
Position Impossible," argued against the place of ethical philosophy in the day to day
work of school administrators:
The administrator may have a desire to understand, but there isn't time.
Understanding can wait. By definition, the administrator is situational, oriented to
a circumstance which calls out for resolution or redefinition. The situation may,
in the long future, be understood as part of a larger whole, but right now it is a
situation requiring movement to a new condition, a new situation. The
administrator's life is focused on this priority of immediacy." (Morris, p. 132)
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It was with an eye to this phenomenon and other unique constraints placed upon
school administrators that Shapiro and Stefkovich built on Starratt's "multiparadigm
approach" to ethical decision making for school leaders (Shapiro & Stefkovich, 2001).
Finding that most existing ethics books designed for school administrators took a
predominately "justice" perspective, these authors presented cases involving ethical
dilemmas through multiple perspectives: the ethic ofjustice (drawing from the works of
Kant, Rawls, and Kohlberg, theories of Act Utilitarianism and Act Deontology, and the
more recent and school oriented Strike, Haler, and Sohis, 1998); the ethic of critique
(based on the writings of Foucault, Friere, and Giroux); the ethic of care (Beck, 1994;
Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986; Noddings, 1984); and their own ethic of
the profession.^ Partly in response to the Interstate School Leaders Licensure Consortium
(ISLLC, 1996) revised competencies for school administrators which called for an
understanding of ethical issues, and partly because they felt the predominant view of the
justice paradigm (with a focus on codes, rules, and principles) was insufficient given the
special context of educational decision-making, Shapiro and Stefkovich presented the
ethic of the profession as a response to the "day to day personal and professional
dilemmas educational leaders face" (2001, p. 20). This ethic takes into account the
individual's perceptions of right and wrong, the community's standards, "including both
the professional community and the community in which the leader works; formal codes
of ethics established by professional associations; and written standards of the profession
(ISLLC, 1996)" (p. 22), with the ultimate goal to "place students at the center of the
ethical decision-making process" (p. 23).
^ Shapiro and Stefkovich do not sufficiently credit Starratt with this original conceptual framework,




Thus, taking all these factors into consideration, Shapiro and Stefkovich's ethic of
the profession would have administrators ask questions within the justice, critique, and
care paradigms, but would have them go beyond these questions to ask what the
profession would expect and what is in the best interests ofthe students taking into
account the fact that they may represent highly diverse populations (Shapiro &
Steflkovich, 2001, p. 25). Their book presents several case studies involving dilemmas
faced by school leaders, with accompanying questions designed to promote reflective
thinking amongst graduate level students studying school administration.
Ethical Leadership in the Twenty-first Century
In the early 1990s, researchers and writers in the field of school administration did
heed Foster's and Greenfield's calls for a "renewed discourse" (Slater, 1991) in
administration scholarship. That discourse now takes place within the context of
education reform. One of the central goals of education reform has been to equalize
learning opportunities and outcomes for all groups of children, including and especially
those groups previously marginalized (Edmunds, 1979, Purkey & Smith, 1983). With
federal education reform mandates of the early twenty-first century (No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001, US Dept. of Educafion), the work of schools is evaluated on
evidence of achievement - not simply evidence of good processes and intentions, and
students' test scores are disaggregated to illuminate the performance of subgroups of
children according to race, income level, and presence or absence of disability. This
demand for universal achievement has brought several ethical aspects of school
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leadership, including distribution of resources and equality of educational opportunity
sharply into focus.
"As social and cultural diversity increases, as equity becomes a greater social
priority, and as demands for fiscal restraint persist, the circumstances of decision making
in educational organizations become more complex and challenging" (Begley, 1999, p.
3). In this era of accountability, codified in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, the
challenges of school administrators take on a more "high stakes" nature than ever before.
Outcomes of schooling indicated by students' test scores determine whether or not
schools will be able to continue operating under their own jurisdiction or be subject to
punitive sanctions that limit self control. The consequences of underperformance, or not
making Adequate Yearly Progress ("AYP"), include the mandate to offer support
services (at the system's expense), allowing for school choice, (in spite of logistical
constraints), and "school restructuring," including the firing of school administrators.
School performance is publicized by the media, influencing a community's perception of
the relative success or failure of school efforts. The need for school principals to make
decisions that will lead to student achievement has never been greater. Resolution of
ethical dilemmas in school leadership takes place in a context of anxious public scrutiny.
To say that principals' livelihoods depend on reaching continually rising benchmarks is
not an overstatement - even as the dilemmas of school leadership grow increasingly
complex.
Kenneth Leithwood offers several changing conditions of schooling that add to
the complexity of the work of the school and, hence, the decision-making responsibilities
of the school principal. They are (1) the "end of the borrow now, pay later" fiscal
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mentality of school finance leaders, which has resulted in cutting back or combining
programs in the name of efficiency; (2) the "end of the belief that all nontraditional
family structures are rare enough to be safely ignored by schools," resulting in the
school's increasing need to take on roles and functions previously thought to belong to
parents; (3) the "end of society's willingness to assign major decision-making authority
to professional expertise," resulting in increased parent involvement in decision-making;
(4) the "end of the public school's technical naivete," resulting in increasing complexity
of the informational infrastructure of the school; (5) the changing "contemporary
understanding ofhow learning occurs" resulting in the cry for constructivist instructional
practices; and (6) "widespread recognition of the need for lifelong learning," requiring
that schools attend to the learning needs of students both younger and older than those
previously served (Leithwood, 1999, pp 30-35). Maxcy cites anxiety around test scores
as well as growing incidences of violence and discipline problems as further evidence of
the current challenges to ethical school leadership (2002, p. 13). Maxcy also presents
increasing cultural diversity in schools as a context for ambiguity in decision-making:
What began as a monolithic educational space in the early nineteenth century,
dominated by one culture and one set of values, has moved through phases of
cultural pluralism, the mehing pot, cultural diversity, cultural identity, and now
cultural isolation. Schools are more segregated than ever before, and fewer
shared values have a common following. A cultural noise resonates against the
rhetoric of national tests, school report cards, and the struggle toward
effectiveness. (Maxcy, 2002, p. 4)
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As recently as 1 999 Kenneth Leithwood questioned the "practical utility" of
studying ethical practices of school administrators, citing the presumption that most
school leaders are prone to behave ethically based on their professional inclinations, the
public scrutiny of school leaders' actions, and the "unclear, difficuh to assess" goals of
the school organization which promote consistency with rules and traditional practices as
reasons why it is perhaps a topic not worthy of rigorous study (Leithwood, in Begley, p.
26). In 2007, however, six years into the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, the goals are
no longer difficult to assess. Either a school makes its AYP or it doesn't. School leaders
are still the same people, with the same ethical intentions, and their decisions still fall
under public scrutiny, but the success or failure to achieve goals is now clear. It makes
one wonder if school principals are now approaching their decision-making differently
than they have in the past. It is easy to see how decisions involving teacher performance,
distribution of resources, instructional and curricular priorities, etc., might take on a more
consequentialist or outcomes-based character, where adherence to principles or a non-
consequentialist stance may have characterized principal decision-making in an earlier
time.
In the afterword of his book of essays entitled Postmodern School Leadership:
Meeting the Crisis in Educational Administration (1994), Spencer Maxcy writes
Efforts are afoot to redefine educational administration from a moral and ethical
perspecfive. Certainly T. Greenfield, Bates, and others led the way in this regard.
In the wings wait those who would have leadership in schools cast as a bit player.
Moral/ethical features of community life are pervasive, but they are also messy.
We lack the same kind of rigorous methods for dealing with such values.
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Nonetheless, commitment to the discourse/practice of value leadership has a
Pygmalian effect: If we believe such values to be central, they can become so.
Where we seek to marginalize morals and ethics, they will end up beyond our
grasp. (1994, p. 158)
In my research related to the ethical and moral dimension of educational
leadership, I hope to add my voice to others who have so passionately argued in favor of
placing ethical decision making squarely in the center - not in the margins - of the role of
the school principal.
METHODOLOGY
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to explore and describe individual principals'
experiences of ethical decision-making in a complex era. I presume that most school
principals have a vivid memory of an experience when they were forced to make a
"tough decision" - one that challenged them to take a position in spite of competing and
deeply felt moral values. I am interested to know how they encountered this dilemma,
what they thought and how they feh about it, what values they brought to bear, what
advice they sought and from whom, how they resolved the dilemma, and what effect the
experience had on their own leadership. A fuller understanding of these "watershed
moments" will contribute to the current knowledge base of the role of the school
principal, with implications for principal preparation programs, professional development
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of current and aspiring school principals and teachers, and policy making that can support
sustainable leadership condhions. Robert J. Starratt, author of Building an Ethical School
(1994) and the more recent Ethical Leadership (2004), writes that "many ethical
problems have no easy solution" and urges that "research be undertaken to gain a better
understanding of the personal struggles of those who must make difficult moral choices"
(Starratt, 1994, cited in Beck & Murphy, 1994, p. ix) It is with a desire to contribute to
the current understanding of the ethical dimension of school leadership that I undertake
this research.
The Study
In this study I explored how selected elementary school principals experience the
phenomenon of decision-making when faced with an ethical dilemma and described the
essential meanings that they brought to the experience upon reflection. I structured the
study around the framework of phenomenological inquiry because I was interested in
learning about the lived experiences of the selected participants as they were engaged in a
single phenomenon - decision-making when faced with an ethical dilemma in their
principalship. I selected eleven participants to interview based on the following criteria:
participants were elementary school principals who
• possessed a vivid memory of being faced with an ethical dilemma that required
conscientious decision-making;
• were able and willing to reflect on their experience and talk about it candidly;





Formulate an overall question that has "both social meaning and personal
significance" (Moustakas, 1994, p. 104). Identify several research questions that
form the framework of the overall inquiry.
2. Describe the philosophical perspectives behind phenomenological research, that
is, "the concept of studying how people experience a phenomenon" (Creswell,
1998, p. 54). This included a description ofmy attempts toward the Epoche, or
bracketing my own preconceptions about the topic as a necessary first step toward
understanding how they might influence my inquiry. This step also included a
discussion of intentionality, noema, and noesis that form the underlying
conceptual framework of phenomenological study (Husserl).
3. Formulate interview questions that will lead the participants to provide a textured
description of the event and uncover the essential meanings therein;
4. Collect data through semi-structured interviews, using the research questions as a
basis for the dialogue; audio-tape and transcribe interviews.
5. Analyze the data through a process that includes horizontalization (or listing and
preliminary grouping of every expression relevant to the experience), reduction
and elimination of overlapping, repetitive, and vague expressions, in order to
determine "invariant constituents of the experience," clustering and thematizing
the invariant constituents, and validation of the invariant constituents and themes
by application to the participants' entire transcript;
6. Construct for each "co-researcher" (Moustakas' term for participant) an
Individual Textural Description of the experience (that is, a description of the
event);

7. Construct for each co-researcher an Individual Structural Description of the
experience (that is, a description of "the underlying dynamics of the experience",
beyond what is seen and accounted for on the surface)^
8. Construct for each co-researcher a Textural-Structural Description of the
meanings and essences of the experience (Moustakas, 1994, pp. 120-121).
The final outcome of the research emerged as a "composite description of the meanings
and essences of the experience, representing the group [selected elementary school
principals] as a whole (Moustakas, p. 121).
Guiding Research Questions
In this study I explored how selected elementary school principals experienced
the phenomenon of decision-making when faced with an ethical dilemma. Ethical
dilemma, in this case, is the term used to describe an event which calls for a decision to
be made when moral values or ethical principles are in conflict. The structure of the
overall phenomenon is framed by the following guiding research questions:
1
.
What is the nature and description of the ethical dilemma?
2. How did the participants learn of the need for decision-making? (Interview
question)
* After attempting to separate the textura! from the structural description of two co-researchers' stories, I
began to combine the two descriptions in the initial writing with the third through the tenth. Separating the
event from the underlying dynamics, feelings, and context proved to me to be too unnatural a way to relate
an experience.
^ Although these research questions are reminiscent ofthose used in Protti's study (described in review of
literature), those researchers asked their participants to describe a "typical ethical dilemma" encountered in
their work. I am asking participants to identify an atypical event - a moral and ethical dilemma that had
them sfruggling for the answer and that somehow affected their notions of leadership.
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3. What were the alternatives explored, and what were their likely outcomes?
(Interview question)
4. Who were the stakeholders involved, i.e. who stood to gain or lose in the
outcome? (Interview question)
5. What moral values emerged as being influential in the decision-making process?
6. What ethical principles emerged as being important to the decision-making
process?
7. How did the participants acquire these moral values and ethical principles?
8. Did the participant seek advice? If so, from whom, and why? (Interview
question)
9. What did the participant decide to do in order to resolve the dilemma? (Interview
question)




In retrospect, is the participant satisfied with his or her decision? If so, why? And
if not, why not? (Interview question)
12. How has the event affected the participants' view of their own leadership?
Discussion of the research questions:
1 . What is the nature and description of the ethical dilemma?
Moustakas writes, "The aim [of phenomenological research] is to determine what
an experience means for the persons who have had the experience and are able to provide
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a comprehensive description of it" (1994, p. 13). This question was designed to provide a
complete, textured portrayal of the ethical dilemma as the focus of study.
2. How did the participants learn of the need for decision-making?
If the first question was designed to elicit a detailed description of the event, the
second question was designed to provide insight into what precipitated the event, the
"...feelings, sense experiences, and thoughts, the structures that underlie textures and are
intimately bound within them" (Moustakas, 1994, p. 78). How a participant comes to
realize that he or she is in fact facing a moral struggle reveals much about the person's
values and ethical principles. Lashway writes:
To be a school leader is to live with ethical dilemmas. Not just a few times a
year, not just weekly, but every day. The dilemmas come in various forms.
Sometimes they announce themselves like flashing neon signs; sometimes they
try to slip past disguised as mere technical problems; and sometimes they just
lurk in the background, throbbing like a toothache that won't quite go away.
(1996, p. 103)
Whether overtly or covertly, at some point the competing values rear their heads and
make themselves known, and, in so doing, announce their prominent status within the
moral and ethical identity of the participants.
3. What were the alternatives explored, and what were their likely outcomes?
This question expanded the boundaries of the event, by going beyond what
happened to what might have happened, but still remaining within the event itself as it
was experienced by the participant. Alternatives considered and then rejected reveal
much about the participants' prioritizing of competing values and principles. If an
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alternative was considered, what was initially attractive about it? What value or principle
might have been promoted? If it was then rejected, why so? This question encouraged
participants to make fine distinctions between desirable alternatives, ultimately
illuminating that which was more important for them.
4. Who were the stakeholders involved, i.e. who stood to gain or lose in the
outcome?
Sensitivity to the impact one's decision has on others is often at the root of an
ethical dilemma, especially for women (Gilligan, 1982; Kirby, Paradise & Protti, 1990).
Asking the participants to describe the people involved and the interpersonal dynamics of
the shuation will evoke deeper memories of the feelings they had when struggling to
decide what to do.
5. What moral values emerged as being influential in the decision-making process?
This question added to my understanding of the participant's moral identity and
the information gleaned was essential to my understanding ofhow the participant
experienced the dilemma. The answers to this question emerged directly from the
questioning or indirectly as the participants' stories about their motivations were formed.
John Nash, in "Real World" Ethics writes that people use a "Second Language" when
talking about their values (2002, p. 58). He calls it a "language of thick description," one
which reveals information about a person's moral character, and which can be better
understood through personal descriptions of beliefs, feelings and intuitions. People use
the Second Language, Nash says, when they discern whether their actions or decisions
are consistent with their idealized, virtuous self, or whether they are operating "out of
character" (Nash, pp. 59 - 63).
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6. What ethical principles emerged as being important to the decision-making
process?
When people talk about ethical principles, they draw from a vast philosophical
tradition that encompasses several theories (deontology versus utilitarianianism,
consequentialist versus non-consequentialist, moral objectivism versus moral relativism),
dimensions ["justice versus mercy," "short term versus long term," "self versus
community," and "truth versus loyalty" (Kidder, 1995)] and paradigms ["ethic of care,"
"ethic of critique," "ethic ofjustice" and "ethic of the profession" (Shapiro & Stefkovich,
2001)]. These theories, dimensions, and paradigms are represented in what John Nash
calls a "Third Language" of moral principle (2002, p. 106). He calls this a "thin"
language, in that it lifts principles and rules up and out of the personalized, textured
context of the individual experience and seeks to apply them universally and
theoretically. In talking about their decision-making process when faced with an ethical
dilemma, participants revealed which of these theories, dimensions, and paradigms
provided the most compelling ethical principles that guided them.
7. How did the participants acquire these moral values and ethical principles?
This question asked participants to reflect on the development of their own ethical
identity. Of particular interest was to be the participants' reflections of childhood
experiences, influential people and communities that have helped them grow into the
ethical beings they are today. Participants spoke in what John Nash calls the "First
Language" of background beliefs (2002, p. 35).
8. Did the participant seek advice? If so, from whom, and why?
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Reasons for the selection of an advisor had potential to reveal much about the
participants' thought process at the time of decision-making. Perhaps they were looking
for someone to validate their own intuition, a force which is sometimes overlooked in
ethical decision-making, in which case they might seek out someone they perceive to be a
"like-minded" person. Perhaps they felt they were lacking in some area of insight and
wished to further their own understanding of the situation, in which case they might have
sought out someone they perceived to be knowledgeable about the conditions of the case.
Perhaps there was someone in their lives whom they perceived to possess greater virtue
or moral integrity, reminiscent of Aristotle's virtues ethics, in which case their selection
of advisor revealed valued character traits. Perhaps they didn't seek advice at all,
preferring instead to apply their own moral principles to the case, a stance reminiscent of
Kantian philosophy and supportive of the "autonomous" dimension of ethical
development.
9. What did the participant decide to do in order to resolve the dilemma?
This question added to the textural description of the event and pointed to the
most compelling ethical principals and moral values at the time of the decision-making.
10. What were the consequences of the decision? (Intended and unintended)
This question completed the textural description of the event and provided the basis for
participant reflection on the decision-making.
1 1
.
In retrospect, is the participant satisfied with his or her decision? If so, why?
And if not, why not?
This question revealed a deeper level of understanding about the ethical
dimension of the participants' leadership. A retrospective viewpoint set aside the
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ambiguity of the dilemma and clarified the participants' moral "bottom line."
Satisfaction connoted consistency with the participants' idealized moral self;
dissatisfaction connoted inconsistency. There were no more "what if s." There was now
only "what was" - a much easier phenomenon to describe in evaluative terms.
12. How has the event affected the participants' view of their own leadership?
This question was designed to elicit the meaning of the experience for the
participants. That he or she had a vivid memory of the phenomenon indicated that it was
in some way meaningful for them, that is, it was important enough to have a lasting effect
on their leadership. Whether or not there were commonalities or themes in the essential
meanings the participants brought to their experiences was seen in analysis, but the
meanings themselves were worthwhile elucidations of the phenomenon. It was here that
the research had potential to inform the current knowledge base available to those who
are curious about the role of the school principal.
Sampling
Creswell states, "In a phenomenological study, the participants . . . must be
individuals who have experienced the phenomenon being explored and can articulate
their conscious experiences" (1998, p. 1 1 1). In attempting to locate co-researchers, I
began with several considerations. I looked for current elementary school principals who
would be willing to be interviewed for at least one contiguous hour and be audio-taped. I
tried to find principals representing both genders, with a variety of lengths of tenure and
socio-economic demographics of school communities. I began with an arbitrary process
which included sending out letters of invitation (See Appendix A) with a follow up
telephone call. This letter introduced me and the nature and purpose ofmy research. It

also described the freedom the co-researchers would have in the process to limit certain
types of information and to cease participation at will. I sent with the letter the separate
"permission form" (See Appendix B) to allow the potential co-researcher to understand
the nature of his or her commitment. Through e-mails and telephone conversations
mutual times and locations were determined for the interviews. Initially, names and
schools were chosen randomly from a general listing of schools in Massachusetts. I
obtained participation from four co-researchers using this method. In the case of three, I
followed up on referrals made through my own colleagues. Finally, I enlisted the aid of
my co-researchers at the end of several interviews to suggest colleagues of theirs that
they believed might be willing to talk to me. (A limited "snowball sampling.") (Weiss,
1994, p. 25). In this way, I obtained the participation of four co-researchers. In the case
of the latter two methods involving an "intermediary," (Glesne, 1999, p. 39) participation
was easily obtained. In one case, I utilized a story emailed to me after a telephone
conversation with an acquaintance. After each interview, I sent a letter to the co-
researcher thanking them for their participation and their insights. Throughout this
process, I attempted to ensure adherence to ethical standards set forth by Moustakas,
which meant that I "established clear agreements with the research participants,
recognized the necessity of confidentiality and informed consent, and developed
procedures for insuring full disclose of the nature, purpose, and requirements of the
research project" (1994, p. 99).
Although I had set out with the purpose of finding a sampling that would
represent a variety of principal identities and contexts, toward the end my participants,
who had been referred to me by other participants, were mostly White women between
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fifty and sixty years of age who had been principals in fairly wealthy districts. This
"convenience" (Weiss, 1994, p.24) or "opportunity" (Delamont, 1992, p. 70) sampling
conceivably limited the generalizability ofmy findings, especially in the
underrepresentation of principals of color and in school districts with lower socio-
economic demographics.
Gaining the trust of co-researchers is important for any ethnographic study, but in
this case it was particularly important. The fact that I am a school principal in
Massachusetts may have worked for me or against me in this regard. In my initial
contact with co-researchers, I was careful to emphasize through my introductory
conversation my role as student, not fellow principal. The reason for this was that I
wanted the co-researchers to feel comfortable talking about their private decision-making
process - for better or for worse - without wondering if I was connected to their school in
some way. Matters involving personnel especially must be kept fiercely guarded. I
found in all cases but one, however, that the co-researchers were comfortably candid in
their discourse, and wished to engage me in conversation about my own role as principal
once the tape recorder was turned off. In one case, I decided to not use the data obtained,
due to the hesitancy in disclosure revealed by the co-researcher as this person asked that I
not identify gender, race, age, description of location, or length of tenure!
Creswell suggests that in phenomenological research, the number of interviewees
be "up to 10 people" (1998, p. 112). For me, the question of how many co-researchers to
include was answered somewhere around the eleventh interview, where I found myself
hearing a slightly different version of essentially the same story. Having committed to
this interview, I followed through on that one as well, and include it in this study.
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However, I must disclose that by that time, certain themes and patterns had already
emerged in my conscience, and I'm sure I was partially biased in paying close attention
to those aspects of her story that seemed to confirm what I was already starting to
believe. In answer to the question, when do you know when to stop gathering data,
Weiss writes.
The best answer is that you stop when you encounter diminishing returns, when
the information you obtain is redundant or peripheral, when what you do learn
that is new adds too little to what you already know to justify the time and cost of
the interviewing. (Weiss, 1994, p. 21)
Bracketing
Piantanida encourages the researcher to consider herself the "instrument of
inquiry" (1999, p. 139). The usefulness of this "instrumenf then is dependent on the
researcher's capacity for listening and understanding the phenomenon as it is presented
by each co-researcher. Obstacles that can get in the way of understanding another's story
abound, but perhaps the most pernicious involve the researcher's preconceived notions
about the phenomena or the people describing it. Delamont recommends "think[ing]
through what your preconceptions are before you begin your data collection" (1992, p.
76). Husserl called this process the "Epoche" and Moustakas considers it a necessary
first step in phenomenological research (Moustakas, 1994, p. 85, citing Husserl, 1931, p.
110).
In my earliest attempts to engage in this process, I thought about my relationship
with this group of people called "elementary school principals." The truth is, as a group I
like them very much. My experiences with principals at conferences, luncheons, etc.,
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have always been congenial and friendly - characterized by a kind of sympathy one
might find among people similarly situated "in the trenches." There has been much
written about the isolation of teachers in schools (Johnson, 1991), but I believe no one is
more isolated in schools than principals. Due to ethics surrounding confidenfiality,
principals have no "confidants" - no one to confide in about pressing problems and
feelings of discomfit. Because I experience first-hand those same problems and feelings,
I am prone to empathize with a school principal's situation, even without knowing many
of the particulars. In my research, this may have led me to accept without probing a
principal's assessment of a situation. It had the potential to lead me to a "cheerleader"
mentality, where I would silently root for the principal to be "right." However, the nature
ofmy research was not to evaluate the Tightness or wrongness of a principal's decision -
it was only to understand its nature. Therefore, this willingness to accept a situation as
presented may have even helped me to attend to the principal's story from their own
perspective. I did find particularly interesting those dilemmas that I have encountered
myself, for example those involving teacher dismissal and student discipline. If the
principal acted as I thought I would have, I attended to that without much questioning.
(With the stories involving teacher dismissal, it is interesting to note now that I never
really probed to find out particulars of the underperformance, accepting at face value the
principals' assessment of the situation.) If a principal acted in a different manner than I
would have, I did probe further to try to understand the perspective different from mine.
In any case, I was cognizant of the fact that my own decision-making was not the real
issue under study - it simply presented a backdrop against which I tried to understand the
phenomena as experienced by the co-researcher. I was hopeful that the affinity I felt I
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shared with other school principals would be an asset in the establishment of rapport and
trust. In retrospect, I believe that it was.
As a principal who is a woman, I must admit that I am sensitive to the particular
difficulties experienced by other women principals. I knew before reading Shakeshaft's
Women in Educational Administration (1989) that women have more to prove - to
themselves as well as others - in establishing public and perhaps private trust in their
own competence in this role. Men tend to become principal's earlier in their careers than
women (Shakeshaft, 1989) after less soul-searching than women who remain in the
classroom much longer before venturing out. For this reason, I thought I might be more
sympathetic to the women principals I would interview, and perhaps wonder while
interviewing the men how much easier it might have been (and might still be) to acquire
and sustain their roles as leaders. In the end, I believe that I was equally sympathetic to
the dilemmas faced by the men as well as the women.
As a White woman, I was cognizant of the fact that the principals in the
"wealthy" towns are all White too. They were primarily referrals from others ("the
snow-balled" sample) and this represented a kind of hegemony that I believe pervades
school administration, certainly in the wealthy suburbs. Only one ofmy co-researchers
was a man of color.
Finally, this research was predicated on one important assumption - that all, if not
most, elementary school principals have at least at one time in their professional lives
been presented with a difficult decision to make. I also presumed that when fully
illuminated (as was my responsibility) these decisions would contain within them an
ethical component. It was not unusual for my co-researchers to hesitate to use the term
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"ethical dilemma" when selecting an experience to relate. They remembered it being a
difficult time, but some were wary of the label "ethical." For this reason, in my pre-
interview conversation, I asked the prospective co-researchers to suspend their notions of
"ethical dilemmas" and simply tell me about a difficult or "tough" decision they had to
make. This made it easier for the principals to tell me the story they wished to tell,
without fear that it "wasn't what [I] was looking for." In each case, there was in fact an
ethical dimension to the difficulty - but I considered it my job to find it and illuminate it.
Data Collection
According to Moustakas, the phenomenological interview "involves an informal,
interactive process and utilizes open-ended comments and questions" (1994, p. 1 14). In
my research, data was collected via interviews of approximately one hour using a semi-
structured format over a period of six months (April, 2006 to September 2006). Audio-
tapes were transcribed by a paid acquaintance. I designed the interview questions to
elicit information pertinent to the research questions. In a few cases, but not most,
interview questions were the same as the research questions. Although questions were
developed in advance, Moustakas allows for the possibility that these prepared questions
may be "varied, altered, or not used at all" depending on how the co-researchers' stories
unfold (Moustakas, 1994, p. 1 14). In most cases, information relevant to the interview
questions emerged naturally from the co-researchers' recollection of the phenomenon
under discussion. Once I asked these principals to tell me about a time in their




With that in mind, the following interview questions, consistent in content with my
guiding research questions, formed the structure of the semi-structured interview:
1
.
Please tell me a little about yourself- background, growing up, how you became
a principal, . .
.
2. Take a few moments to recall a time in your principalship when you were forced
to make a very difficult decision. Please take me through the experience.
3. How did you learn about the situation? Did the need for making a decision come
to you gradually over time, or did you realize it quickly?
4. What alternatives did you have? Which ones did you think about? What would
have been their likely outcomes?
5. Who were the people involved? Who stood to gain or lose by your decision?
6. Did you have thoughts about what should be done? From a moral or ethical
sense? Do you remember what feelings you had at the time?
7. How did you acquire this sense of what should be done?
8. Did you ask anyone for advice? Who? Why this person?
9. How did the situation end? What did you decide to do?
10. What happened as a result?
1 1
.
In the end, were you satisfied with the result? Why or why not?
12. Has this event affected you in any way in terms of how you do your job? Did





Definitions and criteria for the term "ethical dilemma" abound in the literature (Nash,
2002, p. 63). Harding outlines four characteristics of ethical dilemmas that I believe
combine to form the most useful definition for me.
1
.
A dilemma is a valid argument which concludes with a choice between two equal
alternatives.
2. A dilemma assumes that there is no way to avoid choosing one of the alternatives.
3. There is no way, given the present knowledge base, to know the truth of the
premises a priori.
4. To be a dilemma, an argument must demand resolution in the course of daily life.
(Harding, 1985, pp. 45 - 47)
For Harding, the resolution of the dilemma is of secondary importance to "the
process of thought through which individuals come to interpret events as dilemmas"
(Harding, 1985, p. 43). My participants knew from the outset of our interviews that I was
looking for ethical dilemmas in their experiences as elementary school principals.
However, they were not always comfortable with the term, asking hesitantly if their
proposed story was "what [I] was looking for." When I asked them to suspend their
notions of "ethical dilemma" and tell me a story of a "difficuh decision," they were easily
able to relate a story that did in fact have an ethical dimension to it. In all cases, as their
stories unfolded, it became clear to me that there were the two processes at work which
Harding describes as being central to the recognition of a dilemma: (1) the development
of intention and (2) the interpretation of contradiction (Harding, 1985, p. 47). I believe
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that these principals came to recognize the situation they were in through these processes,
even though they might not have consciously articulated it that way at the time.
Intention
For purposes of discussion here, I accept Harding's assertion that "intention" is
the "why ofhuman behavior" (Harding, 1985, p. 48). She provides a framework for
understanding the components of intention. "The first component in the gradual
development of intention involves awareness of a goal, in this case the awareness that
there is a situation demanding a choice between conflicting outcomes" (Harding, 1985,
p. 49). Harding bases this assertion in child development theory, specifically that of
Piaget (1952, 1965, 1980), who theorized that when children see "disruptions" from
"previously perceived regularities" they attend to the stimuli that surprises them, or that
which contradicts their expectations (Harding, pp. 50 - 53). This is a necessary first step
for people who are beginning to understand that achieving regularity demands some sort
of action. The second component of intention is "the development of a plan for achieving
a goal" (Harding, 1985, p. 49). Inifially, the goal for the plan is to promote regularity, or
alleviate the tension between "what is" and "what ought to be." However, in the
formulation of a plan, the person comes to realize that there are more than one possible
outcomes for any course of action. Therefore, the third component of developing
intention comes into being, that is, "an attitude of necessity leading to the formation of
alternate plans" (Harding, 1985, p. 51). Finally, the fourth component of developing
intention is that of "persistence" (Harding, 1985, p. 51). Persistence can exist on all
levels of the developmental continuum. An infant may persist in promofing regularity
through rigid, ineffective acfions. At the higher end of the scale are those who recognize
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that "all events" pose "potential dilemmas" and therefore they must examine "the
truthfulness of premises and the alterability of outcomes" (Harding, 1985, p. 52).
Intentionality, Noema, and Noesis
Harding's view of "intention" shares similiarities with Moustakas' version.
According to Moustakas, "intentionality refers to consciousness, to the internal
experience of being conscious of something" (1994, p. 28). Central to Moustakas' view
is the notion of "directedness." Intention implies the mind is directed toward some object
or idea, whether imaginary or real. Harding's four components of intention are consistent
with a person's growing ability to direct one's attention to an event, to recognize it as
something worthy of attention. Moustakas, however, finds two components of
intentionality. He uses Husserl's (1931) concepts of "noema" and "noesis" to describe
them.
The neoma is not the real object but the phenomenon, not the tree but the
appearance of the tree. The object that appears in perception varies in terms of
when it is perceived, from what angle, with what background of experience, with
what orientation of wishing, willing, or judging, always from the vantage point of
a perceiving individual. (Gurwitsch, 1967, p. 128, cited in Moustakas, 1994, p.
29)
The idea of the noema is important to the phenomenology ofmy participants'
stories in that they share with me their growing realization that there was a problem
surfacing in their school that needed attending to. They directed their attention to it and,




The noesis is that which gives the object or action (the noema) meaning for the
participant. "The noesis refers to the act of perceiving, feeUng, thinking, remembering,
or judging - ail of which are embedded with meanings that are concealed and hidden
from consciousness" (Moustakas, 1994, p. 69). Put another way.
The "noema is that which is experienced, the what of experience, the object-
correlate. Noesis is the way in which the what is experienced, the experiencing or
act of experiencing, the subject-correlate" (Ihde, 1977, cited in Moustakas, 1994,
p. 69).
The conceptual framework of intentionality as the coming together of the noema
and noesis in one's consciousness provides the basis of Moustakas' model of
phenomenology. When describing an experience, these components combine to form the
unit of analysis for the researcher and the participant. The process, however, is not as
simple as it may appear, for in reflecting on their experiences, participants engage in a
process where there are "many meanings:"
The noemata that connect or synthesize in such a way that one comes to know not
only the parts of aspects of a thing but also its unity or wholeness. Husserl calls
the partial views of a whole entity the noematic phases. The phases correspond to
one another, add layers of meaning to each other, correlate with each other and
form a comprehensive meaning of the wholeness of a thing. (Moustakas, 1994, p.
70)
The participants in this study not only engaged in this process as they reflected on
their experiences, but I believe they also felt bound to articulate it for me in a way that
offered some "unity or wholeness," hence the oft-repeated question "Is this what you
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want?" Moreover, if one accepts Harding's proposal that intention is just one component
of a two-component process whereby one comes to recognize an ethical dilemma, and the
process of "looking and reflecting, looking and reflecting again, ... to obtain true,
accurate and complete descriptions" is a necessary first step in bringing intention to
consciousness, then it is no wonder my participants had difficulty labeling their
experience as an "ethical dilemma" at the start.
Contradiction
If the first step in the process of coming to recognize an ethical dilemma is
realizing "intention," then the second step is that of recognizing "contradiction." One
may come to realize that there are one or more choices to be made in order to promote
one's view of the way things ought to be. However, with an ethical dilemma, there is an
element of contradiction in those choices. "The choices inherent in a dilemma are not
just two different options; they are incompatible alternatives requiring a recognition of
the contradictory nature of their outcomes" (Harding, 1985, p. 52). Again, Harding
refers to Piagetian theory that says children eventually come to understand the concept of
"negation," that is, that an action may render an outcome impossible. Put another way,
certain possibilities become "indissociable" from certain actions.
For my co-researchers and me, the phenomenon under study was the process they
went through of perceiving and attending to a problematic situation (intentionality),
choosing between inaction or action, and then recognizing that a dilemma existed as they
grappled with the contradiction and negations inherent in the possible outcomes. My role
was to render an "absolutely faithful description of that which [lay] before [me] in
100

phenomenological purity, and in keeping at a distance all interpretations that transcend
the given" (Husserl, 1931, p. 262, cited in Moustakas, 1994, p. 70-71).
Data Analysis
My initial attempts at data analysis began with the construction of individual
cases ("single subject analysis" Moustakas, 1994). I looked at each participant's
transcripts and pulled together a story with a beginning, middle, and end. Initially, (with
the first two cases), I tried to separate the "individual textural" from the "individual
structural" accounts, consistent with Moustakas' methods (p. 121). According to this
model, the experience of the phenomenon is described first and only in terms of explicit
events, [the "individual textural", or the "what happened" (Creswell, 1998, p. 148)]. The
"individual structural" account is a description of underlying dynamics of the experience,
or "How the event was experienced" (Creswell, p. 148). I found, however, in examining
my participants' stories, that the two accounts were inextricably linked. Participants gave
me rich accounts of their experiences, but the underlying dynamics of the experience
were part of its genetic code. Attempting to perform the initial data analysis while
purposefully extricating the events from the underlying experiences, thoughts, feelings,
fears, etc., felt unnatural to me. For cases three through ten I constructed what Weiss
would call individual case studies (1994, p. 168), or what Moustakas referred to as
"composite" descriptions (p. 121). This is different from the form of qualitative research
called "case study" in that the unit of analysis remains the phenomena under study, not
the person, and as such, is devoid ofmuch of the context afforded to formal case studies.
Because investigators, as well as readers, grasp concrete cases more easily than
abstract models, constructing case studies can be useful even in an issue-focused
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analysis. It isn't necessary, but I have found that when I am unable to work out a
persuasive conceptual scheme or unsure of what to emphasize in achieving local
integration or inclusive integration, I am helped by putting together the materials
of an individual case. I gain from the experience of case construction a more
immediate understanding of the situation of respondents, and I can then more
easily imagine how that situation might be presented and explained. (Weiss, p.
168)
My method is consistent with Moustakas' model in that "Some phenomenologists
vary this approach by incorporating personal meaning of the experience (Moustakas,
1994) by using single-subject analysis before intersubject analysis and by analyzing the
role of the context in the process (Giorgi, 1975, cited in Creswell, p. 55). Single subject
studies are presented in Chapter Four.
In making sense ofmy data, I then constructed a matrix of categories of meaning.
Possibilities included examining the nature of the dilemma through Harding's definition.
That is, to identify the participants' intentions from the contradictions - or in this case,
the obstacles. Other possibilities included identifying the nature of the dilemmas as
being conflicts of duties or moral sentiments. Although this study is not intended to be
one of discourse analysis, I did pay careful attention to the language my co-researchers
used in their narratives, using Nash's (2002) framework for categorizing moral language.
Narrative Analysis
The language we use to narrate our ethical dilemmas - the way we tell ourselves
and others what's going on in the world - is not necessarily the language we use
to analyze and resolve those dilemmas. The former tends to be flexible.
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subjective, artistic. The latter tends to be firm, objective, even scientific. ... At
times, it can seem so fuzzy, amorphous, and slippery as to contribute little to our
understanding. At other times, it can seem so rigid and buttoned-down that the
understanding it conveys, while accurate, is hardly worth having. . . . Ethics is, at
bottom, a verbal activity. (Kidder, 1995, p. 176)
In my work with my co-researchers, and certainly in analyzing the transcripts, I
came to see their responses as "telling stories" - something more than asking questions
and getting answers. Mischler states, "A general assumption of narrative analysis is that
telling stories is one of the significant ways individuals construct and express meaning"
(1986, p. 67). He cites Gee's (1985, p. 1 1) assertion that "One of the primary ways -
probably the primary way - human beings make sense of their experience is by casting it
in a narrative form" (Mischler, 1986, pp. 67-68). Although I was prepared with my
interview questions, I found in most ofmy cases that the co-researchers easily launched
into a narrative format which included most of the data I was looking for, embedded in
the recounting of their experiences. More importantly, stepping back and allowing the
co-researchers room to tell their stories allowed them in turn to focus on what they
experienced to be important phenomena, without having to limit themselves to my
imposed framework. Mischler delineates problems inherent in narrative analysis -
namely, is the story "one story with related subplots or a series of different stories?"
(1986, p. 73). Where does the story begin and end? I believe that the nature ofmy topic
guided my co-researchers to keep their stories bounded to one phenomena. Narratives
were sometimes non-linear in the sequence of events, or the introduction of major
characters, but it wasn't too difficult to go back and reconstruct the events based on the
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semantic cues of their accounts. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the only difficulty
encountered in the story-telling came from a lack of shared understanding of the term
"ethical dilemma." Co-researchers wanted to know that their story would be relevant to
my research. I could only tell them that I believed there was an ethical component to
difficult decisions, and that it was my job to find it. As the stories unfolded, the co-
researchers began to see the intentionality and contradiction (or, they recognized the
dilemma) inherent in their situation. As I encouraged them to continue, we came to a
shared understanding of the nature of the ethical dilemma. This process is reminiscent of
Mischler's accounting of Paget's work (1982, 1983a, 1983b) wherein "she creates a
situation where the respondent too is engaged in a search for understanding" (Mischler,
1986, p. 97).
Analyzing Language
The language of ethical decision making is characterized by words such as
"ought," "right," "fair," "just," and "equitable." In Real World Ethics: Frameworksfor
Educators and Human Service Professionals (2002), John Nash categorizes all moral
discourse into one of three "languages" - First, Second, and Third. Elements of
consequentialist, nonconsequentialist, and virtues theories of ethics are found in each of
the three languages; it is the location of the idea that shapes the language in distinct
ways.
First Moral Language
According to Nash, the First Moral Language is that which originates in a
person's Background Beliefs - those taken-for-granted notions of how the world is or
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how the world ought to be. ^ These assumptions often go unnoticed in all but the most
reflective people but, Nash asserts, provide the foundation from which individual ethical
thought emanates. The First Moral Language of Background Beliefs inhabits the
"metaphysical life-space" of the individual and is the central "moral vantage poinf
(Nash, 2002, p. 37) that provides the initial reference point for ethical decision making.
When people speak of "responsibility, the law, conscience, rights, ideals, and religious
obligations" they do so from a set of "fundamental assumptions" that constitute their own
source of moral authority (Nash, p. 36). Individual Background Beliefs are those which
"ground . . . ethical thinking and behavior in something more than moral whim" (Nash, p.
39). These fundamental assumptions include individual beliefs regarding the nature and
source of morality, [e.g. the possibility or impossibility of an ultimate objective morality
such as "natural law" or "the Golden Rule," (Nash, p. 41 & 49)], spirituality [e.g.
religious faith, atheism, agnosticism, or a belief in the possibility of an unseen but
powerful transcendent force in the world (Nash, p. 43)], and moral philosophy, [including
mode of reasoning, belief in universalizability versus situationalism, and "masculine" or
impartial versus "feminine" or cormected epistemology (Nash, p. 47 - 54)].
Second Moral Language
Nash describes the Second Moral Language as that of virtuosity of character.
People speak in the Second Moral Language when they talk about themselves, who they
are as moral agents, and how this shapes their moral decision making. Contrasting this
layer of language with the "thinner" layers of beliefs and principles, Nash calls this a
"thick" language (2002, p. 58). Within this language, people use terms related to "virtue,
narrative, community, feelings, structures, and ideals" (Nash, p. 61). Central to the
^ Sergiovanni refers to these as "mindscapes" (1992, p. 7).
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Second Moral Language is the idea that people grow into their moral selves, and continue
to grow throughout the life span. Reminiscent of Aristotle's view, it is less concerned
with the question "What should I do?" than with "Who shall I be?" Doing the right thing
has less to do with appealing to the correct rule or principle and more to do with
preserving one's moral integrity. When engaged in this layer of language, people will
talk about whether or not an action was "in character" or "out of character" for them
(Nash, p. 67). How people feel about themselves in response to an ethical decision
reveals the kind of moral person they strive to be, or their personal moral "ideal" (Nash,
p. 78). Intuition is of primary importance here.
When speaking of their bases for ethical decision-making in the Second Moral
Language, people will talk of their moral identities as being shaped by the important
communities in their lives, including ethnic heritage, religion, and family. They may
describe a "moral exemplar" (Nash, 2002, p. 79) or narrate an experience - either as an
active participant or witness - that served as a catalyst for personal moral growth.
When people speak in the Second Moral Language, they use terms associated
with the construct of "virtuous" - caring, trustworthy, honest, etc. A personal, idealized
version of oneself is made up of virtues long ago promoted by Aristotle and Plato, and
people have a strong sense of the virtues most cherished. Ethical dilemmas are present
for people when they feel forced into an action based on principle which goes against
some virtue they believe to be integral to themselves as moral people. (For example,
betraying a colleague's trust in service of publicizing a moral wrong.)
Nash asserts one's profession is a community through which people grow into
their moral selves. Professions provide moral training for people, formally and
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informally, through purposeful and incidental induction and example. In some
professions, such as law and medicine, ethical behavior is formally codified and ever
present in the mind of the professionals. Other professions, such as school
administration, have a set of codified ethics^, but many people are unaware they exist.
Shapiro and Stefkovich (2001) write about the "ethic of the profession," a paradigm
based on such principles as "professional standards," "individual professional,"
"personal," and "community code of ethics" with the "best interest of student" at the
center. They place this ethic on a semantically equal level with other such paradigms as
"ethic of care," "ethic of critique" and "ethic ofjustice.""^ When professional training -
and the resultant "role expectations" (Nash, 2002, p. 93) come into conflict with a
cherished virtue, an ethical dilemma is formed.
Third Moral Language
Nash describes the Third Moral Language in terms of rules, principles, and
theories. Abstracted from the human experience, it is a "thin" language, made necessary
by the diversity inherent in a "secular, pluralist" world.
Even though we belong to a number of concrete moral communities, we must
always come together in secular pluralist institutions. Thus we need to find a
"moral grammar" that is capable of spanning these numerous, divergent
communities if we are to settle our moral dilem.mas peaceably. (Nash, 2002, p.
107)
' see administrator code of ethics
'" Kidder (1995) disputes the validity of elevating specific professional codes of conduct to the level of
"ethic," claiming that all dilemmas come down to a fundamental conflict of core values, and to suggest that




Nash's interpretation of a language which speaks of "morally agreed upon
principles" (2002, p. 109) is reminiscent of Kant's categorical imperative - once invoked,
it takes on moral authority. Its power lies in its universal acceptance.
When people speak of moral principles, they may use "simple maxims" or rules
such as "practice what you preach" or "accept responsibility for your choices" (Nash,
2002, p. 110). However phrased, formal principles such as "autonomy, veracity, fidelity,
nonmaleficence, justice, confidentiality, and promise-keeping" are typically at the root
(Nash, p. 111). Objectivists will argue that moral principles come from some kind of
irrefutable universal law, such as "natural law" or God, and situationists will
contextualize principles in terms of culture or history (Nash, p. 111). When invoking
moral principles to support ethical decision-making, deontologists will state that the
principle itself is that which provides ultimate authority. Utilitarians, concerned with the
consequences of the decision, will most likely invoke the principle of beneficence, or
doing the most good (Nash, p. 1 12). (These classifications are not to suggest that people
neatly fall into one of two categories - Nash believes most people use both ethical
stances at various times in their lives, however with one stance being dominant over the
other.) When a deontological viewpoint comes into conflict with that of a utilitarian, the
resulting action is judged by the other to be a "cop-out," or "caving in" to some lesser
valued principle (Nash, p. 1 14).
Finally, Nash describes the purposeful action of combining the three languages as
"ethical bricolage," or "the process in which one begins with bits and pieces of received
linguistic material, arranges some of them into a structured whole, leaves others to the
side, and ends up with a moral language one proposes to use" (Nash, 2002, p. 146, citing
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Stout, 1981, p. 124). With the claim that "good ethical decision-making incorporates all
three moral languages" (Nash, p. 147, italics in the original), Nash criticizes models of
ethical analysis (including Noddings' ethic of care) that fail to purposefully integrate
background beliefs, moral character, and abstract ethical principles in the decision-
making. Feminist models of ethics, in particular, come under his scrutiny for their
distaste for "masculine" and "hierarchical" formal principles of ethical reasoning. Nash
uses the term "moral discernment," borrowed from Gustofson (1981), to describe the
ideal of ethical reasoning based on thoughtful deliberation, and advocates for a rendering
of both teleological and deontological perspectives: "The upshot of considering both
your consequences and your principles while analyzing an ethical dilemma is that you are
leaving no moral stone unturned" (Nash, p. 198).
In my examination ofmy co-researchers stories, I have born in mind that they
were speaking to me as "multidimensional moral agents who [were] potentially trilingual
in their ethical decision-making" (Nash, 2002, p. 147).
CHAPTER FOUR: PRESENTATION OF DATA: SINGLE SUBJECT STORIES
Statement of the Research Question:
How do selected elementary school principals experience the phenomenon of
decision-making when faced with an ethical dilemma and what are the essential meanings
that they bring to the experience upon reflection?
The ten cases presented here, although they tell very different stories, fall
essentially into one of four topics. They illustrate the ethical struggles these principals
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felt over (1) teacher dismissal, (2) staff supervision, (3) student discipline, and (4)
subverting personal feelings for a professional standard.
Teacher dismissal
So it was probably my most difficult piece ofmyjob, knowing that I was
changing her life. That I was charged with the protection and
enhancement ofthe lives ofthese five year olds and six year olds - that
was a higher priority for me.
The process of dismissing a teacher is a difficult and complicated series of tasks
that can drain the energies of the most competent and dedicated principal. Because the
stakes are so high, it is imperative that the principal be absolutely sure it is warranted. In
the following three cases, Alice, Phyllis, and Linda share their stories of working toward
getting a teacher fired from her job. At the heart of their stories is the concept of due
process. These three did not waver from their belief that it was in the best interest of
their school community to let these underperforming teachers go. Their difficulty lay in
satisfying those aspects of due process that protect employees from capricious judgments
against them, namely (1) standards of performance must be consistently applied and (2)
decisions should be made on the basis of reasonable evidence, reasonable meaning that
evidence is collected over a period of time and shows good faith attempts to help the
teacher improve (Strike, Haller, & Soltis, 1998, p. 77). This is a process which requires






Phyllis is a principal of a middle class suburban school west of Boston. She has
been in the system for 3 1 years, the first 1 8 as a classroom teacher. She became an
interim principal when the existing one was in a car accident during the first week of
school. The system advertised for an interim principal, but no candidates moved forward.
At the end of the fall season, after the Assistant Superintendent had tried to fill the role,
she applied for the interim position and was hired. She had earned administrative
licensure and looked at the situation as an opportunity to "just get things back in order" as
well as to see if she enjoyed the role. She did.
And then of course I got the chance to see how much of an impact I could have on
the classroom teachers. So truly I was a classroom teacher who had the
opportunity to do this small "internship." And at the time most of the graduate
programs you didn't have any opportunity to do field work.
The following year, Phyllis applied for the position permanently and was hired.
That was thirteen years ago. When asked to recall a time in her principalship when she
was forced to make a difficult decision, her immediate answer is
I can think of the first time I let a teacher go. It was a reading teacher and I hired
her. I did hire her. . . . Typically you would like to give someone a chance the
first year. And if you're not going to rehire them my thought would be to let them
go after the first year. It gets more difficult year after year. But her first year she
did an effective job.




Her second year there were many things - in her integrity to the work, her
commitment to the school, a lack of taking direction. . . . We planned some
professional development activities but she wouldn't come to them . . . The final
straw was as I was working with her, . . . Rose Bradley [a Reading Consultant]
was offering a course here. . . . And when she came back she signed on the
attendance sheets that she wasn't present at. And that integrity really shook me.
In spite of Phyllis' skepticism regarding the Reading Teacher's commitment, she
was not confident in her own ability to fairly assess the situation. She called on the
Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum and Instruction for help.
So he began to help me evaluate, sharing the evaluation process and we did
jointly not make a recommendation for new re-hire at the end of that second year.
Phyllis did try to offer the teacher support in the form of informal mentorship ("I
paired her up with another reading teacher at another one of the elementary schools.")
She also met with her to discuss her performance:
I would begin to make meetings to meet with her after school. Which would be
unlike me. I would ask a teacher would they like to talk with me at lunch or if
you have a break come on down. But I began to find myself actually planning the
after school time just see if I could keep her here to think it through.
For Phyllis, the decision to not ask this teacher back at the end of her second year,
even though she had proven to be a disappointment, was made difficult because of the
teacher's youth:
That was difficult. She was a young girl. You know, you keep wanting to give
everybody that shot. That they will come around, that they'll turn around their
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work ethic. Maybe there's something going on in their personal life that's
temporary. It's tough to let someone go, that's always been very difficult for me.
It was also difficult for Phyllis because she was fearful she was evaluating on a
personal level, rather than on an objective one.
Finally, I enlisted the support of the Curriculum Coordinator for English
Language Arts. And that was the best thing that happened to me. To discuss it,
have someone to discuss it with. Have him help me sort out my feelings. Is it
personal? You know, you don't agree with everyone's personal values.
Phyllis felt this mentor was helpful because he helped her examine her fear of the
subjective:
That was a great resource for me. ... He was a great resource that I could go and
talk about the issue that's going on and he was very non judgmental and would
help me to look inside and say, "Is this you or is this a real issue?" and "Try these
strategies." So really mentoring me through. That was very helpful. So he was
less evaluative in his position. He was more in a mentoring aspect.
How did the reading teacher react to the dismissal?
She was disappointed, she was angry. ... I think she always held out hope that I'd
give her that one more year.
Looking back, she believes the situation would have been easier for her if there
was a more objective instrument for teacher evaluation and remediation:
I think a more formalized instrument would 've saved me a lot of agony. I think if
you put it down in black and white, you have a little contract that you're going -
you can work from a printed document that separates it from this personal piece.
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In the end, Phyllis feels she learned about how to make wiser hiring choices:
You know, I think learning on the backs of others is difficult, but seeing how she
performed . . . And I certainly hired someone that I was, a little bit, improved my
interviewing skills, helped me refine the qualifications and the qualities I was
looking for in a Reading person. You only have one and it's a big school.
She also believes that her school benefited from her dismissal:
I needed a higher quality reading teacher. Every teacher stood to gain because I
needed someone to lead the professional development.
Phyllis believes the benefits to her school went beyond the immediate acquisition
of a better reading teacher. She believes that her teachers were reassured to know that
she would enforce a high standard of professionalism among the staff:
Phyllis spoke in the First Language of Background Beliefs when she talked about
what made the letting go of a new reading teacher difficult for her:
You would like to give someone a chance the first year. . . . You keep wanting to
give everybody that shot.
She had hired this teacher, and believed that the "right" thing to do was to give
her "a shot" or "a chance" to "turn around her work ethic." In support of this belief,
perhaps to present herself to me as someone who does give young teachers a fair chance
to improve, Phyllis told a story of another young teacher.
I had one teacher who was very marginal the first year, really little training,
green as green could be. ... This teacher was so green. [PT tells two stories
involving naive mistakes with stuffing report cards and filling out his grade
book.] ... He was trying so hard. But he is one ofmy finest teachers now. He
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just took the guidance, he welcomed being out of the classroom to watch other
teachers, strove to model what good teaching skills were. Was a great success.
So not everybody who was problematic did leave.
Phyllis also believed that harboring personal feelings about the reading teacher
might have led her to make a decision that was unfair - she feared that somehow her own
personal values might have polluted what she felt should be a fair and objective
assessment of the teacher's performance. She wished she had an objective assessment
tool that she could have used in evaluating this teacher.
I think a more formalized instrument would've saved me a lot of agony.
Phyllis values objectivity and impartiality. The person she went to for advice was
helpful because he was "less evaluative" and "very non-judgmental" as he helped her sort
out her own personal feelings and separate them from the "real issue." She uses
quantifiable language when she recounts her thought process at the time:
So, I guess I saw that all along but I had a difficult time framing, and is that
enough for dismissal? You know, weighing out what actually warrants dismissal?
Now, Phyllis finds those aspects of education reform regarding teacher
performance expectations helpful:
There was no protocol you know. ... It was probably around 1995, 96. You know
today with all the education reform, with all the controversies, you need
procedure. There are documented principles for effective teaching. Having those
kinds of expectations and standards written down, I think the whole adoption of
standards helps a principal too ...
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Consistent with objectivist moral reasoning, Phyllis longed for the impartial
authority of a checklist that she could use to determine whether or not this teacher should
be let go. In that year, in the absence of a protocol, Phyllis even attempted to create one
with her colleagues:
I met with the two other, my two other contemporaries to help develop a process
for dismissal. But we didn't own one in the system.
Part of what made this decision difficult for Phyllis was her belief that good
administrators are supportive of their teachers when they make mistakes:
It's a tough job, every day, and it should be - you should feel supported. You
should feel when you make a mistake in the classroom, which people do every
day, that there's an administrator that's going to be standing behind you and say,
okay, how are we going to build this to fix it? How are we going to remediate it,
fix the problem, and move forward? Not a feeling of aha - gotcha!
To illustrate this belief, Phyllis recounted a recent event where a teacher had lost
her patience with a child and, rather than admonish the teacher, she stepped in to help:
Last week I walked by a first grade teacher's classroom and there's a little guy
coming out and he has lots of emotional problems, and she could all but pull
herself together. And you know, I just happened to be walking by. And I said,
get a cup of coffee you know, and pull yourself together. I was so happy that I
was there but I realized this teacher needs support because this child is just too
difficuh. . . . Nobody should be that distraught.
"
It is interesting to note that Phyllis was a mathematics and technology major in undergraduate school.
Has this experience shaped her desire for weights and measurements? For quantifiable evidence? objective
proof that the teacher should be let go? Or was it the other way around - did her belief in objective ways of
knowing lead her to select her major?
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Phyllis also shared a background belief with me that she learned from her parents:
Oh, I definitely think my home values are all in here. You were responsible. If
you said you were going to do it, you did it. And I guess that's something that I
expect from my staff.
With this basic belief regarding the way one ought to be, it must have particularly
offended Phyllis when the teacher signed her name to an attendance sheet for a course
she didn't attend.
Using Nash's Second Language of Moral Character, the attribute of being "non-
judgmental" appears as a desirable trait for Phyllis. She wants very much to be a non-
judgmental person. Her helpful mentor was non-judgmental. Now, after thirteen years of
experience, she believes she is non-judgmental:
I am more confident too. Experience helps everyone. I can easily sit with a
teacher in a non-judgmental way and review a lesson plan. Review what I just
observed. Make suggestions for changes.
In the end, Phyllis is comfortable with her decision to let this teacher go, even
though at the fime she quesfioned her own ability to make the "right" decision. She
believes the decision was helpful in communicating to her staff her expectafions for
teacher performance:
Any teacher that I have let go, I think it buih more confidence in my staff because
if I'm seeing it, they're seeing it. And when you come to work every day and
you're working to your fullest capacity, and the person beside you just isn't,
you're not offended that they're not being rehired and recognized year after year
for poor performance. . . . You know, there were a few people that . . . chummed
117

with that person, but on the greater scale, there was nothing that I did that was
bad. Set up the standard right away that said I expect from everyone.''^
Linda
Linda is a former principal who had just retired when I met her for our interview.
It was during the summertime, and she wore shorts and a bright purple t-shirt with the
name of her elementary school emblazoned on the front. She recalled her 16 years as a
principal in a fairly wealthy suburban town as "the highlight ofmy whole educational
career." She has had a full career - beginning as a second grade teacher in 1963 on Long
Island in New York. She developed an interest in learning disabilities as a result of
watching her son struggle, earning her doctorate in that subject. While a principal, she
taught as an adjunct instructor at a university and was active in MESPA (Massachusetts
Elementary School Principals Association).
The district in which she was a principal had an "open enrollment" scheme,
meaning that parents could choose their school for their children, regardless of where
they lived in town. For Linda, this was a bonus:
. . .so parents get to choose the school that they want to be in. And that does a
couple of things. It makes the parents want to be in the best possible school that
would be the best match for their kid, and they also want to be right about their
selection. So they work very hard in the schools and they - economically can
afford - many of them - 40, almost 50% - to be very actively involved and
meaningfully involved in the school.
'" Phyllis' metaphors are taken from the field of science and measurement: "working to fullest capacity",
"on the greater scale" "set up the standard".
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Linda also enjoyed the benefits of a long tenure, having had selected every teacher by the
time she left. "It was the best job you could ever have in the world."
Linda speaks very positively about her teaching staff:
. . .the teachers wanted to be in a school that was selected, so that in addition to
their internal motivations was a wonderftal advantage for me as a leader in this
school. . . . The teachers, as time went by, began their road toward collaboration in
a way that I had never seen before and they would share lesson plans and units
and projects and grade-wide activity in a way that made it quite unusual.
There was one teacher, however - a Reading Specialist - that gave Linda cause
for concern:
And her style was very different than mine, which is fine. And I guess I was
trying to understand her style. And I would work with her on a weekly basis
because she was part of our child study team and I met with the child study team
weekly. And I would watch her get angry sometimes, in an adult arena, and it
stung me. I thought what is that about? And so, even though I wasn't her direct
supervisor, I made sure to go in and visit her frequently when she was with kids.
And it turned out that while she was with kids in a reading setting, she was only
with them for a half hour at a time, and she could hold it together for that half
hour. So you could never really see anything.
Budget cuts forced Linda to put this Reading Specialist into a first grade classroom.
Very shortly after she began her first grade, the kids kind of went bonkers. They
were yelling and screaming in the classroom. . . . Very shortly, I would say by
December of that year, I knew it wasn't right. And I began to speak to her about
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what I saw and what my areas of discomfort were and where she needed to
improve and what courses I might suggest or workshops, particularly around
discipline. And she took them, and she's very bright. And when I would come in
and observe her everything would be hunky dory. But shortly thereafter it would
fall apart and I would hear screaming in the halls and other teachers would call
and say I think this woman, let's call her Jane, is having trouble. Could you come
down and help?
Linda enlisted a number of people to help Jane in the classroom, and to
discourage her from yelling:
I had the counselor involved, I had parent helpers in there. I had an assistant I put
in there thinking that all those people would, almost - not embarrass her to
behave and to not yell at kids - but it would motivate her. Let's put it that way.
Maybe if I'm being honest a combination between embarrass and motivate.
This went on for a year, and then Linda decided to begin the process of "trying to
get her out." This process would take three years.
For three years I wrote and documented on this woman every single day. Every
day because there was another incident every single day. And in the third year 1
had another principal come in and observe because the union was saying that
perhaps I was biased against her.
Linda even had the superintendent come in to observe her. On this day, Jane
arrived late to her class. One alternative Linda considered was to have Jane transferred to




For Linda, working toward dismissing this teacher was not an easy process. She
characterizes Jane as "a kind person" who would "take a poor child and make him her
project for Christmas and would - instead of buying toys for her own family - invest and
take care of this little boy." Moreover, Linda knew Jane's husband was unemployed and
there were three children in the family - children who were students in Linda's school.
Still, every year Linda would receive requests from parents who didn't want their
children placed in Jane's classroom.
This was Linda's first time she was solely responsible for a teacher dismissal. It
was difficult for her:
. . .her [Jane's] home life was in crisis as well. I knew that and her older child was
getting into legal problems in the junior high and the high school. So my heart
was breaking for her but I had to get her out.
Part of the difficulty for Linda was that, contrary to her preferred method of
supervision, she was forced to purposefully look for weaknesses instead of strengths:
. . . I'm always - 1 tend to look for the best in what people are doing. I wasn't
doing that at the end. In order to make a case I had to focus on the negative rather
than the positive. And I knew what I was doing, that I had to get her out. So that
was kind of a dilemma too because no matter how fast you want to - there are
always some good things but in order for a case to stick legally, when you go into
arbitration and so forth, you need to make your case pretty strong.
At the end of the three year period, Linda was able to dismiss Jane. She had
mixed feelings about doing it, but knew that it was the right thing to do.
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So, though I knew it was right to get her away from the children, I felt terrible
because she's a good human being and I knew she was going through that hard
time with her family. So it was probably my most difficult piece ofmy job,
knowing that I was changing her life, that I was charged with the protection and
enhancement of the lives of these five year olds and six year olds that was a
higher priority for me.
Linda had gone to great lengths to help this teacher improve:
I had the consulting psychologist work with her for the better part of a year ... I
worked with the union, the head of the union. I worked with almost anybody I
could think of. ... I took workshops with her, I tried to befriend her, you know -
not on a boss/teacher level but on an equal let 's learn something new together.
Team teaching - I even team taught with her for several lessons. ... I tried to
reduce the amount of time that she was alone with the kids. ... I departmentalized
the first grade [!] so she would not have the same kids and then I realized I'm
spreading it out.
She talked about her feelings throughout this period:
Mostly I felt terrible. I felt terrible for the children, number one, for the parents,
for her, for me, for her colleagues, for everyone touching it. For my colleagues,
my fellow principal - took up so much of their time figuring out and strategizing
and getting ideas from them ... the hours, and then the anger, too. I have to say
that because the hours that I spent at central office strategizing over how to do
this, the meetings with the union heads, the legal advice. ... It gobbled up so
much ofmy time that it took on a whole other life. It was like having another job
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as well as doing all the other things you have to do as a principal. . . . And so it
was sadness, it was frustration, and eventually anger and then one of advocacy -
you know, I'm going to make that change. But it was depressing too. It was all
those things. ... I thought I was destroying a woman's life in one way.
Linda's only real regret is that she "didn't do h sooner, more rapidly." She
remembers at the time that her perspective was as yet undeveloped:
I was a new principal. I thought, oh, maybe this is what you get. You get a curve.
You get okay, you get mediocre, and you get very good. I couldn't stand to not
have all be at the very good. . . . And I think that I was so motivated to get rid of
people like this particular Jane that I chose to do more work at the college level
and counsel people out who should not be in teaching to begin with. ... I think all
the time about why did I wait so long? Why did that take me four years?
Linda's experience has influenced work that she does now with superintendents:
I have a hidden agenda of encouraging them to be more supportive, particularly of
new principals. Having a mentoring relationship with them or setting up a mentor
that would give them a little bit more confidence to act more rapidly and give
them the tools to do it. ... I suspect every school has some of those teachers. We
need to get them out.
Alice
Alice is a principal in a very wealthy town outside of Boston. She has been a
school principal for twenty-one years. She didn't want to be a principal when she first
thought about leaving the classroom:
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I never actually wanted to be a principal. I was a teacher for seven or eight years
in [large, relatively poor district]. I then decided I would really like to be an
elementary curriculum director or a person who oversaw the principals. So I
realized that in order to do that I needed to have the credibility as a principal, so I
really had to be a principal before I could be in charge of principals . .
.
Once she became a principal, however, she found she loved it - especially being
part of a school community and developing relationships. (Her office displays a large
bulletin board with hundreds of pictures of families within her school community.) She
was a principal in a moderate-income community before moving to her current district.
After ten years she had the opportunity to open a new school in this town.
Alice tells me about her experience with dismissing a teacher when she was in her
third year of the principalship. This teacher was a special education teacher who, in
Alice's estimation, was a "terrible" teacher.
. . .Terrible in that she didn't have high enough expectations. She got by on the
model that people are so relieved - often, teachers are so relieved that someone
else is taking care of special ed students that they don't really pay attention. So,
she had no goals. She thought that these kinds of kids don't make leaps and
bounds in their success and she wasn't pulling them. ... It was like shooting from
the hip every time she met with special ed kids.
Alice seems certain that this teacher was not good for her school. When I ask,
then, what made the situation difficult for her, she first tells me that she was a "nice
person" who "cared about kids." However, she also tells me that the other teachers in the
school did not think she was a good teacher:
124

To the staff- she had been there a long time and she was kind and generous but
they also did not think she was cut out for the job. Even some veteran people,
they did not feel like the kids were taken care of when they were in her hands.
Alice tells me that she was "royally pissed - furious" that the director of
elementary programs at the time did not support her decision to dismiss the teacher.
But the first thing is that people - Special Ed directors don't have a careful enough
eye about what is good and powerful instruction. So the Director of Special Ed
was a wonderful, good guy. The person in charge ofK - 5 thought that this
person's problem was that she was just a difficult personality but her instruction
was fine. ... I was annoyed that this person - the elementary director - thought
that she could just be transferred. So twice she tried to transfer her. . . . And I was
insulted, actually, by the idea that a co-worker who'd been in the system and at
my same administrative level would think that she could be an effective
classroom teacher.
Alice disagreed with the attempts made by the elementary director to transfer this
teacher to first a computer curriculum position and then to a classroom with emotionally
disturbed children. She felt the teacher would not be effective as a "computer person" in
spite of the teacher's interest in technology, due to her lack of organization and
scheduling. She also didn't think it was "fair" to have her teach emotionally disturbed
children without the necessary training.




Alice also worked with the new Director of Special Education in town to help this
teacher improve her instruction.
When we first started out, and I say now we - this was the Director of Special Ed
- 1 went to put her on an improvement plan and I started out thinking that if this is
reversed enough and she takes it seriously we really could turn her toward a - we
could give her a chance and she could rebuild this. She didn't listen - that was
part of her style anyway. She didn't listen and she couldn't hear the feedback at
all. She resisted the conversation and she was defensive so we could never get
engaged in a conversation that was helpfiil to her.
Alice sought advice from a central office administrator who was "an expert in
supervision," but often found that this person would "come up with a different image
from what I was saying." Most helpful to Alice was the new Director of Special
Education:
... it was only helpful to work with the Special Ed Director. The other person
involved had not seen this person as so critical, but didn't like her and didn't, you
know, really still didn't want her in her program, but she wasn't willing to do the
heavy lifting.
At the end of that year with an improvement plan, the Assistant Superintendent of
the district met with the teacher. This meeting led to her resignation.
. . .he actually offered her some ways out. You know to retire, to - sometimes just
in that position they'll buy back sick time or something. And she quit before -
well, now that I think of it from between year one and year two it looked like she
126

was not improving and had not made progress, so year two was going to be a plan
for dismissal. And at that point she resigned.
An important aspect of this situation for Alice is that she was not considered the
primary evaluator of this teacher. Since the teacher was a special education teacher, the
Director of Special Education would have been considered her ultimate supervisor. But
Alice did not believe this precluded her from "calling the shots."
... it doesn't matter that they [special education staff] really worked for the
Department of Special Ed - they are in my school. I have an input on it. I was
calling the shots to say this is the year - she can't work here anymore. She's not
doing the job. We need someone different in the job.
There was no argument from the faculty:
. . .the staff I think understood that there were some issues between [the teacher]
and myself, but they didn't - I don't know - they didn't give me a hard time about
it. They stayed away. I think they felt that they gained something in the end. . .
.
I mean they were the first to admit that they would come down to me and at that
time we only had one Learning Center person, K - 5, and then we had one aide.
And they would do things like say look it's my turn to have the aide do the
service in my room instead of [the teacher]. So, knowing that they had done that,
they knew that they were in a weak position to kind of rally around her.
When I ask Alice about how she acquired her sense of what should be done - her
"moral compass" - she places it in a professional context:
I think from being in touch with my feelings and knowing that if someone's not
doing a good job it makes me so uncomfortable. So, it was really up to me and
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I've had several key mentors who've said it always - what matters is is it good for
the child? So that's easy to come back to but what really matters to me is that I
really do feel responsible for kids learning and I feel responsible when either kids
or a parent - when I have to sit down with them and pretend or try to convince
them that they're having the best year possible and teachers have different styles
and go through that whole routine but I'm so uncomfortable with it. You know,
with the sense of thinking there's a piece of truth here [to the parents' concerns]
and I don't know that I want to be living with either a lie or something and I don't
want to be going through this the rest ofmy career with this person.
Alice then tells me about her feelings of discomfort over another teacher she feU
was not "up to the standard [she] was used to in [her] other school:
But towards the end of the year nine parents from that class came to me and said I
just want you to know how my child experienced this class. ... A couple of
parents when they were assigned to her called and wanted appointments and it
made me so uncomfortable to be saying she is a more traditional teacher. I knew
that this was going to be a difficult year and so it's saying what can I do about
that? I own this problem. And I think that's where it is - I own it.
When I observe that she was uncomfortable that she "couldn't be 100% authentic with
the parents" she responds:
Even [with] the kids. I mean, being authentic is sort of what drives
me in terms ofmy beliefs and things like that.




I think I ask harder questions and more focused questions in interviews. I think I
have very high standards for special ed teachers. I think I try to support teachers
in understanding they are in charge of their own growth. . . . You have to work
with people and create a context of the difficulties embedded in any situation so
that they [teachers] want to work towards change or a higher standard. I think
that's really - that's more the way it has shaped me as a leader.
Phyllis, Linda, and Alice were forced by their moral sense of what was right for
students to engage in the thorny and unpleasant task of building a case against a teacher
in order to have them dismissed. Phyllis perhaps said it best when she talked about how
the process ran counter to her personal code of ethics:
You know, you keep wanting to give everybody that shot. That they will come
around, that they'll turn around their work ethic. Maybe there's something going
on in their personal life that's temporary. It's tough to let someone go, that's
always been very difficult for me.
However difficult the process was, however, these principals were glad they had
made the decisions they did. Not only did they rid their schools of underperforming
teachers, they also sent a strong message to the staff about how far they would go to
uphold high teaching standards. Both Alice and Phyllis reported that they felt more




Staff Supervision and Evaluation
So I believe in being right upfront. I believe you 've got to
call it the way you see it.
-John
School principals have a professional responsibility to ensure their students are
taught by an effective, caring teaching staff. They also have a responsibility to be
accurate, honest, and helpful throughout the evaluation process. While this seems a
simple enough concept, the process of teacher supervision and evaluation relies
ultimately on the principal's subjective judgment. As with teacher dismissal, it is a high-
stakes process of documentation, the resulting evaluation report becoming a permanent
part of an employee's persoimel file. It is also a process that has not been taken very
seriously by some principals, who will often gloss over incompetence with meaningless
and insubstantial comments that don't get to the heart of good teaching. Debra, John, and
Judy are three principals who found themselves in a position where being candid with
staff about their job performance could have unintended detrimental consequences for
them and their school.
Debra
Debra is the principal of a small elementary school south of Boston in a town she
refers to as "working class." We met in the summer before she began her fifth year at
this school. She had been a high school teacher of English, a fifth grade teacher, and a
Reading Specialist before she became a school principal. She considers her experience as
a Reading Specialist important to her current role:
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Having been a Reading Specialist, I had been - had the opportunity to go into a
lot of classrooms and get to see a lot that goes on. You get to see a lot of great
teaching, and I always considered myself a really good teacher.
When I ask her to tell me about a time when she was forced to make a difficult
decision, she quickly replies
The only thing that comes to mind is teacher evaluation. And that to me is
probably one of the more challenging tasks that you face as a principal.
When she first arrived at her school, she had set one goal for herself- to get to
know the students and the staff. She made it a point to not allow herself to be influenced
by the opinions of others:
I try not to - you try not to listen to what other people tell you. You try to go in
with an open mind, look at everyone. I'm brand new, they're brand new. That
was my attitude coming in. Everyone gets a fresh start. Your first year, for me
anyway, you spend absorbing it all. Taking it all in. ... So my first year I decided
to focus entirely on learning the staff and the students.
Debra quickly formed questions about two teachers:
So when I started the initial observations, which were in the fall ofmy
first year, you know there were two teachers that jumped out right at me
that something just wasn't quite right.
After she performed her first of two observations, she met with these teachers:
After the first observation 1 met with both teachers, expressed probably
not as forthright as I should have - some concerns regarding teaching and
classroom management, classroom preparation, lesson preparations. With
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one teacher it appeared to be almost a shock that I was bringing this up.
With the other teacher it was very professional; very what can I do to
improve this situation?
In an attempt to be fair to these teachers, Debra performed a follow up
observation with each of them and saw improvement. However, she observed them in
the spring unannounced, and was disappointed with what she saw. She felt she needed to
act on her evaluations, but being new, she didn't quite know how to go about it:
When in the spring I went to do my unannounced observations, they were worse
than the original announced type of thing. So I did speak with one ofmy
superiors as to what is the district's policy on handling this type of situation. And
I was more or less advised to work with the teachers, do what you can with the
teachers, keep it at the building level.
Debra' s difficult decision in this case came at the end of the year when she was
required to choose between an evaluation that read "meets the principles of effective
teaching" or "does not meet the principles of effective teaching" for these two teachers.
Searching for information that might help her, Debra went to central office and reviewed
the teachers' prior evaluations:
So prior to doing that I said - my gut told me - do a little more investigation here.
So I went up and pulled their personnel files. And I was shocked that the
recommendations, the evaluations - they were average. There was nothing in
there that said, you know, anything was wrong . .
.
In spite of her earlier commitment to look at teacher performance with an open
mind, she found herself influenced by these prior innocuous evaluations.
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So you start second guessing yourself. My God, why isn't someone seeing what
I'm seeing? So - 1 chickened out. And I went back and wrote the evaluation and
put that they were meeting the performance standards.
I am interested in Debra's use of the phrase "chicken out." This is consistent with
the feeling a person who is primarily deontological in thinking gets when they betray
their own internal moral "rule-book." She explains:
Well, after you hear from your superiors that - kind oftake care of it - it was,
well, doesn 't anyone do anything about this? And I was new. And I did walk
into a place where there were two previous evaluators. Two that actually split the
number of evaluations so when I say chicken out I started second guessing
myself. Maybe Fm just - maybe I had too many evaluations, maybe I was
stressed. As silly as it sounds, that's what I mean chicken out. I second guessed
myself rather than going with my gut.
Upon reflection, Debra is aware that she did not do what her conscience was
telling her to do. She is open about the degree to which her own desire to be perceived
poshively entered into her decision-making. When I ask her what her "gut" was telling
her, she answers:
Something's not right. I need to do something because they are not teaching the
way they should be teaching. This is all in hindsight. And really the children are
losing out. That should have been what my - I lost sight ofmy goal that day.
Kids were losing out and I was more like - at that point I was more concerned I
think [of] how I was going to be perceived. You know - is she going to be the
one stirring up trouble? The new one? That's- so I chickened out. That's how I
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- 1 didn't want to be perceived as the one stirring trouble I guess. I don't know
how to say it.
However, she does allow herself off the hook a little when she talks about why
she backed off from writing negative evaluations:
But being the new person and then you check and you see evaluations that are - I
mean nothing that said they were wonderful but nothing that said, you know,
other than slight little suggestions that you would give. I don't know. You were
told to give a suggestion so you gave a suggestion. Those types of suggestions
but nothing on the route I was going to travel.
Debra further explains her reason for not acting according to conscience. She did
not feel confident and she did not have the impression that other principals in her district
took the difficult route.
Not confident - definitely not confident. I mean, I was a first year principal in a
fairly large school. In fact, I believe we are probably the largest K - 4 school. In
talking with my colleagues, no one was talking about anyone that they were
concerned about. Jokingly, I think when we were in a social situation they might
- not mention anyone by name but just say I have this teacher that's not quite
where they need to be - but nothing. ... No one else seemed to be doing anj^hing
so I wasn't going to be the one at this point.
Debra's lack of confidence interfered with her willingness to inform central office
[her superintendent, most likely] that she was faced with this situation. When I asked her
if she asked anyone for advice - a colleague, another principal - Debra reveals her
nervousness about bringing this issue to a higher level:
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No, I didn't. Not at that point. It's, as a first year person it's hard. I mean I had
asked for advice on other things. Very generic things, but this was something that
when I say I chickened out I think it's because T started second guessing, is the
best way I can describe it. Maybe I was - it was me. Maybe my expectations
were not - were higher than everyone else's. I don't know how to say it but no, I
didn't consult because actually I didn't want anyone to know that I was facing this
just yet.
Debra's unwillingness to enlist the aid of central office changed the next year.
Administration changed. And actually with that change also came a lot more
training for the principals. All principals had done [coursework in] observing and
analyzing [teaching] but also under teacher contract the evaluation document
doesn't give you a lot to go on either. . . . But anyway the administration changed,
we had more training on evaluation and with one of the people that did the
training I did speak with him the following year about the situation with one
particular teacher. I also spoke with an assistant superintendent and then the
superintendent. And that's when I felt, I guess I had the support as well as
additional training that yes, I was doing the right thing. This was the right thing
to do.
With confidence gained from the training and the new central office support,
Debra placed both teachers on improvement plans. Her efforts to have these teachers
take performance improvement seriously paid off. Debra tells me both teachers "came
off improvement plans this year."
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Now, with the opportunity to reflect on the experience, Debra reahzes that
ahhough she fek a lack of confidence and support to effect change, she knew all along
that she should.
I think I always knew something had to be done even though I was second
guessing myself, there's always that feeling that I can't be crazy - I'm not crazy -
I didn't get here being crazy. So I knew and I also knew because I used to walk
through the rooms and if they got the heads up that I was coming things were a
little better. If they didn't get the heads up then I saw what I saw. . . .1 just knew,
especially in one case, that h wasn't right. ... I guess I just always knew that I had
to do something. . . . Even that first year when I say I chickened out, it never went
away that I was totally wrong.
Interestingly, even though she considers her decision to evaluate these teachers as
"meefing expectations" "totally wrong," when asked if she had it to do over again, Debra
tells me she would handle it "exactly the same way I did."
No doubt in my mind. Not having that - that first year being new, not really
knowing the system ... I didn't feel as though I had support. So I would have
been the lone - that new person out on a limb, and what if I was wrong? Then
what would I have done? I'm glad I waited because - for two reasons. One -
1
ended up with support, which is what I was hoping for. And two, I knew that I
also had the staffs support when I finally made the decision, and I don't know if I
would have had the staffs support that first year. ... I think I would have
crucified myself in the first year if you put it honestly.
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Although it was difficuh for Debra to back off from writing the evaluation she
believed was necessary, she is not sorry that she did. Pragmatically, it allowed her to
move forward the next year in a more effective way and from a position of confidence
and strength. When I ask her if this experience influenced her leadership at all, she tells
me that yes - it did.
[It] has definitely influenced my leadership style because I learned to be patient. I
learned to absorb - be sure I absorb everything before I make a decision. . . . I've
learned to be a lot more patient in my decision making. I also learned to ask for
help, to seek out other opinions as I do - I would say on a weekly basis with my
colleagues. . . . Now I don't think I could do my job if I did not have the support
system that I currently have, from the Superintendent right down to all ofmy
colleagues in the principalship.
John
John is an African American principal in a large suburban district west of Boston.
This district has seen a noticeable increase in its immigrant population, resulting in an
increase in students who are classified as English Language Learners (ELL). He has
been a school principal for 19 years, the last nine in his current school. During his tenure,
his school became the home of the district's elementary bilingual program, an event
which doubled its size and created "language issues." He recalls two teachers in
elementary school who made an impact on his life. As a child, he tells me he was
"obese" and "shy" and one of his teachers convinced him to take up singing:
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It was much cooler being the singing fat kid than it was being the stubborn fat kid.
So that got me thinking about education as a career. . . So then this music teacher
got me interested in theater. And I figured, you know, if these two men could
have that kind of impact on my life I wanted to be able to have [the same impact
on others] and it led me into education. I never planned on being a principal. It
just kind of happened.
When asked about an ethical dilemma John has encountered in his principalship,
he tells me two stories that end in his believing he had done the right thing. He also told
me a third story where he felt he had not done the right thing, had made a bad decision,
and, in fact, left the school shortly afterward. The following story highlights the
difficulty John had as a new principal reprimanding a veteran teacher.
John had suspected for some time that a teacher in his school was abusive toward
students:
...more on the borderline of Dr. Jeckyl/Mr. Hyde personality and I started paying
attention to it and of course like I said I could never catch it. But what the hard
part was not to have a [disciplinary] meeting partly because this person had just
gotten over a very serious [illness].
Although this teacher was of an age to retire, she was not likely to. "She was way
past her time but she had no life." John's dilemma became one of confronting this
teacher with his suspicions about an abusive style of dealing with the students, which
would certainly make her [and, he suspected, her colleagues] angry, or of "letting it go"
and waiting for her to retire. As a veteran, she had alliances among the faculty, but it was
the new teachers who complained to John about her. Unfortunately for John, it was
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stipulated in the teachers' contract that if a teacher received a complaint, he or she was
entitled to know who had complained, and the complaining teachers were unwilling to
come forward:
The way the contract is set up in the system is that if there is anybody that accuses
anybody of anything the person has a right to [know]. And to tell me I have to let
the person know that you told me if you want me to do anything. Otherwise,
you've got to tell the person. And you can take it out and deal with it that way or
you can tell me information and I can't do anything more. You know, so that's
another dilemma. Like I go to you and say "your teacher is causing a problem, I
saw her hit somebody, but I don't want you to tell her I'm the one that told you."
So now you've got this information and what do you do with it? So I had this
circumstance and after and this went on for maybe a good couple of weeks, a
month or more.
This situation emerged in John's consciousness gradually.
I had a sneaking suspicion; something didn't feel right, those intangibles. But I
had this information from the street. There's that things aren't necessarily good in
the class, not so much the teaching but the kids don't feel comfortable.
Attempts by John to approach this teacher on specific infractions were met with what he
felt were prepared responses:
And the thing is there's almost too quick a response to them. It's like it was
prepared in case somebody called her on it - you know, it wasn't one of those
[situations] where they came back the day afterwards, two, three days later after
thinking about it. She went back to you, and [would] say, "you tell me the person
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who says I'm doing this or none of this counts, or else I'm going to go against you
for harassment. I'll put in a suit against you.
Not only did John lack solid evidence against this teacher, he was also cognizant
of the political power of the teacher's colleagues if they turned against him. This had
happened to him in his former district, and was part of the reason why he'd left. John did
not want to leave this school:
You know, so my dilemma was do I err on the side of children and confront the
teacher, or do I err on the side of the political nature of things and not do anything
at all, knowing that people are watching me in the building. Knowing that
everybody's waiting to see my decision; knowing that as an administrator your
decisions are only as good as your last decision. You know, because what you
did for somebody 10 decisions ago, they'll forget it ...
John called the teacher in to confront her. He tells me it was just "to validate" what he
had heard from others.
It was just to validate. It was to have a conversation with her to see if she could,
if what I heard was going to be validated or if it was going to be immediately
dismissed. I assumed it was going to be dismissed. Even if it was true it was
going to be dismissed. And so of course she stormed out of here in this office at
dismissal and the whole building saw.
John had confronted this teacher, had not achieved his purpose of validation, and
was now being judged by what he felt was the whole school, given his experience with
how quickly news travels in a school building:
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It's just how buildings have ears - they just breathe and share stuff. So that got to
be a big brouhaha in the building.
He found himself in the middle of a controversy:
Everybody's just kind of, there were some that were upset at me because how
could I do this to her after she's just gotten over this medical issue, she was trying
to get back together. This particular dilemma grew into a school [issue]. It was no
longer between me and her, it was between her - it was two factions of the staff
and everybody watching me to see what I was going to do about it.
John did not go to the superintendent with the issue, believing that "he [the
superintendent] had other issues he was worried about," but he did go to an informal
principal support network. ("We're all principals that were all vice principals together at
the same time.")
After going about a few meetings with this whole thing and once it got to be a
school issue, it took probably about three weeks. I had to call her on it. And so
basically I went to her and said regardless of what anybody's told me ... I'm
telling you I have a sense - my feeling is that you're not being right to the kids
because I have some examples of things that I've seen . . . yelling at kids . . . kind
of pulling them along. Then, I've gotten the kind of support I needed from
outside the school as well as my deciding that I'm not going to let this happen to
the children.
Having this teacher fired was out of the question - John's purpose in confronting
her was simply because he couldn't not confi-ont her. To do nothing would be tacit
approval of her behavior toward children.
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Well, I really couldn't fire her because she's a senior person, she's been in the
system forever. I deah with it. ... If I'd decided not to do anything then I thought
the children were going to be in harm.
In a way, h was John's way of sending the message to his divided staff about his
leadership priorities. There were two factions within the faculty - the new teachers who
had joined the school when it "doubled" to host the bilingual program, and the veteran
teachers who had been there long before the bilingual program - and John - had arrived.
You know the [new] staff- they didn't really know her. They didn't care. They
just saw - they believed what they saw was being unjust to the kids. I had the old
staff that was on her side that didn't like me now, and the new staff that was on
my side and said I was doing the right thing for the kids. And watched to see
what I was doing. And there were some people in between.
John knew what he had to do. The dilemma for him was the "potential political
[fallout]."
I was concerned what the word of mouth would be from the people in my
building. ... It's got a whole political piece that I was concerned about. Plus, too,
I had worked so hard to get back to [the district] and I didn't want to [endanger]
that. . . . There's a lot of stuff and you know as well as I do that sometimes it isn't
so much what happens it's the word of mouth about what happens. The only
thing we have in this job is our reputation. Potentially there's a lot of political
damage. There could have been a lot of political damage because of who she
was. She wasn't just a regular teacher in the system. I mean she had clout and
she knew how to play the system.
142

When asked, John tells me that the virtue he prizes most is integrity.
I believe that a person who is firm in their convictions and believe what they're
saying, because they truly believe it, not because it's the whim of the moment, not
the flavor of the day. I also [hate] white lies, every day that people make. Men
are worse at it then women. It's bad to say that there's more men who would tell
little white lies than women do. Integrity, honesty, and - 1 would say if there's
going to be a third virtue, I would say probably a sense of caring and not
necessarily about themselves, but caring about others. And I think that good
educators carry all three of those virtues, and if they don't, they should. ... I think
you need to be honest in your convictions of who you are. You can't be one kind
of person with parents, a different kind of person with kids, a different kind of
person with staff. That creates a Dr. Jeckyll/Mr. Hyde kind of thing in the
building and people start wondering which of the people am I speaking to now?
So I believe in being right up front. I believe you've got to call it the way you see
it.
Judy
This case is different from the others in two important ways. First, the participant
is known to me. In the interest of promoting candor, I made an early decision to
interview only principals who are unknown to me. I feh that if they didn't know me, and
I didn't know them, then they would be more likely to share their stories more openly. I
felt the fear ofjudgment would be lessened somewhat. However, in talking to this retired
principal on the telephone one day about the subject ofmy dissertation, I learned her
story recounted here and felt it represented an interesting dilemma worthy of inclusion.
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Since she shared it with me over the telephone, I did not have an audio-taped account.
Judy was willing to write her testimony via email. As a result, her story is presented here
in a more organized form than the typical testimonials. Judy had time to think about how
she wanted her story written, and could more carefully choose her words than my other
participants. This is apparent in the language of the testimony. I did not have the
opportunity to spontaneously probe for fiarther details, and the testimony is somewhat
"thin" because of it. Nevertheless, I believe it elucidates the ethical dimension of the role
of the principalship much in the same way that the other participants' stories do.
Judy retired from her principalship in a small, suburban elementary school two
years ago. She had been a teacher in a high performance district west of Boston, and then
earned her Masters and Doctorate degrees, saying she "wanted to make a wider
difference at a district level." She held many central office positions, involving staff and
curriculum development for the entire K - 12 system, but gradually came to value the
role of the school principal in implementing change:
I realized the impact the principal made. In fact, things only worked well and
were implemented if the principal supported the idea or process. I wanted to be in
the position to make a direct impact on a school.
Passed over for a principalship in her own town, Judy sought a position elsewhere. In
spite of her advanced degrees and central office experience, it wasn't easy:
Although I had many interviews and was a finalist in several towns, my not
having previously been a principal was an impediment.
Judy persevered and finally obtained the principalship in the school from which she
retired eight years later.
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Before describing her difficult ethical moment, Judy provides the background:
The previous principal had been there 1 8 years and avoided conflict whenever
possible, I was told. The custodian had been there a number of years and was
used to doing what he wanted. He was a large man, given to mood swings and
sometimes refused to do certain assigned tasks. It came to the point where I
would not be alone in the same room with him. [Judy is a very petite woman.] I
was documenting his inconsistent job performance and rudeness in order to have
enough evidence to remove him. The director of buildings and grounds [his co-
supervisor] was working with me and supported the documentation. In fact, we
both wrote letters to the custodian following meetings held and following
incidents of reprimand. This was the third year with this custodian.
One weekend, Judy received a phone call from the Director of Persormel:
...a parent had contacted the Superintendent's office and accused that custodian
of grabbing his daughter. I was told by the Director of Personnel to call the
custodian and say he was on leave with pay pending investigation of a situation. 1
could not say what the situation was to the custodian, since it might impact the
investigation. It was my responsibility to investigate the situation and find out
what happened. I called the father of the fifth grade girl to get information. The
family was Egyptian, and the father was always disrespectful to me. He basically
gave me no information other than his daughter came home and accused the
custodian of grabbing her. He would not allow the daughter to talk to me and
kept her home from school for several days. Additionally, the father of the girl
said he planned to bring civil suit against the custodian in [nearby city's] court.
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Since the father of the girl would not allow Judy to interview her, Judy
interviewed other children who had been in the cafeteria with her and may have seen the
incident:
I had to keep the situation as confidential as possible. Therefore, I only talked to
the Superintendent and Director of Personnel about it. I decided the following
Monday to use open ended questions of students in grade five, since all had lunch
together in the cafeteria. ... I did learn that someone saw the custodian pull the
coat the girl had in her hands to tell her to put it on and go outside so he could
clean the cafeteria. She was one of the last ones in the cafeteria. Evidently, the
girl did go outside and played and did not say anything to anyone at school.
When she got home, she told her father the custodian grabbed her. . . .1 reported
my results the next day to the Superintendent and said I would try to call the
father and tell him what my investigation found. I also spoke to the attorney for
the district, who said that technically grabbing the coat was grabbing the child.
However, I thought it was worth trying to talk the father out of filing a civil suit.
Somehow, I was successful.
Given the problems this custodian had caused Judy in the past, this could be seen
as a charitable act. If Judy did nothing, and the custodian was found guilty in court of
abusing this girl's civil rights, that would be compelling evidence in favor of dismissal.
After speaking with the father, things took an interesting turn:
After I explained what I found, the father decided to meet with the custodian on
his own [outside of school] for drinks. [!] The father said he would not file a suit
against the custodian. I had no other communication with the custodian and do
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not really know what the child's father said to him or who told him what the
accusations were.
In the end, the custodian kept his job, but received a letter of reprimand from Judy
for his actions with the girl. Judy believes the custodian did not appreciate her
intervention with the father:
I don't think the custodian appreciated how hard I worked to save him from a
civil suit and only resented his being on leave during the three days [with pay] of
investigation.
In describing the alternatives Judy considered, she reveals her primary
consideration:
I could investigate and not get enough information to make a definite statement
about what happened. Then, there would have had to be a more formal
investigation by attorneys or people outside the school system. This might then
have become a public situation [newspaper, etc] in court and hurt the school,
school system and community.
Even if her investigation revealed enough incriminating evidence, there would
still be a need to take the situafion to a level that would compromise the school:
. . . then a hearing and action would need to be taken. The outcome would be
uncertain, since many more players would be involved. The custodian would
have been dismissed with good cause. However, it would be a negative situation
for the children, parents, school, school system and the community.
Judy's third option, as she saw it, involved the possibility that the custodian was not
guilty of the accusation:
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I could thoroughly investigate and do all I could toward clearing the custodian if
he had not grabbed the girl. Then, the situation could be kept confidential,
benefiting all parties.
Judy did investigate as thoroughly as she was able to. Although the truth wasn't
as damning as the accusation initially sounded, there was still wrongdoing on the part of
the custodian toward a student in her school. The vulnerability of a child being on the
receiving end of this large custodian's anger, manifested in his physical action, made the
situation particularly egregious. This was a man with which the principal herself was
afraid to be alone. Judy's final option - and the one she eventually carried out - was to
find out the truth, tell the parent the truth, and try to persuade the parent to not seek
outside retribution, preferring to handle the matter in house and save the school from
negative publicity.
At first glance, purposefially trying to keep the situation away from the media
could be interpreted as a self-serving action. However, Judy knew that a media trial
would have negative consequences on her school community and would compromise the
trust that the parents and the children had in their school as a safe place. In a way, sitting
back and doing nothing would have been in Judy's best interest - after all, she had been
trying to get this custodian dismissed for some time.
I stood to gain, since he was a thorn in my side. . . . Part of me really wanted him
to be guilty, so I could have him dismissed. If 1 found he had grabbed the girl, I
would have taken all the steps necessary, despite the negative publicity.




. . .1 worked hard to keep an open mind about what the custodian had done,
although I inhially beUeved it was possible the custodian had done something.
Since there had never been other incidents reported about children [his negative
behaviors were directed to the principal and certain teachers], I questioned the
situation.
In spite of her dislike for the custodian, Judy did not believe that grabbing the coat was
just cause for a civil suit:
... I did not think he should be brought to civil court for grabbing the coat. Ifwe
could have dismissed him for grabbing the girls' coat while it was in her arms, I
would have liked to do that. However, I knew that was not fair, so I did not press
for that.
Upon reflection, Judy clarifies her priority at the time:
I think I acted ethically throughout the process, although I had moments when I
thought about letting the guy take the fall. I still ask myself why I tried so hard to
get the father to drop the civil charges. I think it was because I saw the incident
as a reflection ofmy school and my leadership and did not want this to become
pubHc.
The custodian wound up coming back to work, only to continue in his poor
performance and bad behavior. He claimed a mental breakdown and was let go with a
settlement from the district. Judy was pleased with her ability to keep the matter
confidential:
I was glad that I was good at investigating and was able to keep the situation
confidential. I was also proud that I was able to convince the father to drop the
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charges and keep the situation confidential. I never heard about the incident fi-om
anyone. Despite my wanting to get the custodian dismissed, I could not do it
dishonestly.
When asked whether or how this experience influenced Judy's leadership in the
aftermath, she tells me that, in retrospect, she wishes she had confided in others in order
to gain support and help:
It was one more experience that confirmed the challenges of being a principal in a
small school where I had to handle a difficult situation in confidence and on my
own, essentially. I wish I had developed the network of colleagues and friends I
could have confided in at that time [which I later had]. I was part of [a
professional] principal support group, but the timing was not in line for that
monthly meeting. I could have confided there and received confidential help. I
took things too literally at that time about legal confidentiality and did not turn to
anyone else for help. If that happened today, I would call friends who were
principals and get advice.
Student discipline
I mean I don't take much of this home with me but I'm always processing stuff,
sometimes subconsciously. And I'm never sure that what I'm doing is right.
- Susan
Principals have a responsibility to shape student behavior in their schools. They
also have a responsibility to see that consequences are just and effective when students
break the rules. Disrespectful behavior toward teachers, bullying behavior toward
vulnerable students - these phenomena can have an adverse effect on school culture, (cite
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effective school research here), interfere with student learning, and altogether
compromise feelings of well-being for members of a school community. Sam's and
Susan's dilemmas both involve meting out appropriate justice for student misbehavior.
Their two stories, however, are very different from one another in the personal
motivations that influenced the decision.
Sam
Sam is an elementary school principal in a wealthy suburb of Boston. He has
recently arrived via the public school system of Los Angeles. Having grown up in
Massachusetts, he decided to move with his wife and toddler back to New England to
continue his career closer to home and family. He is outgoing and friendly, using my
name frequently while telling me his story. Pictures adorn his office door of the
schoolwide celebration of his birthday - he is pictured receiving balloons and standing in
a circle of staff members. The story he chooses to share with me when I ask him about
tough decisions in his principalship involves an extreme disciplinary incident when he
was an elementary school principal in Los Angeles. Four students - three male fourth
graders and one female fifth grader - had destroyed a car in the neighborhood of the
school.
I went to look at the car, and Jennifer I was shocked at what I saw. I don't mean
vandalized as in throw a rock. They literally - baseball bat to the windows,
stomped on the roof, crushed h in, because they were walking home from school
and they saw it. And thought it'd be a cool thing to do. They hit it with rocks the
first day, and then they got greedy and got a bat the second day, by the third day
all four of them were on top of the roof smashing it in.
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After seeing the car, Sam knew that he had to respond, and he knew that his
response would have to involve the police. That, in and of itself, was not problematic for
Sam, as it was the school district policy to involve the police when a crime was
committed. Although this incident took place outside of school property, it happened
while the children were walking home from school, and that made it Sam's problem.
. . .in California, I'm pretty sure it's the same around here, we're responsible for
the child from the time they leave their front door, all day, to school. This was the
key in LA, was at 3:00 [going] home till they get to their front door.
Sam wished to perform his own investigation prior to police intervention:
So the next morning I called the school resource officer to let him know about the
incident but I had to investigate it at the site level prior to letting the police in.
Because once the police get involved, once the police walk into the office in LA,
they take over. So, I have to be an observer. I can't be asking questions and I
can't ask questions with the police officer there, so I know to get as much
information that I can get ahead of time for my internal investigation for the
school issue. The law issue, once they come in, they take over.
Sam saw his duty as school principal differently than that of the police officer and
the judicial system. He was in charge of "the school issue," where the police were in
charge of "the law issue."
In performing his own investigation, Sam discovered the identities of the four
children.
When the neighbor came and saw the car was vandalized and she thinks she
knows who did it, based on the witnesses. Fifty kids saw it. ... In this case, the
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lady came down and she gave me the names because she had already talked to the
kids in the neighborhood who squealed. It was hard getting it out of some of the
kids because those three boys and the fifth grade girl [were] the leaders of the
fourth grade. They'll bully all the other kids. But, when you bring them
individually, brought them in one by one you play them off each other. . . . And
they did, they finally admitted exactly what happened.
This is where the ethical dilemma set in for Sam. He knew the four children well. The
three boys had been in trouble before. The girl had not.
Called the kids down, four kids, one ofthem never been in my office, sweetheart,
was a girl. Three boys, been in my office numerous times.
Sam articulated the nature of the dilemma for him:
Then the dilemma was, okay, first of all I have to bring in the school resources
officer. In the irmer city, that's the way of life. That is not in [current district].
Never. But it's a way of life. Call them, bring them in. And the dilemma was
this child is going to have this on her record. And she made a mistake. How do
you balance between the three boys, one with already a juvenile record, two
others going that way no doubt about it, and how can you say get her off without
having her facing the same consequences?
Although he knew that he would have to inform the police, Sam knew that his report to
the police could be shaped to influence the outcome for the children. He had the morning
to consider his report:
The law issue, once they come in they take over. So I did that. I told him to
come over at lunch time. And, the question was, going back to the girl. She was
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involved. She did admit that she did damage to the car. But the other boys were
the main culprits, we'll say. So what do we decide to do?
When I ask Sam about alternatives considered, his reply is immediate.
Let the girl slide, absolutely. ... I knew from past experiences, once the police
officer gets involved, I can turn to him and say here's three names, here's four
names. And, knowing that, the possibility is that they can write a citation right
there, which is recorded. In this case they could arrest, and take off campus, all
four of them. They could take off one. There's whole different scenarios that I
thought could happen.
That morning, Sam shared his dilemma with several others:
What I did was I talked to my counselor who's counsel/special projects, which is
your right hand person. And you know, you start talking to the office staff who
know, they know the kids. This is my dilemma. I let other people have input into
it. I can't make a decision without hearing what other people who have an active
voice in a child's educational career. But, because of course, the teacher knows
she's a good kid, she made a mistake, is that the end of it? So once we get that
kind of information, I take a long time to make that decision because I want to not
rush to judgment.
Nevertheless, the police officer would be at the school at noon, and Sam had a duty to
provide names. He decided to give all four.
Do I give him four names and say, hey listen, this girl was involved but she
wasn't the main thing? And that's what I did.
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Sam rationalized his decision based on several principles. He was concerned for
the safety of the girl if she was seen to receive special treatment:
. . .for these three boys who have been in my office numerous times, that if I let
her go, first of all she lives in the neighborhood. You never know if these kids are
coming back to your school in LA. They can go to another; they can go to
community school, with the option of coming back to your school. And as fourth
grade boys, they were going to come back at some point.
Sam also believed that there must be consistency in consequences for the same behavior:
So, once I heard from her that she definitely smashed the car, 1 felt at that point
that it's got to be consistent, and as an administrator if you're not consistent in
anj^hing you do, you can't build that trust. And people will say "Oh, he'll back
or do for one group but he won't do for another." . . . But I've got to save face for
myself, with the kids. Even though these kids are going the wrong way, what if
that girl is back in school Monday with one hundred fifty other fifth graders who
knew she was involved? It wasn't something that, even if we could keep it quiet,
it wasn't. Gossip spreads that kind of stuff. Oh lookit, lookit, she got away with
it.
Consistency is a valued attribute that comes up in Sam's testimony frequently. In
talking in general about consequences for fighting:
And the parents have said, well my kid hits that kid he should sock him back.
The difference is if I only just suspended one there because he was the antagonist,
but the other kid, he did hit back, if I let that kid back into the population that
afternoon or the next day, what is that telling the other kids? For me, I have to be
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consistent, and it's worked great. Even though you've got to deal with those
parents screaming, yelling, doing all of that stuff, but it's that consistency in
knowing that I have to look at 850 kids, they're safe.
Interestingly, the neighbor whose car had been vandalized did not press Sam to
notify the police. That made his decision-making a little more complicated, because it
allowed for the possibility of handling it on his own with just a school suspension:
But do I turn my back on that and say, they vandalized a car, here's a three day
suspension, I'll see you back next Thursday? Especially with the neighbor, who
is not pushing it. She wasn't looking for money; she was just making me aware
of it. And I could have said, "Okay, thank you for the information" end of day.
But that's not teaching kids, especially elementary kids, what's right and wrong.
You can't vandalize someone's property and think it's no big deal.
The idea that people (as well as himself) would view him as inconsistent in his
decision-making was intolerable to Sam. In the end, he was most influenced by the need
to be (and seen by others to be) consistent in meting out punishment for similarly
egregious behavior. His decision to include the girl in his report to the police, however,
left him feeling disturbed about what would happen to the girl, as well as the three boys.
A ten year old that's going to go to juvenile hall on a Friday, knowing that they
might not get out for the weekend, those are the - what I didn't put in was it was a
Friday when they were taken off campus. Knowing what could happen to them,
what they were going to experience and be aware of, if their parents don't get to
the local police station in time, because they are juveniles. They go to Juvy in LA
and are at the boot camp for the weekend. And I knew that. . . . These kids made a
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mistake vandalizing; they could be in with kids that are older, violent. It's LA, it
is South Central LA. This is, you know, life or death.
Sam was also disturbed by the fact that these children would now have a police record:
. . .it's now going to be on their record until they're eighteen.
However, Sam was also influenced by his experience as a Middle School principal,
dealing with troublesome students whose records did not reflect the severity of their
behavior:
As a Middle School principal - my experience there - we have a lot of kids that
are middle school who've had incidents and in their cume [cumulative record]
from elementary, that should have police records. Should have police activity
involved and there weren't [in the file]. And principals let them get by, and just
dealt with it internally. And now we're at Middle School where we have a gang
banging kid who brings weapons to school, or violent in classes, and does all
these things. And when it comes to their record, their juvy record, there's nothing
in it. ... And then they're in eighth grade or sixth grade or seventh grade and the
officer says this is their first incident.
Speaking in Nash's Second Language of Moral Character, Sam revealed how
important it is to him that he act (and be seen by others to act) with trustworthiness. "The
paradigmatic Second Language question to ask is not only, 'Is this the right thing to do?"
but ' Which decision has the most integrity in terms ofthe kind ofperson I either perceive
myselfto be or am striving to become?'' (Nash, 2002, p. 63) In responding to a question
regarding a simple, factual event, Sam seized the opportunity to tell me about what he
believes is the quintessential virtue for a school principal.
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Q: How did you find out about this situation?
The one thing as a principal, the kids need to trust. If they trust you as a principal,
and in California it's life or death. . . . If a kid trusts you and they'll tell you
something, they know their name would never be used again. Ever. And I lay it
out on the table and I'll say if you were the child who was a snitch, Jennifer, this
infarmation is between you and I. When I call in those other kids your name
would never get brought up, I promise you that. Takes time to do that. In Middle
School it took the kids a whole year to know who I was. . . . Those type of things.
It's building that trust, them to know that they can tell . .
.
For Sam, "the right thing" seems borne of a mostly utilitarian moral belief system.
That is, what decision will ultimately serve the needs of the whole school? He worried
about the girl's safety as she spent the weekend in jail, and tried to mitigate her
consequences as best he could within the parameters of the situation:
Do I give him [the policeman] four names and say, hey listen, this girl was
involved but she wasn't the main thing? And that's what I did.
Omitting the girl's name from his report, however Sam may have been attracted
to the idea, was not really a viable option for him. He came back to his unshakeable need
to be (and appear) trustworthy. He believes consistency is an important component of
trustworthiness:
So, once I heard from her that she definitely smashed the car, I felt at that point
that it's got to be consistent, and as an administrator ifyou 're not consistent in
anything you do, you can 't build that trust. And people will say Oh, he'll back or
do for one group, but he won't do for another.
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. . .For me, I have to be consistent.
Sam used the metaphor "saving face" several times in our interview. This tells me that
he not only feels the need to be consistent and trustworthy, but that it's important to him
that he appear that way publicly:
So yes, I had the influence. But I've got to saveface for myself with the kids.
Even though these kids are going the wrong way, what if that girl was back in
school Monday with 1 50 other fifth graders who knew she was involved? Wasn't
something that, even if we could keep it quiet, it wasn't. Gossip spreads that kind
of stuff
In the end, Sam is still disturbed by the idea that his decision-making may have harmed
the four children:
Because they're kids, they're ten, eleven year old kids. It's not that, oh, I did the
right thing. I mean, yes, I know I did the right thing. How do I describe it? I sent
those kids away. That's not what I wanted to do. That's not. You can't have
personal, personal feelings can't get involved in a decision like that with four
kids. It's just - how can you? ... It would drive my whole weekend into did I do
the right thing for each individual as a whole? Did I think about the girl? I still
do because I'm talking about it today and that was three years ago.
Susan
Susan came to the principalship after having several other roles in education. She
has been a special education teacher, a library media specialist, and a teacher overseas.
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taking some time off to raise her son. She earned a Ph.D. and taught in two different
universities. Being a professor was not rewarding to her, however.
I hated being a professor. I really hated the pace of it. I hated the bureaucracy. I
hated the powerlessness that I felt to do anything. And the things that I valued
weren't rewarded in terms of tenure. And the things that I was less interested in
was.
Susan tells me about her decision to become a school principal:
But the decision that got me to change my mind about becoming a principal had
to do with the fact that as a professor and also during my Ph.D work I spent a lot
of time in school supervising student teachers. And so I got to see the role that
principals played in making a school what it was. And so that their priorities
would be translated into the priorities of the school. And I never saw that sense of
- not that I'm looking for power, but that sense of power in terms of shaping
education.
She went to school in the summer to earn her principalship licensure, which
resulted in a position in a K - 8 school in a large urban district earlier than she had
planned. "So I got licensed in June and just out of nowhere this job came along."
Susan has been a principal now for just three months. When I ask her to tell me
about an ethical dilemma she has faced in her short time there, she tells me how difficult
h has been to get students with special needs included in regular education classes. The
teachers have been resistant, to the point where the special education teachers began a
rumor that they were going to be let go and a grade level team of six teachers complained
to the union about it. She was disappointed in the lack of trust displayed by the teachers,
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because she wanted them to perceive her as being approachable. However, I soon
reahzed that this didn't fall under my definition of ethical dilemma because she knew
very well what she wanted to do - she experienced no inner conflict about what was the
"right thing" - it was just a matter of difficulty getting others to accept it.
She tells me about another dilemma she faced early on involving a disciplinary
incident. Here, she admits not knowing what to do: "I had to make a decision, and I was
back and forth, back and forth." She implies her story is typical:
I mean - this happens a lot of times. As you can well imagine I have to make a
decision whether to suspend, whether to keep it at school, whether to do this,
whether to do that. It's always a judgment call.
At first, she expresses frustration that there are no written guidelines for her
school that everyone knows about:
For one thing, why is it a judgment call? It's that this school has . . . nothing
written down. So kids and parents really didn't have ...[breaks off).
Susan then admits that written guidelines mighi not be helpful to her:
So I am always back and forth. I think even with written rules. A lot of things
are still going to be a judgment call.
She received a phone call one morning from a distraught parent:
I had an incident where a kid - a couple of kids - played a practical joke on
another kid. And how I found out about it was a call from a crying mother, the
kid who had had the joke played on who was crying. The joke was they claimed
to have put an ex-lax pill in his soda and let him drink it. Well I was furious.
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Susan was especially angry because the victim of this prank was an anxious child to
begin with, and Susan knew the boy and his mother:
And this was a kid who has identified himself to me and the mother has come and
met with me. Who is anxious - on anxiety medicine.
After receiving the call, she called in the accused boys:
So I called the kids in and they - surprisingly - they admitted to it and identified
the kid who did it. And I was ftirious. I was so angry. ... I was furious and I said
you know this is a clear case of bullying. ... [The accused] said "We've known
each other since Kindergarten, we hang out on weekends, and [he said] last
weekend he [the current victim] played a really bad joke." And so, that changed
the whole thing to some degree.
Learning that the boys were friends who played together on the weekends, who
were equally guilty of playing practical jokes on one another, put the incident in a new
perspective for Susan. She no longer saw a case of bullying.
And so I called all the other boys in, including the victim of all of this, and it felt
to me like that was the story. And as friends they talked it out. 'Well, you know
it went too far and why didn't you . . . ' this is the victim being able to say this to
his friends.
With this altered perspective, Susan's response was now not so obvious to her.
What should the appropriate consequence be?
And so I had to decide. I mean, I came in that morning and this kid was gone. I
was just so furious and as the story unfolded it was kind of like do I make this
more than it is? So I ended up - I gave them all - I gave them all - they lost their
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break. They have at break at 10:00 and they have to come down here at break.
It's not a big punishment but they are without their peers and whatever.
This lessened punishment was not popular with the teachers:
So of course I got pushed back from the teachers. "You didn't suspend him" and
you know, I explained as much as I could the whole story and I was like it isn 't
what it seemed - it isn 't what it seemed.
Susan reflects on the difficulty of her decision:
This is where I'm saying about preparing people to become principals. I had to
take a stance pretty quickly. And I had to make a decision and I was back and
forth and back and forth. . . . And I knew it wouldn't be popular with the teachers
because already they're adjusting to my style which is very different from the
other [former] principal.
Susan reveals what she learned early on in her principalship, partly as a result of
this episode:
In the first month of school I learned that I need to move slow in terms of -
slowly in terms of making a decision. For example, in this case, I called the
mother back with the child. The child talked, just the child and I were here
. . .And you know, here's a mother who was crying on the phone the day before
about how horrible the trick [was that] the kids played. She's fine with it, she's
talking to her son, everybody's fine with it you know. So I learned not to jump at
the first story, which is always a horrible story and often delivered by parents who
either don't know the whole story or don't want to know the whole story.
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Perhaps remembering the reason for my visit, Susan wraps up the story in terms
of the ethical dilemma:
And so I learned that lesson really quickly ... and I do think in that case the
ethical dilemma was they needed to have some consequence and the obvious
consequence that people outside looking in would look at is they needed to be
suspended. And I just didn't see that.
Susan's statement "I am always back and forth. I think even with written rules.
A lot of things are still always going to be a judgment call" is consistent with a
situationalist's view of morality. Initially furious with the boys for what looked like
cruelty toward an already anxious classmate, Susan saw the incident differently upon
hearing mitigating circumstances. She expected the teachers wouldn't agree, and they
didn't, but she still tried to tell them "It isn't what h seemed. It isn't what it seemed."
She agrees being seen as "tough" would not be a bad thing - especially for a new
principal - but she was true to her preferred style of dealing with discipline:
I knew it wouldn't be a popular decision with the teachers because already they're
adjusting to my style which is very different from the other principal [who] was a
man, big, blustery, all talk no action to be quite honest, and the kids knew that.
And my style is more conversive, let's get to the bottom of this, how are we going
to plan so this doesn't happen again.
For Susan, the outcome was positive because the boys were talking honestly with
one another about how things had gone "too far," and they ended up friends again. She is
not worried about the other teachers' impression of her at this point:
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You would have seen me as tough, yeah, but I think people who have worked
with me and seen me working with kids know that I can be tough when I have to
be . . . everybody's adjusting to the fact that I'm different.
Susan further reveals her situationalist/subjectivist viewpoint when she responds
to my question about how she developed her sense of what should be done, what the right
thing is:
I'm not sure I have a sense. I have - and I think if somebody thinks they have I
think that's pretty dangerous. I think if people think they know what to do, I think
that's dangerous because I think what you end up doing is always a perspective
and a judgment call. And I've had to - I've had to actually go up to students and
change my stance.
In order to illustrate this belief, Susan tells the story of a time when a student was
sent to her office for arguing with a teacher about the classification of a tsunami. She
admits that she acted "in an effort to show who was boss" and "lit into him in the office,
[saying] 'How dare you!' and 'Question the teacher!' and all that." At home later that
night, however, she realized the boy was right and that he was being observant, not
argumentative.
So I went up to the kid, I actually pulled him out of class and talked to him in the
hallway . .
.
Susan is reflective in her role and in her decision-making:
I mean I don't take much of this home with me but I'm always processing stuff,
sometimes subconsciously. And I'm never sure that what I'm doing is right. I
have a sense ofjustice, social justice, and I have a sense ofmy role being to make
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sure that kids who can't take care of themselves, for one reason - race, class,
gender - can't speak for themselves or can't defend themselves, that it's my job to
make sure that they have a fair shake. But I'm not sure I always do that, always,
on a case by case basis.
Unlike Sam, Susan was unconcerned about the staffs response. She trusted they
would, in time, come to understand her form of decision-making.
Subverting the self
At moments I felt that I was being false . .
.
-Paula
These last two stories are about two very different situations. They are unrelated
in content, but they illustrate the dilemma a principal feels when she is called on to betray
her personal feelings to fulfill a professional, public duty. The first story - Denise's -
tells about this principal's duty to reassure the school community that she supported a
superintendent's decision regarding reduction in staff, even though she felt strongly
against it. The second - Paula's - is the story of a school principal who had to
(disingenuously, she felt) speak publicly about a student who had recently died as if she
knew him well.
Denise
Denise, a recently retired principal, met me at her house on Cape Cod toward the
end of summer. Having been in education for over 30 years, her professional background
was varied and rich, beginning as a first grade teacher in an urban district close to Boston.
She spoke with enthusiasm about these early teaching years:
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... I loved it. Worked with great people. We were all still engaged in our
learning because we were going for our Masters and lots of people my age. And
women administrators. ... we adopted a reading and language program that was
not textbook based but teacher decision driven and just lots of exciting things
happening.
Denise eventually went into administration, becoming an Elementary Curriculum
Coordinator for the district. About this time a large university in the city began to study
Denise' s district in order to take over its management. Denise was impressed with the
superintendent:
She was the first woman superintendent I had worked for. She was also the first
superintendent that I ever worked for that I perceived worked harder than I did.
. . . She was only there for two years, but that's when I started thinking that I
wanted to be a principal.
Denise earned her certification for the principaiship and eventually left the urban
district where she began her career. She became principal of a K - 4 elementary school
in a very small but wealthy district north of Boston. She enjoyed a mentoring
relationship with the principal of the other elementary school in town.
He was wonderful - loved working with him - he was a great mentor for my first
year. Actually my second year too.




She was one of those people that thought teachers needed to be whipped into
shape ... we got along because we forced ourselves to get along but she wasn't
someone that I could really confide in or talk things over too much.
Although at this point Denise had worked with "a bunch of principals there and a
bunch of superintendents," she recalls one superintendent vividly:
The new superintendent they hired - he made some decisions - he eliminated the
reading and language arts - I'm trying to think of what they were called but it was
at the elementary level curriculum wide. We had one person that we worked with
for language arts and social studies and one person for science and math. . . . And
I didn't agree with that [the elimination of the position] and 1 just was constantly
put in between him and the teachers and the parents who didn't agree with it.
And then later on, I think it was even the next year, he started eliminating
guidance counselors, like at that time we had fiiU time guidance counselors. So I
started looking other places . . .
'^
Denise found a new principalship in another small tovm on the North Shore and
finished her career there, retiring two months before I met her. In contrast to the
enthusiasm she emitted when talking about her early teaching and administrative career,
her tone is distinctly weary:
Then I retired from there after seven years and actually was sort of glad to retire
because I really think my first year of being a principal was almost the first year
'' As Denise makes this rather startling announcement, I suddenly recall a conversation we had when I first
entered her house. One of her introductory statements was something like "When I didn't like what was
going on in my district I just left!" Her cheery tone of voice as she said this distracted me from the
significance of the statement. In 2007, after 25 years of Proposition 2 and 'A budget cuts, it seems unreal to
me that a town with two elementary schools would have two elementary level curriculum coordinators at
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of the ed reform when everything started changing. ... I don't know if I would
have wanted to stay there much longer.
When I ask Denise (somewhat densely, since she had just given me her story) to
tell me about a difficult situation encountered in her principalship, she goes back to the
Superintendent that caused her to leave:
I know my difficult times in [district] were sort of over the priorities that the
superintendent had as opposed to what we had at the elementary school.
Denise describes in detail the work that the Language Arts Coordinator had been doing:
I do think it was the hardest [accepting the elimation of the position], I think for a
lot of reasons. One, I don't think he understood what she did, the woman. And 1
saw that she could work with teachers that needed work. . . . But we all need to try
new things and learn new things and that was what this coordinator was so good
at is she knew teachers. She had a program where she would work with them in
their classrooms for periods of time and not spotty but she worked with somebody
for a week or maybe in a school for a week. She got grants - we were starting to
do student portfolios at the time so she was helping with that. And I don't know -
he didn't see it. And so, I guess I felt that she was support for me as well as the
teachers.
In addition to losing this valuable support, Denise was put in the awkward position of
dealing with the backlash over the coordinator's dismissal:
And besides the educational purposes there were other emotional things going on
too that I had to control and even avoid sometimes because she would be so
angry. . . . She would talk to me about it and other teachers too would want to talk
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to me about it because they cared, they wanted that position to remain. ... I thinlc
there were times when I really feh they [the teachers] wondered where I stood on
it or if I really - in my conversations they knew I stood for keeping the position.
But I think they wondered if when I went to Administrative Council, was I
supportive of it or - 1 think they questioned that.
In addition to the curriculum coordinators, this superintendent also reduced the
elementary level guidance counselors. Denise was equally dismayed to see them go.
... I just sort of thought - oh the finance committee told him he had to do this. . .
.
They were like social workers kinds of guidance counselors. I mean certainly in
the six years there they became more serious but then add another seven [in her
last district] and you know much more serious than they were 1 3 years ago. And
you know the next year he was cutting those back to half time, and he had been a
guidance counselor. And so I just always thought that he was some fluffy little
guidance counselor that didn't work very hard and he didn't think other people
did either. And by that time I had three terrific guidance counselors that I had
worked with.
In addition to dealing with her staff, Denise was also called upon to defend the action to
her parent community:
I can remember one meeting where I think the parents had actually called it or
maybe he agreed to have it. ... And you know the meeting was in my school and
a parent asked - he was explaining how this was going to be fine. And a parent
asked me. And so here I am in public being asked, you know, how I felt and I did
say I think there's the need for the full time guidance counselor . . . And but then I
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couched it in - but Dr. [superintendent] has to make hard choices or whatever and
we'll do - we'll work hard to meet the needs of the kids no matter what.
Denise characterizes these reductions in staff as "stripping away the elementary
program." The situation weighed heavily on her.
I know there were Administrative Council meetings where I'd practically just be
in tears. I kept Rolaids in the drawer ofmy desk - you know, that kind of stuff
I asked Denise if her dilemma was in terms of her responsibility to support the
administration and to support the system publicly and within her school while still being
true to her beliefs about the needs of the school.
Mmmhh. [nods] That was it. And you know - he's the boss. He's the one
they've hired as the Superintendent. He's not going to leave. Nothing I do is
going to make him leave. So that's when I started applying for other jobs.
I asked Denise if people knew she was leaving because she was dissatisfied with the
superintendent's decision-making. She replies, "And having to be in that middle
ground."
Paula
Paula is the principal of a school in a fairly affluent town west of Boston. She has
been principal of this school for eight years - the first one since it opened. Opening a
new school is an attractive prospect for a school principal, as it provides the rare
opportunity to staff it entirely with people of the principal's own choosing. It also
presents several challenges, one of which is that the staff has not worked together before.
Paula introduces herself in this way:
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school - it's a brand new school. It's a brand new configuration. So the teachers
that this school opened with had not worked together before. I'm just giving you
a look backwards, but this was my first principalship. And because it's been such
a wonderfijl and successful experience for me I have no intention of going
anywhere.
An art major in undergraduate school in the late 1960s, Paula decided to forgo her
plan to be an artist and go into teaching:
And it was the 60-70s social upheaval times and 1 felt like I really needed to do
something more, I don't know, relevant and public service oriented and so I went
back and got my Master's Degree one year after I graduated in Special Education
and Rehab. So I was a newly married woman living in Boston and going to
graduate school.
Paula went on to work as a special education teacher in two wealthy communities until
she was offered a new opportunity:
. . .to run a clinic that evaluated children for learning problems in a
multidisciplinary context within the Department of Pediatrics. So it was a rare
opportunity and I wasn't having that much fun in public education at the time - it
was 1 980 or 76 - can't remember, but it was when everybody was getting riffed
[laid off due to insufficient funds] and people were losing their jobs.




I learned so much in so many ways there - about child development, about
learning, but most of all I learned how to operate with the big boys. Which was
something in public education, at least at that time, you really didn't get. I did a
lot of research, I presented a lot, I consuhed to school systems all over the
country. And it just gave me an added layer of experience and I think then
confidence that I never would have had if I stayed in public education as a
teacher.
Paula divorced her first husband "in the midst of all those years of teaching" but
then remarried and had her son.
And that's the point at which I was still at UMass working. I decided that I
wanted to go back into the public schools and bring what I had learned about
children to the public schools.
She became an "inclusion specialist." In this district that meant traveling to five different
schools to provide guidance and training to staff in including student with disabilities in
regular education programs. This position piqued her interest in the role of the school
principal:
. . .it was an impossible job. It was just - 1 mean I knew a lot and I had a lot to
share, I just didn't have the hours of the day or physical ability to be where I
needed to be all of the time. And while I was there I really looked at what the
principal's role was in the school and how critical it was to making sure the
children with special needs were getting, you know, equal access. And also to
just lead a community of educators and a community of learners and so at that
point, two years into that job, I went to MESPA, Massachusetts Elementary
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School Principals Association, the principal's licensure program, and that was
fabulous.
It didn't take Paula long to obtain her first principalship:
And so I got out of that program and a year later got my first position here. It was
the first place I interviewed. They took a real chance in hiring me but it was the
right match. It was, and it's been great. I can't believe eight years have gone by
in many ways because it's been so much fun and it's been so rewarding
professionally. And I just love my faculty who work so hard at being a thriving
community and they are all on the same page together along with me on how to
keep it alive.
The position, however, has had it's downside for Paula personally. She is candid about
the impact her job has had on her personal life:
The personal life, however. And the only reason I'm mentioning it is that I think
a little bit ofmy job had something to do with it [her divorce]. Not completely,
but I think I loved what I was doing so much and I also think I was, for the first
time, so successful at something and really feeling good - how good it feels to be
successful at something, that I think it did have an impact on our relationship [her
second husband's]. My husband wasn't doing as well as I was doing,
unfortunately, professionally, so I think that was one of the factors. I also gained
25 pounds, haven't lost it, lost a little but not a lot. So that's where I am.
When I ask Paula to tell me about her ethical dilemma, she is equally candid
about how she feels she must respond:
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While there have been many difficuh decisions, the way I interpreted your request
for ethical dilemmas, because they seemed pretty clear to me about what the right
thing to do was - they didn't feel like ethical dilemmas. They might have been
ethical questions but I wasn't torn.
When I ask Paula to not feel bound by any definition, she first acknowledges what I have
learned concerns so many other principals:
I would have to say most ofmy difficult decisions have been around personnel.
I'm sure that's what you'll hear from most principals when you have an
underperforming teacher or a situation that one of your staff members or more
than one of your staff members are involved in and your needing to address it
because you feel that it's having an effect on the employees and the children and
the overall morale of the building.
Paula then relates a story that I never would have anticipated:
We had this year two children who died in a car accident just a few months ago,
couple months ago. One was a high schooler and one was a fourth grader in this
school. Figuring out the right way, the best way to deal with that for everyone
was a real, not so much - I guess part of it was ethical, but certainly a moral
dilemma of how to play it out for everybody.
"How to play it out for everybody" is an interesting choice of words to me. It suggests
that Paula assumed responsibility for somehow controlling this trauma, or working
purposefully to affect the way people would react to and process it. It turns out that is
what she does mean:
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With this age group, figuring out how to respond initially to the children, how
involved and deeply to go into it, how much public expression to have, how to
communicate to the parents, how to mobilize the school in acknowledging the
initial death and then the memory of the kids. And trying to figure out where 9
and 1 year olds are emotionally and matching that up with how much time and
attention to pay to it.
With this list of considerations, Paula reveals her primary focus on the children in
her school. However, she also felt responsibility for the parents in her school
community:
How to support the parents. I mean that was one piece that I hadn't really
anticipated so much was the parents really looked to me. The parents in the
classroom of the child looked to me for help and guidance about what to do. How
to talk to their kids. What to do in memory of the child.
Paula then turns to what I believe is at the heart of her story and the reason why it
comprised, for her, an ethical dilemma:
My first concern was to the family and respecting the family without knowing
them, (emphasis mine.) Here's a dilemma for a principal in general with a school
of 600 children. You don't know all of your kids and all of your parents and
unfortunately I didn't know this child. When I saw pictures of him I knew who
he was but I didn't know him by name and if I had dealings with him they were in
the context of a group. He had never been in my office for anything. And that
needing to respond appropriately without knowing him and knowing the family
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and making sure that we were respectful and attentive and appropriate in our
expressions.
Not knowing this child personally made the situation difficult emotionally for
Paula. Having spent much of her career as a special education teacher, getting to know
her students on a highly personal level, Paula was at a loss as to how to appropriately deal
with the emotions of this tragedy. She injects this personal difficulty several times into
her story:
So you know the first thing was how to tell the kids and how to tell the faculty.
We told the faculty first, obviously. I was called on the weekend. And you know
what, this is partly not knowing him, the police were so upset and so moved at the
time that they called me, they were at the scene of the accident. And I didn't have
the same emotional reaction because I didn't know the child.
Paula labels her feelings at the time:
And I wasn't there. And I felt guilty almost, that I didn't have ... the first thing
that happened to me is that my defenses went up so that I could handle the
situation and help everybody else. Which is often what I have to do. Things
don't get to me emofionally in this job so that I can function. ... So, intellectually
figure out what needs to happen even around emotion, which is interesting
because it's not the way I function in my personal life at all.
Paula found herself in the middle of this community's tragedy:
So telling the teachers, telling the kids, telling the parents, the letters, the
communication, and then very quickly moving on to who's going to the funeral,
who's going to the wake. Parents were looking for my guidance on should their
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children go to the wake? Should they go to the funeral? I had lots of
unanticipated interactions with the minister of the family's church, with the
minister of the hosting church, with the police department. . . . The classroom
teacher, who was 23 years old at the time, just out of her Master's program, she
was totally distraught and she needed a lot of support. ... So that was an
experience no new teacher expects to have.
She returns to her feelings of guilt for not having known the child:
So, and you - after the initial - and that's when I met the parents was at the wake.
These parents were just so unbelievable - so brave. And I felt badly and I still
feel badly that I didn't know them before because I love them now and I just felt
kind of- they came in to see me yesterday just to pick up some more things that
he had left behind and to look at the bench and the tree that we planted and we
started talking about ways - all they want to do is give back.
Paula wraps up her account of this ordeal:
So that's been a huge experience for me and sort of - to know the right way to -
not the right way but the best way, the most natural and appropriate way to
express your emotions to them and to honor his memory. We dedicated a page in
our memory book and we had a book collection for him at a school meeting
where each classroom donated a book in his memory and we had a little ceremony
and the parents came. So we have a little shelf in memory of him.
Still looking to understand her difficulty in decision making, I probed Paula for
details regarding what she chose to do about canceling programs, letting staff go to the
178

funeral, etc. She answers my questions, including one where I ask her to tell me about a
decision she was glad she made.
I'm glad that I listened to everybody that contacted me. ... I listened to their
advice ... It wasn't a time for me to be making authoritative decisions as much as
just [just!] leading and organizing and giving people permission to do what they
needed to do...
Still, I hadn't understood where the ethical difficulty lay until Paula patiently explained it
to me again:
No regret in decisions that we made about it. None. What my regret was, and it's
a continuing regret as I mentioned already, is not having known him and wanting
to make a bigger effort to get to know all of the kids in the school earlier on.
She adds:
It's given me a new perspective on what's important although I always knew that
it was important to know as many kids as you can but everything gets in the way
of it as you know. Especially when you have 600 kids.
Paula is disappointed in her performance in this aspect of the role, and especially
when she thinks back to the child who died:
But I think other principals do a better job of it than I do. I have this sort of
friendly veneer with all the kids and they all know me and I'm out there a lot but
I'm really bad at names and so I just feel badly that I hadn't been in his classroom
more.
And now we get to the essence of Paula's dilemma and one important cause of her guilt:
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At moments I felt that I was being false because I didn't know him and I was
planning and saying things about him based on what other people told me when I
had to get up and - because everyone wanted me to be the one to say things. And
I did. But I didn't know him, so I didn't want to appear like I did but I wanted to
represent what other people had to say about him.
Paula was torn between her need to be authentic and honest and her need to
express all that was good about this child, whom she did not know. Early in our
conversation she had told me about her age, her weight gain, her divorces - this is a
woman given to easy disclosure. During this difficult time she had to grapple with the
fact that she didn't know this child in her school and yet present to the community as if
she did. To "come clean" and announce to the community - especially the child's
parents - that she didn't know him would have been inappropriate and not at all helpful
to the people who were looking to her to honor this child's life and memory. Other
principals who were not so prone to candor might not have considered this a dilemma. It
certainly is difficult to get to know 600 children personally, especially given the demands
of the principal's job. Other principals may have more easily forgiven themselves for
this lack of connection to this one particular child and then moved on - with feelings of
sadness, no doubt, but not the level of guih experienced by Paula.
180

CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Introduction
For these principals, conflicts of duties - whether professional or personal -
emerged as ethical dilemmas. Consistent with Harding's (1985) theory of how ethical
dilemmas emerge in consciousness, there was a motivation to achieve something and an
obstacle within the situation. That obstacle was often the principal's sensitivity to his or
her own personal moral code. A paradox was formed when two or more personal or
professional values came into conflict.
Turmoil stemmed from what these principals experienced as a conflict of duties.
All professions contain a set of duties to be implemented throughout the day, year, and
lifetime of the career. The job of the principal is no different in this regard, although the
list of duties to be performed, and roles to be enacted, is long and wide. The Principles of
Effective Administration contain within them a set of duties - of things to be done - in
order to meet the expectations of the school and professional community. What these
principals considered their "duty" reflected their professional and personal ethical codes.
School principals feel a sense of duty to themselves as people, too, to be consistent with
what they value in their own virtuous qualities.
Consistent with the conclusions of prior studies (Grogan and Smith, 1998; Kirby,
Paradise and Protti, 1989), I, too, found that the most vexing ethical dilemmas reported
by these principals involved imposing sanctions for staff (primarily) and students
(secondarily). In three cases - those of Phyllis, Linda, and Alice - the issue was
dismissal for underperformance. In two cases - those of John and Debra - the issue was
communicating dissatisfaction with teacher performance, either verbally (John) or
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through the formal evaluation process (the case with Debra). In Judy's case, taking no
action would have likely resulted in punitive sanctions for her custodian. In two cases -
Sam's and Susan's - the issue was student discipline, specifically the determination of
appropriate consequences for misbehavior. Two cases - Denise's and Paula's - were
unique in that they didn't fall into this category, but were certainly illustrative ofhow
inner conflict arises when one is duty-bound to present a stance that runs counter to one's
authentic self For the purposes of analysis, I present these dilemmas as occurring within
one or more of the following paradoxes: Justice versus mercy, '"* conflict within the ethic
of the profession (as described by Shapiro & Stefkovich, 2001), and personal code versus
professional code.
The "Justice Vs.Mercy" Paradox: "Being the Bad Guy"
The ethic ofjustice has its foundation in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the
preeminent deontologist. Deontology, an ethical belief system which privileges the
"right" over the "good" (Rawls, 1999, p. 28), emphasizes rules and processes over
outcomes.
The ethic ofjustice honors impartiality and objectivism (Rawls, 1999). School
principals contemplating a teacher dismissal, in order to be "just," must act impartially
and objectively. This ethical responsibility is contractually encoded in the terms of "due
process." Due process is a set of steps principals must follow to ensure equitable and
ethical treatment while judging teacher performance, especially if the judgments are
negative. As these principals have learned, however, dismissing a teacher is not as
''' The paradigm was coined by Kidder (1995). It might also be conceived of as the ethic ofjustice versus
the ethic of care.
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simple as following a series of steps. The process is fraught with knotty ethical issues -
particularly when one is more apt to ground decisions from an ethic of care, as is the case
with many female principals (Beck, 1994, Noddings, 1992).
The principal's critical role as instructional leader has been emphasized in the
literature primarily since the advent of late twentieth century education reform (Beck &
Murphy, 1993, Leithwood, Jantzi, & Steinbach, 1999, Hallinger & Murphy, 1985). A
key responsibility of this role is to ensure effective and caring teacher performance.
Typically, this occurs through careful hiring practices, coaching, mentoring, and the
provision of professional development programs. When a principal discovers that a
teacher is not performing effectively or with care, it is his or her duty to remedy that
situation. Teachers' unions are quite concerned, naturally, about the way a principal may
go about remedying this situation, and so teacher evaluation processes are negotiated
carefully and in detail. While details may differ from district to district, central to a
teacher's rights is the principle of due process. This aspect of "justice" demands that
steps are taken to ensure that a decision affecting a teacher is not made capriciously or
hastily. In his book The Marginal Teacher: A Step-by-Step Guide to Fair Proceduresfor
Identification and Dismissal, Lawrence (2005) lists over 50 pieces of documentation a
principal should compile in order to safeguard due process rights while working toward
dismissal. Going through the process of documenting - and discussing openly - every
mistake, every complaint, and every disappointing observation is painful and not at all
consistent with the actions of a supportive, caring person. The work of Gilligan (1982)
and Noddings (1992) supports the conclusion that female administrators tend to operate
from an ethic of care - that is, a stance which asserts concern and responsibility for
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others. In these three cases of teacher dismissal, however, it was concern and
responsibihty for the children in their school that motivated the principals to follow
through with dismissal procedures.
Due process is about respecting an individual's right to equal treatment - giving
people what they deserve and distributing benefits and burdens on the basis offair
cnYma (Nash, 2002, p. 138).
Generally, issues of due process concern the nature of fair procedures for making
decisions. The question is: What counts as fairness in making decisions about
matters that affect others' lives? Questions of due process are not usually directly
concerned with the fairness of the decision itself, but with the fairness of the
process used to reach it. (Strike, Haller & Soltis, 1998, p. 76)
When Phyllis asked herself, "Is that enough to warrant dismissal?" her question
reflected Aristotle's discussion ofjustice and the right to equal treatment. If she was
going to take away this teacher's position in the school - with the monetary, professional,
and personal consequences a dismissal entails - she wanted the scales to balance out.
The teacher must have shown such recalcitrance that it made it equal - the dismissal was
warranted. The only way to ensure she was giving fair treatment was to use fair criteria
for what had been taken away from the school community because of performance and
for what she was contemplating taking away from the individual. There had to be fair
criteria, and the punishment (which was significant) must have been warranted
proportionately.
That which is just, then, in this sense is that which is proportionate; but that
which is unjust is that which is disproportionate. In the latter case one quantity
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becomes more or too much, the other less or too Httle. And this we see in
practice; for he who wrongs another gets too much, and he who is wronged gets
too Httle of the good in question:... (Aristotle, p. 104)
Strike, Haller and Soltis (1998) refer to this principle as "the principle of equal
treatment." That is, "In any given circumstances, people who are the same in those
respects relevant to how they are treated in those circumstances should receive the same
treatment (p. 54). Driven by this principle, Phyllis was afraid to act without assurance
that she was, in fact, using evaluation criteria and a process for dismissal that treated
people equally. She wanted to let the teacher go for reasons that any principal would, but
she had to be non-judgmental, which for her meant bracketing against unfair and
irrelevant criteria (such as personal values) in the decision-making equation. Phyllis'
personal ethic told her she should be non-judgmental and caring. Her professional code
told her she must use judgment to let a teacher go.
For Strike, Haller and Soltis (1998) the foremost consideration is that "equal
regard be given to all sides in a case and that all appropriate evidence be brought to bear"
(p. 76). Although Phyllis did not use the term in her testimony, she was disturbed by
thoughts regarding how she handled the process of dismissal, not the dismissal itself
She questioned her own ability to identify appropriate evidence (lying on an attendance
sheet) vs. that which was inappropriate (her own personal feelings toward the teacher.)
Strike, Haller and Soltis (1998) discuss the idea of notice within due process: "If
people are to be judged according to the quality of their performances, it is reasonable to




Did Phyllis offer enough notice that the teacher was in trouble? Had she given
her notice regarding performance expectations? She told me that she met with her "a
couple of times" after school and that in the end the teacher was not surprised, although
she was disappointed. However, Phyllis was disturbed by what she believed was a lack
of clarity provided to the teacher regarding performance expectations and, most certainly,
a clearly defined process for dismissal. The Reading Specialist role in elementary
schools has undergone a transformation recently from one of primarily direct service
provider to children (using a "pullouf model) to one of instructional leader and coach for
teachers, (cite reference regarding reading specialist role) Is it possible the reading
teacher began the role thinking she would be serving children primarily and Phyllis
thought she would lead the teachers in their own practice? Phyllis' testimony suggests
this may have been the case.
The aspect of due process involving notice is also relevant to both Debra's and
Alice's stories. Teachers they had seen as underperforming had been given reason to
believe by other administrators that their job performance was fine. This made Alice
"furious" and Debra quesUon her own judgment. In both cases, these principals had to be
the first to put the teachers on "nofice" that their performance needed to improve.
Strike, Haller and Sohis (1998) list another component of due process as the
"requirement that standards must be consistently applied" (p. 77). Phyllis was frustrated
by the lack of an objective standard for teacher performance that would have, she
believed, helped her to apply her judgment consistently. This former mathematics and
technology major was not comfortable relying on her memory and intuifion.
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The third component of due process described by Strike, Haller and Soltis (1998)
is that the decision is made "on the basis of reasonable evidence" (p. 77). By the end of
the year, Phyllis believed she had adequate evidence that keeping the teacher was not in
the best interests of the school, evidence that her mentor helped her to sort out and weigh.
However, gathering this evidence went against Phyllis' personal code of wanting to be
the kind of principal who gives everybody "a shot."
Linda's decision-making surrounding teacher dismissal was a little different from
Phyllis'. After a three year process, this teacher had surely been given enough notice and
many attempts to help her improve. However, Linda believed the teacher she set out to
dismiss was a nice person, "a good human being", who was down on her luck and had
serious problems at home. Spending two or three years documenting this woman's
underperformance went against her own notion of herself as the kind of person who
looked for the "best in people." She had great difficulty reconciling her self-identity as a
supportive person while actively looking for this teacher to make mistakes. Yet, in order
to be "just" she needed strong evidence in favor of a dismissal. Strike, Haller and SoUis
(1998) might locate this dilemma within the paradox of two different principles. That is,
the principle of benefit maximization, a consequentialist principle concerned with an
outcome beneficial to most parties, versus the principle of respect for persons, a
nonconsequentialist stance concerned only with the treatment of the individual (pp. 79-
80). In Linda's case, the two principles do not conflict absolutely: Linda was able to
treat the individual with respect by adhering to the principle of due process, but in the end




Susan's story about student discipline is somewhat unique in that she encountered
a "justice versus mercy" dilemma and, in the end, opted for mercy, lessening
consequences for boys who had played a mean practical joke on a classmate. "Furious"
and ready to hand down a tough punishment, she listened to both sides and changed her
mind after receiving a fuller picture of the incident. Knowing that her decision would be
unpopular with her staff, (teachers were clamoring for a suspension), she nevertheless
prioritized strengthening the relationship between the boys over promoting herself as
being a "tough" principal. Susan's decision making was reflective of Nodding's
assertion that when operating from an ethic of care, a person is careful to understand the
perspective of others (1984, p. 24). For Susan, the best outcome was the strengthening the
friendship between the boys, although it was costly to her as a new principal. Susan also
articulated her belief in situational decision-making, going so far as to say that it was
"dangerous" for someone to think they were sure of their own decisions, and that even
with written guidelines she remains going "back and forth." Susan's stance was
reflective of a situationalist, morally relative ethical position. The moral authority in this
case was her own conscience. Frankena (1973, pp 24-25) would say that Susan acted
from a position of act-deontologism, which he defines as "the claim that each situation is
different and even unique, so that no general rules can possibly be of much help in
dealing with it, except as mere rules of thumb." Joseph Fletcher (1966) used the term
"situation ethics" to describe an act-deontology that held the primacy of love as the final
arbiter of ethical decision-making, and the "rightness" of any decision as being wholly




Sam's story involving student discipline also placed the dilemma within the
"justice versus mercy" paradigm, but he opted for what he believed was "just" and
"consistent" with his other decisions over giving special consideration for a girl he
believed was less guilty than the other students. His stance was utilitarian, in that he did
what he thought would be in the best interest of the largest number of affected people,
namely, his school community. Sam believed the community needed to see swift and
equal punishment in order to feel safe in his school. In the utilitarian view, moral
authority is neither derived from motive nor adherence to principle. Moral authority is
derived from a calculated course of action which maximizes intrinsic value for the
greatest number (Bentham, 1789). Consistent with the principle of moral objectivism,
John Stuart Mill stressed the importance of impartiality in this calculation or decision-
making:
Utilitarianism is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As
between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as
strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. (Mill, cited in
Kidder, 1995, p. 156)
Sam considered it his duty to be impartial and disinterested where the students were
concerned, even though he did care about them. His belief in moral objectivism is seen
in his testimony:
I know I did the right thing. How do I describe it? I sent those kids away. That's
not what I wanted to do, that's not. You can't have personal - personal feelings
can't get involved in a decision like that with four kids. It's just - how can you?
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Judy's story, falling within the "justice versus mercy" paradigm as well, left her
with the option of inaction. She would do her duty to investigate an accusation of
misconduct by her custodian, who had behaved badly toward her and whom she would
have liked to see dismissed, but she did carry some influence over whether or not he
would stand trial in a civil suit. She opted for exerting influence over the parent and
saved the custodian from a trial. This was a merciful act, but it is interesting to note that
she didn't make her choice to help the custodian, but rather to protect her school from the
negative publicity such a trial would engender.
The Ethic of the Profession
"A moral belief collid[ing] with institutional reality." (Lashway, 1996, p.
107)
"What would the profession expect?" (Shapiro & Stefkovich, 2001)
Alice's case provides an example of conflicting duties within the ethic of the
profession. Unlike the other principals working toward dismissal, she did not have the
support or agreement of her administrative team. Neither the teacher's primary
supervisor, the Special Education Director, nor the K - 5 Curriculum Director, Alice's
superior, supported the dismissal. A school principal must maintain high standards of
teaching, but she also has a professional duty to be loyal to the district administrative
team. This made it difficult for Alice to proceed and is what makes her "furious" to this
day. When a new special education administrator came to the district and did support her
in the dismissal, she was able to accomplish what she had set out to do on her own.
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Unlike the other principals who faced the "justice versus mercy" dilemma, Alice was
clear in her own mind about what needed to be done, but she found it "infuriating" that
she didn't have the support of her administrative team. In his book "Real World" Ethics:
Frameworksfor Educators and Human Service Professionals, Robert Nash (2002)
discusses how the "workplace shapes the practice of professionals through the values,
skills, rewards, and folkways it transmits. . . ." (p. 89). Alice railed against a workplace
where administrators were unconcerned about the underperformance of a special
education teacher.
John's dilemma didn't involve teacher dismissal, but he did agonize over having a
"disciplinary meeting" with a teacher who was, in his estimation, "bad for kids." His
conflict of duties also fell within the ethic of the profession. On one hand, avoiding a
disciplinary meeting with this teacher would be tantamount to tacit approval of her
harmful interactions with children. He had a duty to uphold a standard of caring student-
teacher interactions. On the other, he knew that having the meeting would result in a
fractious, divided and distracted faculty, as well as political backlash for him. One
important duty of a school principal is to keep the comfort level and morale of the faculty
up so that they can concentrate on their teaching, and he knew word would spread about
his reprimand and would distract the faculty. He also faced the very real threat of
political fallout. Members of the faculty who were loyal to the teacher may have
impugned his reputation in the community. John had fallen victim to this phenomenon in
his prior district. John did have the meeting with the teacher. It went as badly as
predicted, with the teacher storming out and rallying her friends in the building. She did
not improve in her interactions with students, and John's relationships with many of his
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teachers were compromised. In the end, however, he beUeved did his professional duty
on behalf of his students.
John's decision making was representative of a Kantian deontological belief
system. The fact that John was disinclined to confront this teacher, knowing in advance
that it would probably result in greater hardship for him, would, in Kant's view, make it a
more "moral" act. With nothing to gain, but unable to keep silent, John upheld his
standard of teacher-student interactions. This teacher might not have agreed, but John
acted according to Kant's criterion of "good will," wherein the moral measure of an
action is best taken in proportion to service to "duty":
. . .an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it
but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon, and therefore does
not depend upon the realization of the object of the action but merely upon the
principle ofvolition in accordance with which the action is done without regard
for any object of the faculty of desire... . (Kant 4:400, p. 13)
In Kant's view, an action is not moral if it is taken out of personal inclination, or
with consideration for outcome. In fact, the more one is disinclined to an action, the
more "moral" the action Kant deemed it to be.
Debra's dilemma was similar to John's, but her decision-making was quite
different. A new principal, she grappled with teacher evaluations for two teachers who
were underperforming. If she was going to be truthful in her evaluations, which meant
assigning "not performing to expectations" and putting two teachers on "improvement
plans" she ran the risk of being perceived as a "trouble-maker", one who "stirred things
up", by her own staff as well as the other principals in the district. She used the words
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"chicken out" frequently to describe her failure to be truthful on the evaluations. This is
consistent with the feeling a person who is primarily deontological in thinking gets when
she feels she has betrayed her own moral code. After talking with other principals, her
superintendent, and reading the evaluations written by her predecessor, Debra believed it
was the administrative norm in the district at that time to write mild evaluations for
underperforming teachers. Her decision to withhold criticism was borne of a more
utilitarian, pragmatic need to learn more about the workplace norms and develop her ovra
competence in evaluating teaching so that when the time came she could put the teachers
on improvement plans from a position of strength: "And that's when I felt, I guess I had
the support as well as additional training that yes, I was doing the right thing. This was
the right thing to do."
Personal Versus Professional Code: Subverting the Self
The professional paradigm is based on the integration of personal and
professional codes. However, frequently an individual's personal and
professional codes collide. This makes h difficult for an educational leader to
make appropriate decisions. (Shapiro & Stefkovich, 2001, pp. 55-56)
Denise and Paula's stories bear little resemblance to one another except in one
important way: They both illustrate the dilemma principals face when their role requires
them to be less than honest with their school community about their beliefs. Paula was
disturbed by feelings of guih and fraudulence when she was required to speak publicly
about a child in her school who had died as if she knew him well, when she didn't.
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Denise was required to publicly support her superintendent's choice of staff cuts, even
though she thought they were terrible mistakes. Both of these women were forced to
subvert their authentic selves in favor of doing what was expected according to school
community standards and role expectations.
The attribute of authenticity has recently come into use in the educational
leadership literature (Sergiovanni, 1992, Evans, 1996, Fullan, 2003, Starratt, 2004). In
his book, Ethical Leadership, Starratt (2004) eloquently describes this important virtue:
There is a tacit moral imperative to be true to oneself. To not be true to oneself
would be to miss the whole point of one's life. Since I am a unique being who
will exist only once in the whole history of the universe, my originality is
something that only I can discover, author, perform, define, and actualize. Only I
can realize a potentiality that is solely my own. If I refuse this most basic human
privilege and opportunity, then I violate my destiny and myself (p. 66).
Denise 's and Paula's story illustrates what happens to people when their
profession's role expectations cause them to betray their own belief system. Denise's
story is perhaps the more pronounced in this regard, ending with her actually leaving the
school. Denise had thrived in her career. She found meaning and purpose in teaching,
admired her first female superintendent for her work ethic and integrity, and enjoyed
being the principal of a school where curriculum and instruction, teachers and children
were well supported by central office. When her new superintendent cut critical staff
from the budget, Denise was angry and frustrated, but was forced to support the
superintendent's decisions publicly - to her parent community, her teachers, and even to
the people who were being let go. The need to keep m.edicine in her desk for an upset
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stomach revealed the amount of pain this situation caused her. C. Michael Thomson,
(2002) author of The Congruent Life: Following the Inward Path to Fulfilling Work and
Inspired Leadership refers to this as a "spiritual" pain, or "the pain of being separated
from my authentic self, of having to live someone else's life in order to go along and get
along that well trod sequential career path" (p. xiii). Finding no way to resolve the
dilemma, Denise simply removed herself, taking the first new principalship she could
find.
Paula's pain came from her feelings of fraudulence when she helped her school
community deal with the tragic death of a student. She confessed many times her
feelings of guilt over having not known this particular student personally. To speak
publicly about his life implied she knew him on a level deeper than was true. However,
her school community, in particular the grieving parents, needed her to do just that. In
their book Primal Leadership: The Power ofEmotional Intelligence, Goleman, Boyatzis,
and McKee (2002) contend that a key component of leadership with integrity is
transparency. This attribute, which they say is tantamount to trustworthiness, is "an
authentic opermess to others about one's feelings, beliefs, and actions. . ." (p. 47). In my
short time with Paula, I had learned much about her personal life that she freely offered.
She was forced during this time of dilemma to subvert her feelings of guilt over not
knowing the child - over not knowing many of the 600 children in her school - to help
the community process the loss.
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In the Public Eye
The only thing we have in this job is our reputation. (John)
One influence in their decision making that nearly all these principals reported
was the impact their decisions would have on their school community, especially the
staff. In some cases, they acted in the way they did because of the public pressure - in
others, in spite of it. Whether their natural inclination was toward subjectivist situational
decision making, as with Susan, or utilitarian, as with Sam, or objectivist, as with Phyllis,
or deontological, as with John, these principals thought in advance about how their
decisions would be interpreted by others in the building, and how that communal
interpretation would affect their perceived leadership. Phyllis believed the outcome was
positive in terms of her perceived leadership: "Any teacher that I have let go, I think it
built more confidence in my staff because if I'm seeing it, they're seeing it. ... [It] Set up
the standard right away that said I expect from everyone." Debra was negatively
influenced by her fear that she would be perceived as the "new one" who would "stir up
trouble," so much so that she was not truthful on a teacher evaluation. John had been
forced to leave his last position, in part because his faculty turned against him, and now
his conscience was telling him it could happen again:
You know, so my dilemma was do I err on the side of children and confront the
teacher, or do I err on the side of the political nature of things and not do anything
at all, knowing that people are watching me in the building. Knowing that




It was no longer between me and her, it was between her - it was two factions of
the staff and everybody watching me to see what I was going to do about it. ...
You know as well as I do that sometimes it isn't so much what happens - it's the
word of mouth about what happens. The only thing we have in this job is our
reputation.
Judy proactively saved her disgruntled custodian from a civil suit in order to keep
a situation out of the public eye. "I think it was because I saw the incident as a reflection
ofmy school and my leadership and did not want this to become public." Sam was
heavily influenced by his need to appear consistent to his school community:
. . .as an administrator if you're not consistent in anything you do, you can't build
that trust. And people will say "Oh, he'll back or do for one group but he won't
do for another." . . . But I've got to save face for myself, with the kids. . . . Gossip
spreads that kind of stuff. Oh lookit, lookit, she got away with it.
Denise feared her integrity in leadership was questioned by her staff as she was forced to
publicly support staffing cuts:
I think there were times when I really felt they [the teachers] wondered where I
stood on it or if I really - in my conversations they knew I stood for keeping the
position. But I think they wondered if when I went to Administrative Council,
was I supportive of it or - I think they questioned that.
Paula felt intense pressure from her school community to present herself as a




At moments I felt that I was being false because I didn't know him and I was
planning and saying things about him based on what other people told me when I
had to get up and - because everyone wanted me to be the one to say things.
Of all the principals, Susan was least influenced by the impact her decision would
have on the staff
So of course I got pushed back from the teachers. "You didn't suspend him" and
you know, I explained as much as I could the whole story and I was like it isn 't
what it seemed - it isn 't what it seemed. . . . And I knew it wouldn't be popular
with the teachers because already they're adjusting to my style which is very
different from the other [former] principal. ... the obvious consequence that
people outside looking in would look at is they needed to be suspended. And I
just didn't see that.
It is notable that Susan had been a principal for a mere three months when she
spoke with me about this event. It would be interesting to see if she changes at all in her
resiliency to public scrutiny after a few years in the role.
In the Aftermath: Shaping Leadership
Upon reflection, many of these principals were able to speak positively about
their experiences, believing that their struggles resulted in refined leadership skills.
Several principals (Phyllis, Debra, Alice) said they were more confident in their own
judgment, better able to make good hiring decisions and better able to offer pointed
feedback in the evaluation process. Susan and Debra said they learned to be patient as a




slowly in terms of making a decision." (Susan) Debra, John, and Judy learned to ask for
help from trusted colleagues.
I took things too literally at that time about legal confidentiality and did not turn
to anyone else for help. If that happened today, I would call friends who were
principals and get advice. (Judy)
Support from Above: The Critical Role of the Superintendent
Finally, the experiences of these principals underscore the need for support from
the superintendent and other central office personnel when difficult decisions must be
made. Debra and Alice were not able to follow through with their respective duties until
new central office persormel came in, providing training and back up. Phyllis openly
credits her Assistant Superintendent with providing the necessary mentorship to help her
sort out her own thoughts and self-doubts. Denise's school lost her as its principal
because the Superintendent refused to consider her need for curriculum and guidance
support staff Linda withstood the painful process of documenting underperformance for
three years, a period of "frustration" and "depression" that surely she would not have
been able to sustain without support from her Superintendent. To this day Linda believes
so strongly in the need for Superintendent support for principals that she now instructs
them with this "hidden agenda." Both John and Debra were reluctant to even approach
their Superintendents with their dilemmas - Debra because she had been told to "handle
it at the building level" and John because he believed the Superintendent had "other
issues to worry about."
Finally, and perhaps the most notable finding, was that all of these principals
believed that they had "done the right thing" and that their decision-making had resulted
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in the best outcome for themselves and their school communities. Or did they? That
these events were troublesome for the co-researchers is supported in the language of their
testimony. But what truth claims can be made about how they really felt about their
decision making in the aftermath? Should their testimony be taken at face value? What
can be said about the fact that they all related satisfaction with the outcome, with the
possible exception of Paula, who indicated ongoing feelings of guilt? It is perhaps
impossible to know with any certainty whether these principals honestly believe they
acted in the most ethical manner, or if they were simply unwilling to admit error or
g doubts.'^
In their analysis of the metaphors used to describe school principals in the 1920s,
Beck and Murphy found that the dominant metaphorical theme in the literature likened
the principal to a "spiritual" leader of the community (1993, p. 14). Elwood Cubberly,
one of the first authors of a textbook on school administration, referred to the principal as
the "priest in the parish" (Cubberly, 1923, p. 26, cited in Beck & Murphy, 15). Nearly a
century later, it seems this mantle is a difficult thing to shrug off. In many cases, these
selected principals reported reluctance to share their struggles with anyone, certainly their
superintendents, who should have been in a position to help them. They certainly did not
share any doubts with me, regardless ofmy promises of confidentiality. Whether self-
imposed or due to external perceptions of the role, the notion of the school principal as a
"paragon of virtue" seems to be a phenomenon that stubbornly refuses to go away.
'^ My few attempts to probe for decision-making that resulted in feelings of dissatisfaction were met with
such resistance that I soon abandoned any hope of obtaining that level of disclosure.
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Significance of the Study
One of the central goals of American education reform at the turn of the twenty-
first century has been to equalize learning opportunities and outcomes for all groups of
children, including and especially those groups previously marginalized. With federal
education reform mandates of the early twenty-first century, the work of schools is
evaluated on evidence of achievement - not simply evidence of good processes and
intentions as it was in the past. The role of the school principal, in particular, has
received increasing scrutiny for being instrumental in improving learning outcomes
(Hallinger & Murphy, 1989).
Throughout the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first, the
theme of role conflict in the school principalship pervades every significant educational
reform effort. At its source seems to be - on one hand - an ongoing public desire for
school principals to attend to the needs of their community, as heard through the voices
of superintendents and governing school boards, and - on the other hand - a more
personal desire for principals to attend to their own professional organizations and
university programs, who appeal to the principal's nobler motivations to effect social
change through their school leadership. In a way, the organizations and universities have
used the schools to change often oppressive systems, and the communities have used the
schools to sustain often oppressive systems, and the school principal has traditionally
been caught in the middle (deChiara, 2002).
Now, however, with the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, there is
a new contender vying for the attentions of the school principal - the federal government
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- and this new contender is a formidable one. The message from the federal government
to public school leaders is unambiguous - raise test scores or suffer sanctions. Four years
into the implementation ofNCLB, the work of the elementary school principal takes
place in a context of soaring expectations, public scrutiny, competing values, diminishing
resources, and unprecedented accountability demands for student achievement.
Although the mandates ofNCLB are clear, their means of accomplishment are
not. Schools are complex places characterized by competing interests, and the problems
of schooling are not easily solved. The school principal is responsible for making
decisions and taking actions that will lead to improved student achievement, without
compromising the individual and collective rights of the students, staff, and families that
make up the school community. Because the stakes have never been higher, the time for






1 am a doctoral candidate at Lesley University studying educational leadership.
Specifically, I am researching selected elementary school principals' experiences with
decision-making when faced with a "tough decision" or ethical dilemma. I presume that
most school principals have some experience in this area! The purpose of this letter is to
ask you to consider participating in this research as a subject of interview.
The research model I am using is a qualitative one through which I am seeking
comprehensive descriptions of principals' experience. Your participation would mean
being interviewed by me for approximately one hour, with your experience audio-taped,
transcribed, and analyzed along with the stories of 8 - 12 other school principals.
Through your participation and that of others, I hope to understand how
elementary school principals experience making a difficuh decision - one that perhaps
draws on conflicting ethical principles or moral values. I am seeking vivid, accurate, and
comprehensive portrayals of what this experience was like for you: your thoughts,
feelings, and decisions, as well as the situation, event, and people cormected with your
experience. Your identity, including that of your school and district, will be kept strictly
confidential. You may discontinue participation at any time.
As an elementary school principal myself (Dean S. Luce School, Canton,
Massachusetts), I understand how difficult it is to take time out of a busy day to
participate in a research project. However, the results ofmy study will, I hope, help
current and aspiring principals to understand the nature of the job a little better, and,
perhaps shed some light on the difficulties faced by school principals for people outside
the role.
1 will follow up this letter with a phone call after a few days have passed to see if
you are interested in meeting with me or if you have any questions or concerns you
would like to have addressed. I have mailed these letters out randomly, but have only
included towns where I have no professional or personal connections. If you do agree to
participate, please review the attached "Participant Release Agreement" which details
conditions of participation. Thank you very much for your consideration of this request.
Yours truly,





I agree to participate in a research study of "Decision-making of selected elementary
school principals in an ethical dilemma." I understand the purpose and nature of this
study and I am participating voluntarily. I give permission for the data to be used in the
process of completing a Ph.D. degree, including a dissertation and any future publication.
I understand that a brief synopsis of each participant, including myself, will be used and
may include the following information: family status, number of years in current role,
prior relevant work experience, gender, race, ethnicity or religion, unless I specifically
ask that the information be omitted. I understand I may discontinue my participation at
any time. I agree to meet at my school for an initial interview of one hour. If necessary,
I will be available at a mutually agreed upon time and place for an additional one hour
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